Série C N° 15

UNIVERSITÉ DE STRASBOURG

# The Object of Christian Worship

## A study of the notion of objectivity in relation to religious experience

THÈSE

présentée à la Faculté de Théologie Protestante
et soutenue publiquement le 11 juillet 1938
pour obtenir le titre de

DOCTEUR DE L'UNIVERSITÉ DE STRASBOURG
(mention Théologie Protestante)

par

M. R. F. ALDWINCKLE

On sale :
6a, MEADOW CLOSE, CLACTON-ON-SEA
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*La Faculté n'entend ni approuver*
*ni désapprouver les opinions*
*du candidat.*

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Assesseurs : M. F. MÉNÉGOZ ,,

M. HÉRING ,,

*To*

*MY MOTHER AND FATHER*

*in grateful recognition of many sacrifices*

*willingly made.*

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# L'OBJET DE LA FOI CHRÉTIENNE

*Etude sur la notion de l'objectivité de Dieu par rapport à l'expérience religieuse*

## CHAPITRE PREMIER.

### *Critique de l'Objet de la foi chrétienne*

Nous essayerons, dans ce chapitre, de caractériser ce que devient dans le « climat » intellectuel et spirituel d'aujourd'hui la foi chrétienne en un Dieu personnel, agissant dans la vie individuelle des hommes et dans les mouvements de leur histoire. Cette foi se heurte, d'une part, à des tendances plus ou moins hostiles, notamment à celles de la psychologie, de la sociologie et de l'étude comparative des religions; d'autre part, la méthode des sciences dites exactes paraît, à présent, n'avoir plus qu'une portée limitée, et l'on constate, en conséquence, une assez forte réaction contre l'ancienne tentative d'emprisonner les richesses de « l'expérience immédiate » dans le cadre étroit des abstractions scientifiques. Les critiques psychologistes de la réalité de l'objet religieux appellent, à titre de réplique, une métaphysique permettant de définir cet objet comme la donnée spécifique qu'appréhendera l'expérience religieuse. L'effort de Karl Barth, visant à éliminer de la dogmatique toute métaphysique d'ordre philosophique, ne présente pas une solution satisfaisante. La foi suppose trois éléments :

1) L'expérience religieuse chrétienne implique une croyance en la personnalité de Dieu. Sans cette croyance, elle perd sa raison d'être.

2) Une métaphysique est nécessaire, comme cadre intellectuel, pour assurer à la pensée et à la vie religieuse la fermeté qui leur est indispensable.

3) L'expérience religieuse s'affirme comme une donnée dont il importe de saisir la spécificité.

## CHAPITRE 2

D'un côté, le point de vue de Descartes paraît trop étroit, et les résultats de sa méthode du doute, sujets à caution. D'un autre côté, Whitehead dénonce judicieusement le caractère abstrait et trop rigoureusement « orthodoxe » de la métaphysique dite scientifique. Nous préférerons commencer par la description scientifique de l'évolution du monde pour, après un aperçu historique concernant l'apparition de l'esprit, essayer de tirer quelques conclusions de cette histoire : au cours de l'évolution cosmique, la religion apparaîtra comme une des activités caractéristiques de l'homme individuel, et cette activité se manifeste sous les formes divergentes, précisément, de « l'expérience religieuse ». Il existe en somme deux attitudes religieuses fondamentales et opposées : l'une considère l'essence de l'univers comme impersonnelle, l'autre comme personnelle. Pour examiner ces diverses données religieuses, il faut les chercher là où elles se trouvent, c'est-à-dire, dans le croyant qui vit sa foi. La Bible, plus particulièrement, montre ce qu'est la religion vécue, quand il y a compréhension croissante, par l'homme, de ce qu'est la nature de Dieu saisi comme « personne ». La nature de l'activité intellectuelle de l'homme exclut une certitude logique, démonstrative et absolue de l'existence de Dieu, mais elle ne rend pas impossible une certitude de tempérament religieux. Métaphysiquement, la croyance chrétienne en un Dieu personnel se vérifie par une induction basée sur une série d'évidences tirées de « l'expérience » immédiate de l'univers en laquelle se synthétisent nos activités intellectuelles et esthétiques, morales et religieuses.

## CHAPITRE 3

Puisqu'il faut une métaphysique, il importe d'examiner la possibilité et la légitimité, ainsi que ses rapports avec la religion vécue, de la philosophie spéculative. Kant a affaibli la confiance en la possibilité de la spéculation. Whitehead s'efforce de la restaurer. Cependant, la religion, loin de se fonder sur la réflexion rationnelle, jaillit d'une expérience sui generis. Pascal a mis en évidence d'une manière saisissante la complexité de cette situation et Locke avait raison de nier toute connaissance innée de l'existence de Dieu.

## CHAPITRE 4

La science permet à l'homme de se faire une image approximative de l'évolution de l'ensemble du monde. Si cette image est exacte, le monde a existé avant l'apparition de l'esprit. Que signifie cette constatation ? A ce sujet, l'archevêque William Temple énonce trois propositions :

*a*) Le monde tel qu'il nous apparaît se présente comme chronologiquement antérieur à la connaissance que l'intelligence de l'homme en acquiert peu à peu.

*b*) Le fait que l'esprit, quoique issu de l'évolution du monde, peut en retour la comprendre, atteste que l'essence de cette évolution ne saurait être étrangère à l'esprit.

*c*) Plus on considérera l'esprit comme constituant une partie intégrante de la nature, et plus la nature s'enveloppera de ténèbres pour qui tenterait de l'expliquer en faisant abstraction de l'esprit.

Par conséquent, la seule hypothèse satisfaisante pour l'explication métaphysique de l'être sera celle de l'existence d'une souveraine Volonté personnelle et intelligente qui dirige l'évolution du monde. Toutefois l'application des catégories personnelles à Dieu ne laisse d'impliquer certaines difficultés.

## CHAPITRE 5

La nature de la connaissance scientifique est telle que celle-ci ne saurait s'élever au delà d'une aperception symbolique, c'est-à-dire inadéquate, du réel. Sa portée est limitée (Boutroux). Sans déprécier l'intelligence autant que M. Bergson, ce qui paraîtrait outré (Taylor), Whitehead critique avec sagacité les concepts scientifiques qui dérivent de la philosophie de la nature du dix-septième siècle. En quel sens peut-on dire que la science dévoile la vérité en scrutant avec ses propres méthodes l'énigme du monde sensible ? Le cosmos exige pour le moins un Dieu mathématicien.

## CHAPITRE 6

L'obligation caractérise le fait moral, mais ne l'épuise pas. Bien qu'il y ait lieu de distinguer entre morale et religion, l'objet éthique tend à se muer, comme M. Hauter l'a montré, en objet religieux. D'autre part, il y a divorce entre les faits concrets et les exigences morales. Le critère purement formel

de l'universalité (Kant) paraît insuffisant pour fonder une éthique. On ne saurait aboutir à une définition adéquate de la vertu en excluant les jugements de valeurs. Ceux-ci, à leur tour, ne trouvent leur sens véritable que dans le cadre d'une « ontologie » religieuse.

## CHAPITRE 7

Il y a lieu d'interroger avec une attention sympathique l'expérience religieuse elle-même. La nature particulière de l'attitude par laquelle l'homme religieux répond à Dieu le saisissant à travers l'univers, exige-t-elle pour son explication les catégories personnelles ou impersonnelles ? On connaît les diverses conceptions de la conscience relgieuse. Il y a les définitions

*a*) Intellectualiste — Spencer.
*b*) Emotionaliste — Schleiermacher.
*c*) Volontariste — Feuerbach.
*d*) Durkheim et le sacré, Otto et « das Heilige », M. Hauter et la notion de la force.
*e*) Max Scheler et la notion du sacré.

L'expérience religieuse se précise à la lumière de l'étude comparative des religions (l'Hindouisme et le Bouddhisme). On montrera ce que sont les traits essentiels d'un « dieu » selon Leuba. Enfin dans l'expérience religieuse chrétienne, Jésus joue un rôle unique; la révélation y est rigoureusement personnelle. L'insuffisance des critiques psychologistes (Freud) et sociologistes (Durkheim) apparaît, dans ce point, évidente. En résumé, l'affirmation de l'existence de l'objet de la foi chrétienne trouve, semble-t-il, sa garantie dans une série d'évidences convergentes. Celles-ci proviennent d'abord de la réflexion rationnelle sur la nature de l'évolution du monde et l'apparition de l'esprit; puis du fait que la connaissance scientifique implique un Esprit Transcendant; ensuite de la morale, laquelle postule la signification « métaphysique » de la personnalité et des valeurs éthiques; enfin, de l'expérience religieuse elle-même et de son témoignage relatif à l'activité de Dieu dans l'univers et la vie humaine.

## CHAPTER I.

## THE ATTACK UPON THE OBJECT OF CHRISTIAN WORSHIP.

*These our actors,*
*As I foretold you, were all spirits and*
*Are melted into air, into thin air:*
*And, like the baseless fabrick of this vision,*
*The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,*
*The solemn temples, the great globe itself,*
*Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve;*
*And, like this insubstantial pasgeant faded,*
*Leave not a rack behind: We are such stuff*
*As dreams are made of, and our little life*
*Is rounded with a sleep.*

*SHAKESPEARE, The Tempest.*

*If faith were an illusion? If Freud's theory were true, if religion were only the product of my emotionally-stirred imagination? If psychology were capable of dissolving faith by explaining its origin exclusively by means of natural factors? What then?*

*Emil BRUNNER.*

*And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only-begotten from the Father), full of grace and truth.*

*The Gospel according to St. John.*

The prominence of the word « object » in the title of this thesis is meant to draw attention to an issue which is being thrust, almost brutally, upon all religious people and indeed upon all thinking men and women. It is a fact that the dynamic of the Christian Faith, its inexhaustible power and force, derive from the belief, held with intensity and conviction, that the object of worship, God, really exists and that however much men may differ in their apprehension of Him and His will, in the last analysis, God remains as the great Fact confronting every human being. There have always been people who have denied His existence under the stress and strain of life or in

the face of some shattering disappointment. In the face of such pressure, men have declared the Christian to be the victim of an illusion and have tended to say—there is no personal God in the universe in whose image man is made, that when he prays, he is only using a certain mental technique which can induce a certain state of mind wrongly interpreted as intercourse with God, that love, joy and peace are indeed agreable experiences but they have no roots in an abiding reality but are the chance products of forces guided by no purpose, that human personality at its highest has no permanent value, that « we are such stuff as dreams are made of », that death is the total extinction of all consciousness and the values it apprehends, that it is only a question of time before life disappears from this earth, and the universe becomes dead, inert, pointless and inexplicable. Life may be made tolerable by the fleeting pleasures of the moment and may be lulled for a time by the passing beauties of this world into the false belief that life is worth living. This is an illusion that the consistent thinker will cease to entertain. If he is a courageous as well as a consistent thinker, he will proceed at once to annihilate the will-to-live in himself and depart this world by a self-imposed death. Schopenhauer admitted the logical inescapability of this conclusion but, being a bon vivant also, did not act upon it. Our purpose here is not to deal with those only too real challenges which life makes to faith, but with that slow sapping of faith which has taken place in thinking people through the pressure of intellectual difficulties raised by our modern way of thinking, and in particular by the studies of history, comparative religion, and psychology.

It has been said by someone that when Jesus appeared upon the stage of world history, all men had some belief in a God or gods. The problem was to persuade them that the power behind the universe was such as was revealed in Jesus. Today many are willing to concede a very high, indeed the highest, rank to Jesus of Nazareth as a religious genius. The problem is rather to believe in God and especially that the actual universe is governed by a living and transcendent Personality, possessing the moral and spiritual attributes discerned in Jesus. Henri Bergson, writing as an esprit fort, drescribes Jesus as an « âme ouverte » in contrast with all forms of tribal religion, and gives

to him the religious leadership of the world (1). Even the atheism of the neo-positivist accepts the religious consciousness as an undoubted sociological phenomenon. It cannot explain away the fact of religious experience, even if it explains away its object of reference.

The present « climate of thought » is in some ways hostile and in others more congenial to all for which the religious man stands.

Let us take the hostile tendencies first. The modern convergence of historical enquiry, comparative study, and psychological analysis in the treatment of Christian origins and the Christian religious experience has carried the attack right into the heart of the Christian faith. Durkheim, the French sociologist, rejects the ideological and abstract method and insists on the necessity of studying the facts of human life in actual historical institutions and customs. He admits, for example, that the feeling of obligation described by the word conscience is not just a whim of the individual but is really derived from a source outside the individual.

« Tout ce qui est obligatoire a sa source en dehors de l'individu » (2). For him, however, the eternal source is not God, but human society, including present humanity and the deposit of institutions and customs left by previous generations. The religious man is conscious of a power which dominates his life, whilst at the same time sustaining it and raising him above himself. Durkheim agrees with the Christian that any adequate explanation of the religious life must account for and not simply explain away this central conviction. For him, the source of these higher energies is society—« le seul foyer de chaleur auquel nous puissions nous réchauffer moralement » (3). It will be seen from this brief allusion that Durkheim, whilst accepting the religious man's experiences as facts, gives to them an interpretation which for the Christian is equivalent to a denial of their ultimate validity. If then the very existence of Jesus himself is to be called in question or knowledge of Him reduced

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(1) H. Bergson. Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion. Paris 1932, p. 56-7.

(2) E. Durkheim. Les Règles de la méthode sociologique. Alcan, ed. p. 129.

(3) E. Durkheim. Formes Elémentaires. Paris 1925. p. 607.

to a minimum, if the study of other religions shows Christianity to be far less original than was formerly thought to be the case, if psychological analysis sees in the love of God only the sublimation of the « libido », frustrated of its normal outlet, then what becomes of the Christian certitude that in Christ God has spoken His final and saving Word to man. Theological bad temper in the face of this situation is the worst kind of strategy. The Church must not retreat before these difficulties, for it does so at its peril, nor must it show servile deference to « modern thought » but the issues raised are genuine ones and the Christian should give a reasonable and courteous reply. The above tendencies of thought have led men to doubt the existence of the object of Christian worship, God, and have reinforced the subjective temper of mind. « God turns out to be a product of the human mind. As an independant or unitary being, active in the affairs of the universe, he does not exist. » (4).

We have said that in some ways the present climate of thought is more congenial to the Christian faith. From the standpoint of the so-called natural sciences, physics, chemistry, biology, the situation has somewhat improved in the sense that those who pursue these methods of enquiry now recognize that their technique has a limited application and that their descriptions of that part of experience which they isolate for special study are not exhaustive of all the possible ranges of experience. The concept of natural law as un unchanging and unbreakable operative force has been modified in the direction of admitting that natural laws are descriptions of « our customary pattern of experience », the way things generally happen and that beyond this we have no right to dogmatize. To abandon the concept of natural law as absolute need not necessarily lead to Humian scepticism which sees in natural laws only the chance association of events which have always happened in a certain way and which we naturally expect to do the same in the future, although we have no definite proof to that effect. It is obvious both to common sense and to the technical philosopher that there is a certain reliability and coherence in the operations of nature, such as the regular sequence of day and night, without which we could not live.

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(4) J. Huxley. Science, religion, and human nature.

A capricious nature, upon which we could never depend, would not be much of a help or a comfort to the religious man, and there is no reason why the latter should be hostile to the scientific effort to find order and regularity in nature. Yet he has the right to maintain that what science calls the « laws of nature » are only provisional in the sense that they describe only that part of nature which man has so far explored and that they therefore cannot be regarded as absolute. This attitude leaves the religious man free to make the valid claim that any adequate description of reality must not confine itself to the measurable aspects of experience, those elements which can be weighed and counted and the result expressed in mathematical terms, but it must apply itself to the undoubted data supplied by the religious and moral consciousness. It must aim at an accurate description of human personality in response to the whole environment of man, physical and spiritual. The new attitude to natural law has also made the objection to miracle less forceful and convincing, at least from the strictly philosophical point of view. This development in scientific thought has ceased somewhat the tension between science and religion, but let no one imagine that the issue between the two is settled. Attempts to reconcile science and religion are not to be commended, if this means a policy of delimitation of territory on a basis of expediency. A vital religion must always claim to possess the dominant categories in terms of which the whole of human life can be interpreted, and this involves a certain subordination of science in the final synthesis. That there has been for some time past a reaction against the attempt to explain in scientific terms the ultimate significance of human life, no one can doubt. It is noticeable, not only in philosophical circles, but among literary men and indeed even among scientists. Aldous Huxley relates a conversation with that strange genius D. H. Lawrence on the subject of evolution in which the latter always passionately disbelieved. « But look at the evidence, Lawrence », Huxley insisted, « look at the evidence. » His answer was characteristic. « I don't care about the evidence. Evidence does not mean anything to me. I don't feel it here », pressing his two hands to his solar plexus (5).

(5) Aldous Huxley. Introduction to the letters of D. H. Lawrence. London.

To many this incident will only be another proof that Lawrence was mad, but one cannot but feel that he was right in his groping search for something more adequate, comprehensive, and satisfying than scientific abstractions, even if we find Lawrence's own solution, if it can be so called, completely unacceptable.

In the face of these currents of thought, let it suffice to say here that the Christian is compelled to make two assertions without which his faith ceases to be the force historically recognizable as Christianity.

(*a*) God is an ethical Personality, Creator of heaven and earth, active in history and working out His purpose in the historical process. He is not the God of Aristotle, existing in blissful contemplation of Himself and uninterested in all that passes in this sublunary world. Nor can it be said that the magnificent synthesis of Aquinas has permanently succeeded in baptizing the pagan philosopher into the Christian faith. The God of the Christian is He « who brought the people of Israel up out of the land of Egypt; who spake by the prophets, and who in these latter days has spoken unto us in his Son ». Yahweh is essentially a living God with whom historical nations and individuals can have contact. The prophet is governed by the conviction that he has been divinely called and entrusted with a special message, not by a philosophic hypothesis as to the nature of God. « The word which came to Jeremiah from the Lord, saying Arise and go down to the potter's house and there I will cause thee to hear my words. »

(*b*) The second affirmation is really a logical implication of the first—namely the possibility of a direct contact between Creator und creature. The Jewish-Christian tradition has never obscured this essential distinction between the two terms of the relationship. Christian prayer presupposes this distinction, without which it becomes a display of auto-suggestion, useful perhaps, but with no reference beyond the individual practising such a technique. M. F. Ménégoz justly says of Christian prayer—« Elle demeure un entretien libre, naturel, naïf du croyant avec son Dieu » (6). Any philosophy which reduces prayer to a superficial, if not inessential, element in the Christian life, whatever other virtue it may possess, ceases to be

(6) F. Ménégoz. Le Problème de la Prière. Strasbourg.

an authentic expression of the Christian life and faith. It is precisely at this point that Kant, with all his fine sense of the moral life, departs from the genuine Christian experience. Our second affirmation raises the difficult question of mysticism; by common consent of the mystics themselves their experiences of being united with God are ineffable and therefore not demonstrative for those who have not had a similar experience. Further it is on the whole agreed that the mystics do not reveal anything essentially new. « The essence of the mystical experience is simply its intense reality. That and that alone is the source of its astonishing authority and its "givenness" And the value of the witness of the mystics is not that it confirms any particular theology but that it displays the typical ego-other relationship, characteristic of all experience that can be called personal in a form which stresses the objectivity of the other as definitely as certain other experiences, also of an abnormal type, stress the ego, i. e. the paranoiac. » (7). Since mysticism has been found in all ages and among all peoples and is frequently associated with a pantheistic tendency, it cannot be uncritically accepted as valid witness to the distinctive Christian experience. The fundamental implications of the latter have been crystallized in these two affirmations. The validity of these will, of course, depend upon the epistemological value we attribute to this experience and belief. These latter must be assessed in the light of principles accepted as valid for knowledge in general. « Il n'est pas sûr qu'on rende ainsi service à la religion, en particulier à la religion chrétienne, en la considérant comme une sorte de connaissance mystique. Il faudrait auparavant avoir démontré la valeur épistémologique de l'expérience religieuse. » (8). When we speak of « objectivity » in relation to the religious experience, we are not raising an historical or even a psychological but a metaphysical question. No one challenges the fact that Christian men and women have believed and worshipped in a certain way, that they have had certain experiences and felt certain emotions, that this reaction of their personality, whether illusion or not, to the power behind the universe, has led them to live and act in a certain way; all

(7) L. W. Grensted. Psychology and God. 1930. p. 211.

(8) C. Hauter. Essai sur l'objet religieux. p. 189 note.

this is of the stuff of human history, facts which no serious historian would think of disputing. « For where the Saviour's name is named, there every demon is driven out. Who has so rid man of the passions of the natural man, that whoremongers are chaste and murderers no longer hold the sword, and those who were formerly mastered by cowardice now play the man? And in short, who persuaded men of barbarous countries and heathen men in divers places to lay aside their madness and to mind peace, if it be not the faith of Christ and the sign of the Christ? » (9). Later Christian history has added corroboration to this description of Athanasius. The facts are not imaginary. They are there, whatever explanation be offered. The Christian faith, which has historically produced these results, demands (*a*) for its practical vitality and (*b*) for its theoretical justification, certain metaphysical postulates which transcend the facts of this world in so far as it is open to our observation and inspection. No man hath seen the Christian God at any time, that is as a Being impinging upon the five senses, although the orthodox tradition asserts that the natural world is God's handiwork and that in Jesus the essential nature of God is revealed, not merely symbolically but actually.

In short, the Christian must demand an effective belief in a reality which is extra-mental in the sense of transcending the mental experience both of the individual and of the race. When he truly prays, it is not to his ideal self, but to the Creator of Heaven and Earth and the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. The conflict thus centres upon the various interpretations which can be given to this Christian experience.

Let us then attempt to state clearly the fundamental criticisms made by the sociological and the psychological schools. As we have seen the sociological school maintain that the Christian religious experience can be adequately explained and accounted for by reference to the whole nexus of social forces present in the world as we know it. The material structure of the universe as revealed by the application of the scientific method, together with the history of life on this planet from its earliest forms to its consummation in human beings, can adequately account for all the data supplied by the religious

(9) Athanasius. Da Incarnatione. Trans. A. Robertson 1911. p. 88.

consciousness. « Die Theologie ist Anthropologie, d. h. in dem Gegenstande der Religion, den wir griechisch Theos, deutsch Gott nennen, spricht sich nichts anderes aus als das Wesen des Menschen. » (10). God is only the deified being of man and theology itself is therefore only a history of man's desires and needs and the various expressions and rationalizations he has given to them. Belief in a personal God is a sign of mental immaturity and will automatically and inevitably disappear with the mental growth and the final adulthood of the human race. Comte embodied this conviction in his formula of the three stages through which the human race has passed:—

(*a*) The theological stage, when man attempts to interpret all the phenomena of nature by means of supernatural causes which are arbitrary in their working.

(*b*) The metaphysical stage, when man substitutes abstract entities like cause to explain natural phenomena.

(*c*) The scientific or positive stage.

« Enfin, dans l'état positif, l'esprit humain reconnaissant l'impossibilité d'obtenir des notions absolues, renonce à chercher l'origine et la destination de l'univers, et à connaître les causes intimes des phénomènes, pour s'attacher uniquement à découvrir, par l'usage bien combiné du raisonnement et de l'observation, leurs lois effectives, c'est-à-dire leurs relations invariables de succession et de similitude. » (11).

Then there is the psychological criticism. The psychologists, or it would be more just to say, some of them, maintain that so-called religious experience is entirely explicable in terms of the psychological mechanism discoverable on analysis of this same experience. There are psychologists, however, who recognize the limits of their speciality. « Le sentiment religieux est un fait qu'elle a simplement à analyser et à suivre dans ses transformations sans aucune compétence pour discuter sa valeur objective. » (12). Leuba endeavours to establish three fundamental propositions:—

(*a*) Belief in the existence of the « gods » of religion and

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(10) L. Feuerbach. Das Wesen der Religion. 3. Vorlesung.

(11) A. Comte. Cours de Philosophie Positive. Première Leçon II (2) (5).

(12) Ribot. Cited by Flournoy. Leuba. Psychologie des Phénomènes Religieux. French Trans. p. 292.

indirectly, certain other fundamental doctrines, rest in fact upon induction drawn from the « inner life ».

(*b*) Religious experience (inward experience) belongs entirely to psychology—entirely, of course here, in the same way as whet we declare that the non-religious phenomena in the life of consciousness belong entirely to science.

(*c*) Since the gods of religion are empirical gods, they therefore depend upon science.

After a somewhat caustic resume of Protestant thought in the latter 19th. century and early 20th., he reaches the following conclusions. The inner experiences which are taken to constitute the religious life are regarded:—(1) As serving as material for an « induction » of the existence of a divine power—an induction which constitutes apparently (he is obviously sceptical) a rational and scientific procedure. (2) As bearing within themselves the mark of a supra-human origin, i. e. these experiences are considered as immediate revelations of God. This is the mystical claim (13). Leuba concludes therefore that the Protestant theological position may be summed up thus:—« Religious experience differs from other forms of consciousness in that it gives us an immediate knowledge of the outer existence of certain "objects" of belief, although these objects do not fall under the senses, and an immediate knowledge of the truth of certain historical facts. » (14). Our critic rejects at once the mystic claim and pours scorn on William James' assertion that the « mystical experience is invulnerable » (15). James, however, was certainly not concerned to defend any particular orthodoxy for he says in one of his letters—« Christianity is now so foreign to me that if Christian ideas are mixed up with the expression of a mystical experience, I have to make an effort to abstract them from the latter before I can give it my attention. » (16).

For Leuba, if superhuman factors are at work in human experience, there are no other ways of discovering them than the scientific. But, and this is the result of a scientific analysis, « In the religious lives accessible to psychological study, there is nothing which compels the recognition of suprahuman

(13) Leuba. Op. cit. p. 279.
(14) Ibid. p. 280.
(15) Ibid. p. 284.
(16) W. James cited by Wahl. Vers le Concret. Paris 1932. p. 99.

influences. There is nothing, for example, in the life of the great Spanish mystic (St. Jean de la Croix) whose celebrity has been revived by contemporary psychologists—not a desire, not a sentiment, not a thought, not a vision, not an illumination which can make one think seriously of transcendant causes.»(17). A final summary will end this excessively long series of citations, the justification of which is in the clarity and precision of the position advocated and its complete antithesis of the Christian affirmation. The final conclusions then are:—

(*a*) « The immediate character of religious knowledge is illusory. The expression « immediate experience » can only be suitably applied to pure sensation, i. e. to those sense impressions which are not referred to an object, and to feeling in its pure state. Every state which places the subject in relation with an object situated outside himself falls under the criticism of the intelligence. » (18).

(*b*) Christian theology therefore is faced with this dilemma—Either it must find a basis in experience metaphysically treated; but metaphysics since Kant have completely discredited any reasons for believing in a personal God entering into immediate relationship, whether affective or intellectual, with man or theology must reject metaphysic and allow its basic experiences to be the object of impartial scientific enquiry and rest content with propositions derived from subjective experience. This means giving up the claim to a knowledge of a Transcendent Object of faith, such as Christians conceive God to be. This may be taken for the moment as a formulation of the negative psychological criticism of religious experience. Suffice it now to point out the unproved assumptions which vitiate the argument:—Firstly, is the suggestion that every subjective state which implies also a relation to an object is necessarily open to intellectual criticism an implied denial of all "objectivity" in human experience, including the scientist's? Secondly, it has not been proved that Kant has uttered the last word or that metaphysical enquiry must remain for ever hostile to the religious claim. Thirdly, the mystical claim, if it is to be dismissed as illusory, cannot be so treated by psychological

(17) Leuba. Psychologie des Phénomènes Religieux. p. 233.
(18) Ibid. p. 327.

arguments only but by metaphysical ones. The competence of psychology, pace Leuba, is strictly limited to a certain domain.

It will be seen therefore that the real conflict is not between science and religion in the strict sense but between two rival philosophies, one of which claims to be based on facts of a scientific order but which in its positive declarations goes far beyond the limited field of the scientist, the other equally basing itself upon indisputable facts of a spiritual and moral order, which have been renewed from age to age in the lives of Christian men and women. The divorce between the two is the spiritual tragedy of our times. « It is a deep-seated schism in the personal life of every intelligent modern man who wishes to be honest and sincere with himself. Can I be at once sincerely scientific and religious? Is the scientific temper in me compatible with my tendencies towards religion? Can I honestly be at once a scientist and a Christian? or must I sacrifice one urge in myself to the other? These are the real questions at issue, and they are questions that tear a man to pieces when he faces up to them. » (19).

Let us consider briefly some recent reactions to this situation. One of the most interesting attempts to solve this problem from the religious side is the movement which has taken its name from Karl Barth, the Swiss theologian. This latter was equally impressed by the influence of the three studies already mentioned upon the religious life. He early perceived the "subjectivity" of all purely psychological analyses of religion, the relativity of historical notions, and the difficulty of philosophically defending the uniqueness of the Christian faith. Barth has therefore proceeded to attack with vigour what he considers to be the harmful effects of the whole tradition deriving from Schleiermacher.

« Schleiermacher and his followers, down to the present day, have sought for God in religious experience and have looked to discover the basis of faith in some religious *a priori* peculiar to humanity. Man, they say, is capable of rising to God. Finitum capax infiniti. » (20). Yet it is precisely Barth's contention that « one cannot speak of God simply by speaking

(19) J. Macmurray. Reason and Emotion. London 1935. p. 178.

(20) J. McConnachie. The Significance of Karl Barth. London 1931. p. 64-5.

of man in a loud voice ». His general position would seem to be as follows:—

(*a*) All attempts to build a theology on the religious data supplied by human experience, he considers to be hubris and destined to failure. There is no possible way from man to God, neither the way of thought, morals, or religious experience. Man's religion at its highest only serves to accentuate man's rebellion and the supremely enigmatic character of his existence. The religious consciousness does not deliver us from sin and death. Religious feeling differs only in degree from æsthetic feeling. Man therefore can by no possible means rise from this world to God. This should lead to the logical conclusion that man has never had a genuine knowledge of God of any sort. Yet, says Barth, theology must be based on the objective, God, not on the subjective experiences of man. Finitum non capax infiniti.

(*b*) The basis of the Christian faith must not be sought in historical events, even the historical Jesus, since all history is by nature relative and subject to the corrupting influence of time.

(*c*) He distrusts all psychologism, which treats all religious experiences as alike in that they exhibit the same psychological mechanism.

(*d*) He repudiates the claim that there is a natural knowledge of God alongside the other facts of knowledge. This eliminates the scholastic arguments for God's existence by natural reason and all philosophical constructions. There is no analogia entis between human and divine permitting man to reach by his own efforts even a partial knowledge of the true God. True he admits somewhere that God can speak to us through a flower or a dead dog, but this is far removed from a natural theology.

(*e*) He makes a fundamental distinction between religion and revelation. Religion is man's attempt to find God but the attempt can never fully succeed since the attempt is man's. Revelation is the movement of God towards man. God has entered history "once for all" in the never-to-be-repeated event, Jesus Christ. Religion regards Christianity as the highest monotheistic faith, believes in the possibility of a transition from man to God by mystical experience, assumes a continuation

of the human soul with God, and is often found in alliance with Idealist philosophy and monistic theories. The result is the blurring of the gulf between man and God, the minimizing of evil, and a decline in the sense of sin.

Without discussing exhaustively the merits and demerits of this presentation, it is imperative to define our attitude to it, since if all attempts at philosophic construction are dust and ashes and inadmissible within the realm of theology, then the presuppositions of this thesis are false and are only a human obscuring of the divine Word. Honesty at least compels us to indicate the point from which we start. We agree with Barth so far—

(*a*) The Christian lives by faith in the Object of his worship, God. He knows that his own inward experiences, however lofty, do not make himself his own creator and he knows too that redemption or salvation is not the unaided achievement of his own will, with all its imperfections and weakness.

(*b*) He believes that God has spoken to us in His Son in a way different from His voice heard in the prophets or in the death of Socrates or in the sacrifice of the Buddha.

(*c*) He believes that the "good news" is contained in the fact of God's descent to man, not in man's upward groping search.

Our own position, in distinction from Barth's, implies the following:—

(1) There is a way from man to God through man's highest experiences. This implies that the mystic's claim is valid in principle. The fact that man can reach intellectual truth, the success of science, shows that the imago dei is not entirely corrupted and may still lead him to a genuine knowledge of the « real ».

(2) The fact that God has descended to man in a special and unique way in Jesus Christ does not involve as a necessary corollary that God has never descended at any other time to man and that He has never made even a partial self-disclosure of his Being in the experiences of men. This means the rejection of Barth's fundamental distinction between religion and revelation. This distinction really implies that Jesus is the only man who has ever been in contact with God, not excepting the prophets, and that all other men have only had "subjective

experiences" that have prevented them from having a direct contact with God—this is a high price to pay for the uniqueness of the Christian faith.

(3) Although Barth does not believe in the verbal inspiration of the Bible and is not in principle hostile to the last hundred years of Biblical criticism, his position really detaches Jesus from significant contact, either with the history and religion of his own people or with the human race in general. Yet if the humanity of Jesus is taken seriously, as even orthodoxy claims to do, then Jesus is in direct contact with the previous history of mankind and particularly of his own nation, and this is confirmed by all that the New Testament tells us about Him. The doctrine of the Incarnation is not therefore a proof of "finitum non capax infiniti" as Barth seems to think, but rather the assertion of the glorious and much more difficult fact to believe, the real stumbling-block, that in very truth the finitum is capax infiniti. Human personality made in the divine image can, despite the Fall, become the abode of the « pleroma » of God and that, although sin may separate man from, creation still links him to, God. In other words, God can redeem man through man. It is a curious and at first sight surprising fact to note the agreement of Barth with Ritschl in regard to the relation of metaphysics and religion. Both wish to free the Christian faith from any necessary connection with a metaphysical system. « Theology goes beyond its rights if it undertakes the proof directly or indirectly of the Christian revelation by showing that it agrees with such and such philosophical or "judicial" view of the world; for in regard to conceptions of this kind, Christianity is quite simply adverse. » (21). Leuba crystallizes in three affirmations the substance of Ritschl's views:—

(*a*) The facts, upon which theology rests, are to be found in the religious consciousness and not elsewhere. These facts form a group apart.

(*b*) Theology is independant of metaphysic. It cannot make use of arguments for speculative theism.

(*c*) Christian dogmas are an illegitimate mixture of theology and metaphysic and must be purified of the latter (22).

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(21) A. Ritschl, cited by Leuba, p. 250.
(22) Leuba. Psychologie des Phénomènes Religieux, p. 251.

Barth would not agree with the mode of expression in the first affirmation. He would say that theology rests upon the Word of God in Jesus Christ, attested in us by the Holy Spirit. This does not alter the fact that the recognition of the Incarnate Word, even with the aid of the Holy Spirit, remains a human experience, at least in its form, and it is to this particular form that Barth calls attention. Barth too would dispute the Ritschlian "judgments of value" as of the essence of the Christian faith, but despite these differences, they both take up a similar position in regard to metaphysical enquiry. This attempt to put the religious experience into a kind of intellectual quarantine, to isolate it from all other activities of the human spirit, whether this is done in a liberal spirit (Ritschl) or in an orthodox one (Barth), the result is not in any way satisfactory. Superficially it may appear to remove faith from the sphere of hostile criticism, but at the cost of severing any vital contact with other movements of thought. Our position is that, although the religious experience may be found to have specific characteristics which distinguish it from other experiences, yet it cannot be completely isolated and that faith must interest itself in metaphysics. This at once opens up the possibility of renewed attack, since every form of metaphysic is open to criticism, but it is our contention that religious faith and the Christian faith in particular will be more healthy and less liable to panic than if it takes the sort cut of eliminating all metaphysical enquiry. A. N. Whitehead says, à propos of certain attempts to use the subconscious as the organ of religious knowledge, « Religious truth must be developed from knowledge acquired when our ordinary senses and intellectual operations are at their highest pitch of discipline. To move one step from this position towards the dark recesses of abnormal psychology is to surrender finally any hope of a solid foundation for religious doctrine » (23). It is our contention that the religious man cannot avoid the attempt to « generalize the final truths first perceived as exemplified in particular instances » (24). The attempt of early Christianity to adjust itself to the thought of the Graeco-Roman world was not a mistake, though we may feel the need of

(23) A. N. Whitehead. Religion in the Making. Lowell Lectures, 1926. p. 109-10.

(24) Ibid. p. 110.

modifying or perhaps even abandoning certain of the formulations thus offered to us. The Christian response to Christ cannot be left simply a brute fact, it must be related to the whole of our experience and to every human activity. Only in this way can it become really fruitful and a determinative factor in the life of the world.

We have endeavoured to give a faithful picture of the present position of the religious life in relation to the different intellectual currents which mark the present age. We have shown how the "Object of Christian worship" has been subjected to a series of attacks tending to undermine its power and force. Certain attempts to meet these criticisms have been describes and rejected as insufficient. Yet it has been insisted throughout that religious experience is a datum that must be included and accounted for in any adequate philosophical construction.

## CHAPTER 2.

## A STUDY IN PHLOSOPHIC METHOD.

*What is it that I employ my metaphysics on? To perplex our clearest notions and living moral instincts? To extinguish the light of love and of conscience, to put out the life of arbitrament, to make myself and others worthless, soulless, Godless? No, to expose the folly and legerdemain of those who have thus abused the blessed organ of language, to support all old and venerable truths, to support, to kindle, to project, to make the reason spread light over our feelings, to make our feelings diffuse vital warmth through our reason—these are my objects, and these my subjects. Is this the metaphysic that bad spirits in hell delight in?*

*Quoted from COLERIDGE*
*by Dorothy Emmet.*

It is the duty of every philosopher to make as clear as he can the basic assumptions which underlie his treatment of a problem and to indicate the method he proposes to employ. We have tried to show that the essentiel structure of the religious consciousness, especially in its Christian form, implies the reaching out after or the tendency towards an Object, which transcends both the limits of the individual and of the race. For the Christian, this object is a personal Being, who is active in yet transcendent to the world-process, and who has disclosed His essential nature in the Person of Jesus Christ. For the Christian, his whole life centres upon this Object which he calls God. The word "object" is employed to convey the idea of a Being existing in His own right, independent of man's perceptions, conceptions, and imaginations. The whole of the religious life loses its practical dynamic and its theoretical justification, if the Object of faith does not exist. We have

seen how three converging lines of criticisms have led to the denial of the existence of this Object, save as an idea in the minds of particular men. Our task now is to show that these criticisms are not intellectually valid and that one is under no compulsion to draw conclusions detrimental to the Object of religious faith from these respective branches of study.

The phrase "religious experience" has already been used to indicate certain data offered to an impartial study of human history. The attempt will now be made to show the way in which we intend to attack the criticisms already mentioned and the use we propose to make of the facts revealed by an examination of the concrete religious life of man. Our method implies the rejection of the attempt to demonstrate the existence of God by purely logical means and the Cartesian method of universal doubt. It is well known how Descartes set out upon his task of doubting everything, pretending that the evidence of his senses did not exist, until he arrived at the bare notion of a self which thinks, a res cogitans. He pretended that other people did not exist, that the outside world with all its wealth of sensuous appeal might be sheer figment of the imagination, that even his own body might be simply his "idea" of it. Resolutely following this course to the bitter end, he finished by being unable to doubt the existence of the self which had done all the doubting. Cogito ergo sum. No one will deny the justice of this reasoning so far as it goes, but it needs to be pointed out how little has been proved and what little value it has when it has been proved. It is impossible to imagine oneself thinking without thinking something. A blank mind conveys nothing. Yet as soon as one imagines oneself thinking something in particular, it is impossible to do so without bringing back into consciousness all the things that have just been dismissed by doubt. If one starts with a self thinking nothing in particular, a bare cogito, then one cannot possibly make the transition back to the world of people and objects outside this artificially impoverished "self". You cannot take out of the self what is not already in it. Descartes is not sufficiently a metaphysical magician to effect this transition in a convincing way. Modern science cannot eliminate the element of "givenness," it cannot transmute all the data supplied by the senses into abstract laws, it must retain what has been

called brute fact. This sense for the concrete is evident in this line of William James, written to his brother Henry, « I have to forge every sentence in the teeth of irreducible and stubborn facts » (1). « In the real world, there is always, over and above "law," a factor of the "simply given" or brute fact," not accounted for and to be simply accepted as given. It is the business of science never to aquiesce in the merely given, to seek to "explain" it, in virtue of rational law, or of some simpler initial given. But however far science may carry this procedure, it is always forced to retain some element of brute fact, the merely given, in its account of things. » (2). The scientist may indeed maintain that the common-sense interpretation of the world is partially mistaken, but at least he can never deny the existence of that something "outside" without rendering his own scientific study pointless. Whitehead has some interesting observations in this connection. After noting the customary contrast between the "objective" approach of the ancient Greeks and the "subjective" approach of the moderns, initiated by Descartes, and further emphasized by Locke and Hume, he singles out the following errors which mark the modern period:—

(*a*) The assumption that there are a few definite avenues of communication with the external world, the five sense-organs. Hence, in searching for data, the question is—what data are supplied by these five senses and in practice this often means the eyes only. But « the living organ of experience is the living body as a whole ». « The truth is that the brain is continuous with the body, and the body is continuous with the rest of the natural world. » (3).

(*b*) The second error is the presupposition that the sole way of examining experience is by acts of conscious introspective analysis. Finally care must be taken to include every element of our immediate experience in our search for the data.

« Nothing can be omitted, experience drunk and experience sober, experience sleeping and experience waking, experience drowsy and experience wide-awake, experience self-conscious and experience self-forgetful, experience intellectual and expe-

(1) W. James, cited by Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, Lowell Lectures, 1925. p. 3.

(2) A. E. Taylor, Plato the Man and his Work, 1937.

(3) A. N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, New York, 1933. p. 290.

rience physical, experience religious, experience sceptical, experience anxious and experience carefree, experience anticipatory and experience retrospective, experience happy and experience grieving, experience dominated by emotion and experience under self-restraint, experience in the light and experience in the dark, experience normal and experience abnormal. » (4). The only other real alternative to the Cartesian method is to commence with a realism which accepts naively our direct experience of the world. We may be compelled later to make our realism less naive but once we eliminate this realistic element completely, once we eliminate the "given" of immediate experience in the interests of no matter what theory, no mere reasoning will get us back to it and we are left in an uneasy subjectivism, which is not far from the absurdity of solipsism.

What then, asks Whitehead, is the store-house on which philosophy should base its discussion, and in what terms should its discussion be expressed? His answer is language, social institutions, and action. This means, as we have seen, the rejection of the Cartesian method which begins by asking if there are good grounds for believing in a world outside the "self" and of which the first rule is « never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such ». Commenting on this, Temple asks—« Why is my perception that $2\times2=4$ to be regarded as either more clear und distinct or more compelling of acceptance than Isaiah's perception of the holiness of God? » (5). Whitehead's answer also means the rejection of Hume's doctrine of sensation. This latter demands an impossible narrowing down of the range of data. « Thus an appeal to literature, common language, to common practice, at once carries us away from the narrow basis of epistemology provided by the sense-data disclosed in direct introspection. » (6). He insists, too, on the necessity of avoiding uncritical trust in the adequacy of language and in the strained attitude of introspection as a basis for epistemology.

Let us then summarize our method of approach. We shall not ask whether there are grounds for believing in a world

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(4) Ibid. p. 290-1.
(5) W. Temple, Nature, Man and God, London, 1935. p. 86.
(6) Adventures of Ideas, p. 293.

outside the "self". We shall start with the assumption made by every scientist that there is an "object" of study. Commencing with the scientific account of the world-process, which postulates the existence of a physical world in time before the appearance of mind in it, we shall study the significance of the latter when it does finally appear and see if it throws light on the nature of the process from which it has sprung. "Mind" will therefore be considered, not only speculatively but historically. An attempt will be made to determine its nature by an adequate description of what it has shown itself to be in the course of the world-process and to discover thereby the essential nature of "mind" and the activities proper to it. The Biblical criterion By their fruits you shall know them—will be applied to the emergence of the mind as concretely manifested in literature, common language and common practice. These fruits are the result of the mind's never ceasing quest for what it considers to be true, good, and beautiful.

Having arrived at this point, we then discover that there is among the activities of personal beings one which characterizes the human race as distinct from the animal creation, and which cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of the three activities previously mentioned. This is found in what is called the "religious experience" of the human race. What does this latter signify and what interpretation may be put upon it? Here there is evidence of both agreement and disagreement in the deliverances of the religious consciousness. « Religion », says Dr. Whitehead, « is world loyalty.... In its solitariness the spirit says—What in the way of value is the attainment of life? And it can find no such value till it has merged its individual claim with that of the objective universe. » (7). The religious consciousness seeks after a harmony which springs from an intuition of a fundamental rightness in the nature of things. The individual must reach some kind of relationship, some kind of adequate adjustment to this essential character of the universe, if it is to find inward harmony and peace and significance for itself. Whitehead has given us the well-known definition « Religion is what a man does with his solitude » upon which the comment of Macmurray

(7) A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making, p. 49.

is surely just, at least in the eyes of a Christian—« When Prof. Whitehead says that religion is what a man does with his solitariness, he is saying what is almost the reverse of the truth, although he is, unlike many philosophers moving in the right universe of discours. » (8). There will be occasion later to criticize Whitehead's refusal to use personal categories. For the Christian, the prime necessity for each spirit is an intimate and harmonious relationship with God, conceived as a personal Being, active in the world-process as we know it yet transcendent to it. In his concrete religious life, this is expressed in the practice of prayer. The final adjustment, which brings surrender and peace, is the assurance of the forgiveness of sins through the Mediator, who is God's self—disclosure of Himself in His essentially personal being, not only as Creator but as Father, Redeemer, and Sanctifier. At this point it has to be honestly admitted that there is a considerable part of the religious experience of the human race, which would definitely contradict this fundamental assertion of the Christian—namely that the substratum of the universe, the underlying reality behind this world-process, is personal. « Throughout India and China, religious thought, so far as it has been interpreted in precise form, disclaims the intuition of an ultimate personality substantial to the universe. This is true for Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindoo philosophy. There may be personal embodiments, but the substratum is impersonal. » (9). This divergence is a serious one and we shall be compelled to grapple with the difficulty in earnest when we come to consider the nature of mind and its significance and the detailed study of the religious consciousness. The question cannot be settled simply by an appeal to a majority vote, otherwise we might have to dismiss the Christian belief because it is held by a minority of the human race. Whatever the merits of majority votes in the political world, they do not play the decisive part where truth is concerned. Nor do we hold with the pragmatist that the question of "objective reality" is unimportant and that the "truth" is simply that which works. The Christian would certainly claim that his religion "works" in the sense that it

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(8) J. Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, p. 225.

(9) Religion in the Making, p. 51.

enables him to adjust himself harmoniously to his environment, physical and spiritual, and supremely to God. « Yet its working does not constitute its truth but is part of the evidence that it is true. » (10).

Let us attempt to elucidate more carefully this phrase "religious experience". Experience can be used to justify many things. Even Macchiavelli would claim that his advice to his Prince to simulate piety for the order and good of the state was certainly based on his experience of men. Equally well-known is the modern reaction in Barthian circles against the very term "religious experience" as implying a man-centred piety rather than a God-centred faith. A Christianity, which is only a thinly veiled secular humanism, is rightly a subject of Barth's criticism but it still remains true that the only way of seeing God's activity is in the human relationship, and this necessitates the study of men and women's religious experience. There are sometimes, however, legitimate suspicions that those who appeal to their religious experience do so to avoid the challenge of genuine criticism. If a man falls back upon his own individual experience and refuses to discuss the question further, one can only deplore such a complete damper on all rational enquiry.

We cannot escape the simple and indisputable fact that thought must work upon some data, that man cannot think in the void in detachment from all the concrete content supplied by his intercourse with other people and the external world, or as Macmurray insists, thought is always about something already known, reflective thought implies the knowledge given in immediate experience, just as the most abstruse scientific theory really presupposes the world of sense-perception common to scientist and ordinary man alike. The Christian thinker, like the scientist, does not wish to escape this reference to the basic immediate experience which underlies all man's mental and spiritual activities. The Christian will claim that his theological constructions can be referred to a range of facts in immediate experience, just as the scientist can test his theories in their reference to the objective system of nature as it impinges upon our consciousness. Yet a difficulty arises from the start.

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(10) W. R. Matthews, Essays in Reconstruction, p. 34.

The scientist can claim that the world of nature revealed through our five physical senses is more or less the same for all human beings, despite the existence of the colour-blind and people who may be defective in one or other of the five senses. The Christian on the other hand cannot claim the same universality in his appeal to experience. The human race taken as a whole has not reached the same level of moral and spiritual attainment. There are immense differences in the level of moral sensitiveness and spiritual apprehension both between races and nations and individuals in the same nation. An Australian aborigine will not be compared to a St. Francis in moral zeal and spiritual fervour. The Christian is compelled to remember St. Paul's dictum that the natural man cannot grasp the things of the spirit. In selecting the facts upon which his theology rests, he cannot appeal without discrimination to the whole human race; he must appeal to the religious expert, the saint Because a man may be so sunk in self-centredness and worldliness, so overcome by the cares and riches of this world that the fruits of the spirit, love, poy, and peace, seem to be quite unreal, if a man's conscience and spirit have been so deadened by his manner of life that he can no longer respond to the power of self-sacrificing love in Christ, it does not follow that the Christian life is an illusion, anymore than Einstein's theory is discredited bceause the majority do not fully understand what it means or how the theory has been arrived at. When therefore the Christian thinker appeals to the experience of men to supply him with certain facts, he will not appeal to the average sensual unconverted natural man for his data but to the Christian saint who is living the Christian life in however humble a way. Or as A. E. Taylor maintains « The men of Galilee and their lived religion set the Christian theologian his task, as the sense-experience of the common man sets the physicist his. » (11) Or as Whitehead expresses it « Hence religion bases itself upon a small selection from the common experiences of the race. On this side, religion ranges itself as one among other specialized interests of mankind whose truths are of limited validity. But on its other side, religion claims that its concepts, though

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(11) A. E. Taylor, The Faith of a Moralist, London, 1930. Vol. 2. p. 104.

derived primarily from special experiences, are yet of universal validity, to be applied to the ordering of all experience. » (12). M. Guérin has made the same point in maintaining that the religious "object" is not vouchsafed to all and sundry but only to those who have already practised a previous "ascese". In other words, the religious man is one who is open and sensitive, not only to the limited number of objects which constitute the material world, but to that other world of invisible things which is present to a man's consciousness when he performs a religious act. His assimilative capacity, or as M. Guérin would say, his digestive capacity, is not confined to what is called the world of sense-perception. It is indeed an important element in the approach of the phenomenological school to the question of religion to widen considerably the scope of the word "object" and to apply it to a large range of facts which, although not immediately present to the senses, yet have an indisputable existence in the human consciousness. « Mais la phénoménologie nous apprend à voir de nombreux objets, qu'on ne saurait classer ni parmi les données sensibles ni parmi les données immanentes, à moins de gonfler le sens du mot immanent au point de le faire éclater. » (13). M. Guérin stresses the same point—« Nous voudrions simplement faire ressortir que pratiquement on limite trop la notion du réel à celle du sensible ou du concret. Même les qualités les plus abstraites, si elles n'existent pas de la même manière que les choses palpables, existent cependant. » (14).

These citations are intended to reinforce the contention that we are not discussing something of a sensible order, something that can be tasted and touched, and that we must avoid the prejudice common to a scientific age to regard the latter as the only real things. Religion may receive concrete expression in the building of churches or in the performing of certain acts of worship or deeds of charity which all the world can see, but the experience which is the source of all this activity and which has prompted such acts, cannot be handled like a physical object or measured with the tape or weighed in the balance.

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(12) Religion in the Making, p. 21.
(13) J. Hering, Phénoménologie et Philisophie Religieuse, p. 93.
(14) M. Guérin, Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuse, mai-juin, 1937.

Yet this experience is as much a fact, something actually existent in the world, if you like an "object," as the world of sights and sounds and colours. We may seem to be labouring the obvious and insisting on things which all intelligent people recognize, yet it is to be feared that the widespread influence of the scientific mentality, coupled with the everyday pressure of the senses, has tended to implant in the minds of many a deeply rooted feeling that the spiritual world is less "real" than the physical. The real clash is not so much as to whether there is an invisible world as in regard to the different interpretations men put upon it. What we have called religious experience does supply us then with an order of facts, a range of data, which must be considered. One may deny that they imply the Christian view of the world as the creation of a personal Being, who is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. What no impartial enquirer is at liberty to do is to deny that such an order of facts exists, even if he himself is completely devoid of what may be called religious experience. No sensible man denies the existence of other countries because he has never seen them with his own eyes. There as a matter of simple historic fact is Christ and the new community animated by His spirit and producing a new and distinctive piety. The fact is there to be accounted for, even by the unbeliever.

Before this task can be adequately treated, another question must be settled, at least provisionally. Granted there is, whether illusion or not, a religious experience to which appeal can be made, is this experience limited to what is called Christian or is there, as Scheler maintains, a natural theology, not in the 18th.-century sense of a series of rational propositions about the nature of God which all intelligent men can discover by their unaided reflection, without the aid of the Bible and special revelation, but a natural theology based upon a sense of the impact of the divine upon the human consciousness, an experience which, from the human side, takes the form of an apprehension of the sacred. Is there outside the God-consciousness mediated through Christ a direct contact of man with God? Granted there is such a range of facts as we have pleaded for, what is their extent and how inclusive must our selection be? This brings us up against the question contained in the old

antithesis between natural and revealed religion. According to the old division, natural theology was the attempt to think about God, His existence, nature and attributes in complete independence of the data supplied by the Bible. The positive practice of religion was therefore ignored in formulating its propositions, just as if one tried to reach a definition of human nature in complete disregard of what man has shown himself to be in the course of history. One might decide a priori that the human being had wings but one fears that the conclusion would not be regarded as very helpful or the author of the suggestion very sane. Biblical criticism has done two things:—

(*a*) It has shown that the Bible is first and foremost a record of human experience whatever else it may be, and that although this experience may be the medium of a divine revelation, it can be studied from its human angle like any other.

(*b*) It has made the philosopher aware of the fact that the Bible, in giving him primarily concrete experience and not theological doctrine, also gives him data which he cannot ignore in the construction of his system. The Bible gives him an impressive account of man's search after and comprehension of the divine over a considerable time and shows man positively engaged in the practice of religion as distinct from reflection upon it at second-hand by the detached thinker. Therefore, if the experience of primitive races is to be adduced as evidence of human conceptions of the divine, then why not also the religious experience embodied in the higher religions? We can no longer start with the simple assumption that all religion outside the Christian is by that very fact alone illusion. We may reach the conclusion that much of it is so, but at least we must give some reason why we think so.

The natural theologian therefore will not indulge in purely abstract speculation as to the nature of religion but will include in his survey, not only the rites and practices of primitive and superstitious races, but the mystics of the East, the devotion of the Mohammedan to Allah, and the Christian experience of God in Christ. This attitude implies the admission that the divine, whatever its ultimate nature may be, can reveal itself or Himself in some measure throughout the whole process of cosmic evolution and human history and not simply within the pages

of the Bible and during the limited period that it covers. At this stage of our research, we qualify the divine as It or He in order to include those religions which hold to an impersonal view of ultimate reality, although we may have good reason to be unsatisfied with this ambiguity before we reach the end of our discussion; it may be said quite truthfully that the Bible itself does regard the whole cosmic process, including human history, as the sphere of God's continuing activity, but today the extent and scale of this sphere has been vastly enlarged by our new knowledge.

Our method, however, does not merely include an appeal to what has been called "immediate experience" with special reference to "religious experience" but also the possibility of valid reflection upon this experience. Let us then in concluding this section say a few words in regard to the sort of certitude sought by the religious man and the kind of assurance one can reasonably hope for in reflective activity. We may take as guide the three statements of Macmurray in « Interpreting the Universe » (15).

« There is no way whatever of guaranteeing the truth of any conclusion in terms merely of the reflective processus by which it has been reached. » One may sit in an arm-chair and evolve a theory of the physical universe which is quite fantastic, but it is not possible to show that it is so until the theory is referred back to the concreteness of our immediate experience of the world. Applied to the religious sphere, it is not possible to prove with the rigour of mathematical reasoning that prayer is other than a pleasant illusion until it is verified in the process of living the religious life. If, for example, a Christian finds that prayer in the Christian sense has no effect on his daily life, that instead of giving him strength and courage it progressively enfeebles his character, that his moral dynamic after prayer is less than it was before, that the practice of prayer has led him to break the ten commandments and slowly made him a degenerate, if he finds himself becoming more carnal and enslaved to the world and more indifferent to the things of the spirit, if in short prayer had entirely the opposite effects of those which it has had historically in Christian experience,

(15) J. Macmurray, Interpreting the Universe, London, 1933. p. 73-83.

then surely one would have to conclude that prayer was not a communion with a living, personal and holy God, since the result is the disintegration of human personality itself. But no one has the right to draw the conclusion that prayer is illusion on the basis of the experience of men who have never prayed. One may, of course, offer reasons why the venture of faith is justifiable and show that it is compatible with a reasoned philosophy but in the last analysis, it is difficult to see what other verification there is for the genuineness of prayer than in the fruits of the spirit which it produces and the whole and harmonious adjustment it achieves of the individual spirit to his physical and spiritual environment.

« Thought alone, however correct it may be, cannot guarantee its own conclusions. » To guarantee the conclusions of our reflective thought, there must be a return to the field of practical activity. Verification is not simply a reference to sense-perception but to the field of immediate experience in which "consciousness is only the cognitive aspect of practical activity ». The scientist tests his theories by the doing of definite experiments in the laboratory. How can a philosophical theory or a moral intuition or a religious conviction be tested in this way? Put simply, it means that one acts on the hypothesis that if one acts in a certain way, then certain results follow. To apply this directly to the sphere of theology, the doctrine that "God is love" is not based on the speculative activity of the abstracting intellect but on the historical fact that Jesus, believing Himself to be at one with the Father, went to the Cross because of the love that was in Him. The concrete expression of love in actual sacrifice is the basis of the theological proposition. If one may be daring enough to use the image, the Cross of Christ was a laboratory experiment in which the power of redeeming love was being tested but in this case the laboratory was the sinful world of human experience. That such love is capable of winning men from the sinful self-centredness of the natural man to a new life, making of them new creatures, is verified again, not in the realm of speculative philosophy, but in the impact of such love upon men and women in the course of Christian history. The philosopher will always seek to distil from this experience certain abstract

general principles, which he will then attempt to harmonize with the principles discoverable in other spheres, e. g. the affirmation that "God is love" and the biological study of man.

« That no experiment can ever guarantee the truth of a conclusion with absolute certainty. » A fresh experiment may always produce a slightly different result and therefore demand a change, however small, in the hypothesis to be tested. It is not the function of thought to provide us with knowledge fixed, absolute, finally guaranteed for all time. Knowledge in the scientific sense excludes utter certainty. Applied to man's religious life, this means that we have no right to expect that our reason shall supply us with a demonstrative knowledge of God comparable to $2\times2=4$. A rational belief is one reasonable to believe, i. e. with greater evidence in its favour than any other. The Christian's certainty does not lie in his reflective thought only but in his concrete experience of the religious life, his personal response to Jesus, the direct perception that a certain kind of life is worth living, his experience of pardon and forgiveness, the power of a new life in Christ, the efficacy of prayer in the name of Jesus, the dynamic of faith. This does not mean intellectual reflection is unimportant or that the religious life can be reduced to the play of feeling but that the religious man's certitude is primarily in his experience of the religious life. When he comes to reflect upon these experiences and to clothe them with the incomplete symbolism of words, he will find great difficulty in giving them adequate expression, just as the human tendernesses and beauties of friendship and love are rarely capable of expression in words, although for the person who knows them their certainty and their existence are beyond question. Reflective knowledge implies the use of words and this at once precludes us from attaching absolute and final certainty to the verbal formulation of the experience. This does not mean that the Christian can sink back lazily upon sentiment untouched by rational criticism nor does it mean that he will not reflect about his religious life und deduce from his experience certain conclusions which can be embodied in terms of reflective and philosophical thought. None the less his "religious" certainty is not of the same order as his "intellectual" assurances.

Our endeavour then is to construct a metaphysic that will make it reasonable in the sense above defined to accept as a valid and genuine avenue to a knowledge of reality that religious experience that is designated Christian. Whitehead's philosophy of organism cannot exhibit the Christian religious experience as a particular instance of his general scheme, since a philosophy whose categories are "organic" cannot rightly include the "personal" and this means the annihilation of the Christian religious experience as possessive of more than a relative and partially mistaken insight into the nature of the "real". It is our contention that a system of general ideas, which works with the notion of "personality" is far more comprehensive and successful as a method that the philosophy of organism. The framing of such a speculative philosophy is not, however, an end in itself, since it must guide action as well as reflective activity. However far we may succeed in demonstrating the philosophical reasonableness of the Christian faith and the objective validity of its fundamental intuitions, there is always needed the act of faith which is not content to hold a theory as probable but decides to venture on its truth in the field of action. Thus all our metaphysical discussion and effort will not and cannot save each individual man and woman from the obligation of making a final personal response which he or she alone can give. This is not to say that the effort to think about the religious problem is of no use and that the result is of no value. We must steer a middle course between defeatist anti-intellectualism and an uncritical trust in speculation.

The issue then is—given the Christian experience of God through Christ, can we construct a metaphysic to justify us in asserting the existence of that Object to which that experience refers or in other words, from the undoubted historical fact that men have really believed in the Christian God as if He really existed, can we make the confident transition to the "objective" existence of such a God whose purpose and nature have been revealed in Jesus Christ. Religious people, whose certainty springs from the warm and intimate personal communion with God in their daily lives, are apt to be impatient with the critical and sifting mind of the philosopher and accuse him of dissecting only to destroy. This may be true of certain

philosophers but there is no reason why it should be inherent in the exercise of the philosophic method, apart from the inevitable and healthy tension between the operations of the intellect and the response of the whole man in worship. Indeed, if the Christian belief about God is true, it would be strange if the results of man's reflection upon the world, which God Himself has created, were in irreconcilable opposition with God's own self-disclosure in the religious experience of men.

What affirmations then may one make after a survey of the world-process and of the human race's varying experiences and what may one conclude as to the existence of the Object of Christian worship—God? The importance of an adequate phenomenology of the religious life is not disputed; to elucidate the essential nature and structure of the religious consciousness as it has manifested itself in the course of human history is an essential preliminary but the question of truth and error is not thereby solved, nor is there eliminated the necessity of constructing a metaphysic to adequately account for the data disclosed in such experience. Furthermore, as we have already seen, a phenomenology of religious experience, which includes the East as well as the West, presents us with disagreement on the vital question of the personal or impersonal nature of the substratum of the universe. The necessity is therefore thrust upon us of discovering and presenting what M. Hauter calls « the great objectivities which govern human life ». Our future plan of study will therefore be as follows:—

(A) An attempt will be made to define and justify speculative philosophy in the face of attacks levelled against it and to show its role in relation to the religious life.

(B) The ground will be cleared by showing that there is no innate knowledge of the existence and character of God as the early rationalist thinkers maintained.

(C) A constructive effort will be made to show the significance of the emergence of mind and to justify the use of the category of personality for the purposes of philosophical explanation.

(D) An analysis of the nature of scientific knowledge will enable us to show its limits and justify our appeal to immediate

experience and the moral and religious data offered in the course of history.

(E) An investigation into the nature of morality shows the incompleteness of it without a religious basis and its inevitable dependence upon a "personalist" approach to ultimate reality.

(F) Finally our "personalist" metaphysic will be found to be completed by an empirical study of religious experience, culminating in the specific Christian reaction to the universe. There are therefore three converging lines of evidence to justify us in asserting the existence of the Object of Christian worship—metaphysical speculation and scientific practice, the moral life, and the concrete practice of the religious life itself.

## CHAPTER 3.

## A JUSTIFICATION OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY, ITS RELATION TO RELIGION, AND A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF MAN'S INNATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

Kant has expressed in language unusually poetical for him the risks involved in the unbridled use of the speculative reason. « We have just passed through the country of the pure understanding and have carefully examined each region; further we have measured it and assigned to each thing its proper place. But this country is an island, enclosed by nature within unchangeable limits. It is the country of truth (flattering name) surrounded by a vast and stormy ocean, which is the peculiar province of illusion where many a fog, many an ice-berg, soon to dissolve away, affords a deceitful image of fresh lands and ceaselessly lures by false hopes the wandering sailor in search of new regions, involving him in adventures he cannot renounce and whose end he will never reach. » (1). The differences between the various philosophical systems, the stiffling effect of a dominant group of ideas, have frequently produced a severe reaction against all attempts at constructing a comprehensive system of thought. Socrates, with his customary irony, feels it his duty to deflate the undue confidence of his contemporaries. « For whenever I convince someone of ignorance, those who are present imagine that I know that of which he is ignorant. » (2). His divine task is to bring home to others their lack of knowledge, not to put forward on his own account any coherent system of thought. Locke too, faced with the endless differences

(1) Kant, KdRV. cited in Kant, Theodore Ruyssen, Paris 1929, p. 109.
(2) Plato, The Apology, Oeuvres Complètes, Paris, 1925, Tome I, p. 147.

between men's views and the dogmatic assurance with which they are held, is tempted to believe that « either there is no such thing as truth at all, or that mankind has no sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it. » (3).

Since Kant, speculative philosophy, as an attempt to construct a comprehensive system of ideas in terms of which every element in our experience may be interpreted, has not been in favour, despite the later ambitious attempts of the German Idealist school. Firstly Kant's influence has been sufficiently great to make man doubt even the possibility of speculative philosophy in the above sense. Secondly, the continuous advance of the sciences with their never ceasing investigation of « irreducible and stubborn facts », together with an increasing recognition of the theoretical difficulties involved in their interpretation, has reinforced the sense of an undecipherable complexity in the nature of things. The immediate social situation during and after the war, with its revelation of the power of the irrational forces at work in the world, has also sapped that calm confidence in the rationality of the universe which is indispensable in the attempt to philosophize on the grand scale. The universe may be mysterious, as Sir James Jeans has said, but it is not simply inscrutable mystery. If it were, all thought about it would be impossible.

The intention here is certainly the more modest one of trying to define and defend certain positions which will enable us to treat constructively the questions which arise from consideration of the "Object of Christian Worship". Our aim will be rather the removal of philosophical prejudices than a sustained attempt at speculative philosophy. None the less the assumption is that the latter is legitimate and possible and that a natural theology has not been rendered hopeless by Kant or his successors. The question is of present interest in view of Dr. Whitehead's ambitious attempt at a new synthesis, and his courageous venture into the field of speculative metaphysic. As frequent use will be made of his writings as illustrative of a fruitful method of approach and as heralding an endeavour to return to pre-Kantian modes of thought, it is relevant to

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(3) Locke, An Essay concerning the Understanding, Draft of 1671, Edited by B. Rand, Cambridge (Mass.) 1931, p. 18.

consider here the main principles which have governed his thought.

Dorothy Emmet's comment is—« Yet Whitehead can still hold that there is a place and a necessity for a natural theology. He is maintaining that cosmology—speculative scientific philosophy united with speculative theology—is more than fanciful myth-making. » (4). Is this a possible faith and if so, upon what is it founded? The first chapter of "Process and Reality" gives us his views as to the possibility and legitimacy of speculative philosophy. His position may be briefly summarized under the following heads:—

(*a*) « The primary method of mathematics is deduction; the primary method of philosophy is descriptive generalization. » (5).

(*b*) « Metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious, they are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities. » (6).

(*c*) The merely inductive method of approach is not sufficient but must be accompanied by the free play of the imagination controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic.

(*d*) « The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought; and the starting point for any thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience. » (7).

(*e*) « Speculative philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element in our experience can be interpreted. » (8).

Perhaps the best way to unterstand the implications of Whitehead's method is to consider his position in relation to Kant. The result of the latter's critical philosophy was, according to Miss Emmet, to give up the attempt to find an order in things. Henceforth the mind has turned in on itself and « sought an order in its own experiences as thinking and willing ». The

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(4) D. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, London, 1932, p. 244.
(5) A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality, Cambridge, 1929, p. 14.
(6) Ibid., p. 11.
(7) Ibid., p. 5.
(8) Ibid., p. 1.

significance of the Kantian philosophy is in the Copernican revolution which makes the constructive activity of the subject the primary factor in all possible experience.

Prior to Kant, the dogmatic metaphysicians and the empiricists were agreed that knowledge proceeds from the action of things upon the mind. « Renversons l'hypothèse », nous propose Kant, « et supposons que la connaissance s'explique par l'action de l'esprit sur les objets. » (9). Yet it should never be forgotten that Kant was not intentionally idealist and that a realist element remains. « L'existence d'un objet agissant sur le sujet demeurera le postulat fondamental que la critique admet et ne démontre pas. » (10). For Kant, however, this object is the unknown and unknowable « Ding an sich ». The only thing one can say is that it is there, and even that is difficult to justify in the light of Kant's previous analysis. Further he never denied the fundamental importance of sense-experience. « Or tandis que le géomètre peut a priori construire un cône dans l'espace, le métaphysicien ne peut a priori déterminer la couleur du cône parce que, d'un concept vide, il ne peut rien tirer si une matière ne lui est donnée par l'expérience. » (11). Thus for Kant « Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. » (12). Whitehead expresses in a sentence the fundamental conception embodied in the critical philosophy— « The process whereby there is experience is a process from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. » (13).

Whitehead attempts to renverse this method of procedure. If he can be labelled at all, one would say that he is a Platonist in the sense that he believes there is some affinity between the reason in us and the objective logos in the structure of the world. « The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity, namely from the objectivity, whereby the objective world is a datum... to the subjectivity, whereby there is one individual experience. » (14).

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(9) T. Ruyssen, Kant, p. 68.
(10) Ibid., p. 69.
(12) Kant, Transcendental Logic, Introduction, § 1 cf. Process and Reality, p. 217.
(13) Process and Reality, p. 217.
(14) Ibid., p. 217.

This is not the place to attempt to expound the philosophy of Whitehead as a whole. The question raised here is whether our attempts at an understanding of the world are condemned beforehand by the very nature of things. Miss Emmet formulates the issue thus—« We must either say that no intellectual understanding of the world is possible, that reason can tell us nothing whatever about the nature of things, and so be frank anti-intellectualists; or we can make the postulate that there is a logical structure in reality, and that rationalism is a never-ending adventure in trying to approximate more nearly to an adequate symbolic formulation of it. » (15). If it is admitted in principle that the latter is possible, then it will not be unjustifiable to preface our study of concrete religious experience by certain metaphysical considerations drawn from our experience of the world in general. However, as A. E. Taylor points out, there is no reason to claim that there is a special metaphysical way to God, seeing that metaphysics is « an unusually hard effort to think clearly » (16).

At this point it will not be without value to discuss in more detail the relation between this metaphysical discussion and the religious life. Here the greatest clarity and finesse are needed. If the validity of the religious life is made to rest upon the certainty of the propositions which constitute our "natural theology", the former becomes infected with all the uncertainty attaching to any metaphysical system whatsoever. If, on the contrary, the two are divorced, one is faced with the curious combination of intellectual agnosticism or even scepticism and religious faith. The latter now freed from any effective intellectual control can easily degenerate into futile superstition. This question can best be discussed not in the abstract but in relation to a concrete personality, conscious of the problem and determined to solve it without the suicide of the reason or the transformation of living religion into a mere set of metaphysical postulates, admirably exemplified in the person of Blaise Pascal. He has been criticized as being in reality a disciple of that extreme form of scepticism which has received its name from Pyrrho of Elis (300 B. C.). One has even gone so far as to speak

(15) Emmet, Philosophy of Organism, p. 54.
(16) A. E. Taylor, Essays Catholic and Critical, S.P.C.K. 1926, p. 45.

of the atheism of Pascal, that is to say, that he completely despaired of reaching any certain knowledge of God's existence or His attributes by the exercice of the natural reason and that therefore his faith was a leap of despair, a suicide of the reason and, as a natural implication of this criticism, an act of feebleness marked by the disappearance of that intellectual vitalty and force which characterized his early efforts. That this criticism, which we believe to be mistaken, has been possible at all is due to the following features of his work:—

(1) Pascal did attack with vehemence that false pride and self-sufficiency of the reason confident in its capacity to solve all problems in heaven or on earth.

(2) He wished to retain a place for another sort of knowledge obtainable not through the reason but through the heart (cœur).

(3) He knew that living religion transcends metaphysics, however logical and cogent may be the reasonings of the latter.

(4) None the less he retained his faith in reason (la pensée), regarded it as the chief glory of man, and never adopted anti-intellectualism as a final and satisfactory attitude for the religious man.

Since these four assumptions also underlie this thesis, it will be useful to see how Pascal dealt with the issue.

Firstly, Pascal notes the existence of two forms of excess – one is to exclude the reason, the other is to admit only the reason (17). It is with the latter that we are now concerned—the attempt to make reason the sole arbiter. Here Pascal does not hesitate to take sides quite often with the sceptics, the Pyrrhonists. He finds that his mathematical and scientific researches have brought him no nearer to an understanding of man as man. « When I began the study of man, I saw that these abstract sciences are not proper to man and that I was wandering further from my condition (as man) by penetrating them than others by ignoring them. » (18). He shows that reason has not yet arrived at results which compel the universal and unconditioned assent of all men. It is reasonable on the part of

(17) Pascal, Texte établi et annoté par Jacques Chevalier, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Vol. 34, 1936, Pensées, par. 3.
(18) Ibid., par. 80.

reason to confess that it has not yet discovered anything firm or solid. The structures built upon reason are shown to possess an element of uncertainty. « We burn with the desire to find a firm seat and a final solid basis upon which to construct a tower which rises to infinity, but this whole foundation of ours crack and the earth opens to reveal an abyss. Let us not therefore seek assurance and stability. Our reason is continually deceived by the inconstancy of appearances; nothing can fix the finite between the two infinities which at once enclose it and shun it. » (19). The reason is weakened by constant conflict with the passions, what Pascal calls « une guerre intestine ». The effort to renounce the passions has been as unsuccessful as the attempt to suppress the reason. « The reason remains always, accusing the passions of their baseness and injustice and disturbing the peace of those who yield to them; but the passions are still active in those who wish to renounce them. » (20).

The reason is tempted to make absurd claims for itself and when it does this, it must be combatted. He has some harsh words for those philosophers who believe that man can reach a knowledge of God by introspection. The advice is useless if a man lacks self-knowledge and if he has it, he knows very well that a knowledge of his own imperfect nature is not a pathway to God. « La belle chose de crier à un homme qui ne se connaît pas, qu'il aille de lui-même à Dieu. Et la belle chose de le dire à un homme qui se connaît! » (21). Scepticism is a useful weapon for attacking the unjustified claims of the reason and in this sense one can say—« Le pyrrhonisme sert à la religion ». Can a man say that he has absolutely certain demonstrative truth? He cannot. What then is the alternative—must he doubt everything, even his own existence? That is not possible and Pascal has the common sense to admit that there has never been an effective complete sceptic. « La nature soutient la raison impuissante et l'empêche d'extravaguer jusqu'à ce point. » (22). None the less the intellectual uncertainty to which man is heir draws forth from him this

(19) Ibid., par. 84.
(20) Ibid., par. 317.
(21) Ibid., par. 377.
(22) Ibid., par. 438.

well-knows apostrophe—« Connaissez donc, superbe, quel paradoxe vous êtes à vous-même. Humiliez-vous, raison impuissante; taisez-vous, nature imbécile: apprenez que l'homme passe infiniment l'homme, entendez de votre maître votre condition véritable que vous ignorez. Ecoutez Dieu. » (23). This vigorous attempt to deflate the pride of the reason has led many to regard Pascal as an utter sceptic where the former is concerned. There will be occasion later to see that this was not the final and considered attitude of Pascal.

Secondly, Pascal contends for another kind of knowledge to be obtained by the heart (cœur). It must be remembered that when he is using this word, he is not necessarily thinking of sentiments and the emotional side of life in contrast with the intellectual but also of those intuitions which come to us with irresistible force, that instinctive knowledge of first principles which is not the product of a chain of reasoning. It is not then surprising to find Pascal saying our knowledge of the three dimensions of space and of the infinity of numbers is a knowledge of the « heart ». He is here emphasizing what has already been affirmed that knowledge obtained by reasoning presupposes a previous knowledge of the world given to us in unreflective experience. There is no way of demonstrating rationally that our waking life is not a dream; this inability on the part of reason does not shake our initial certitude in regard to these data but only shows « la faiblesse de notre raison ». Thus reason must base itself upon this initially given, instinctive knowledge of the world. « Et c'est sur ces connaissances du cœur et de l'instinct qu'il faut que la raison s'appuie, et qu'elle y fonde tout son discours. » (24). Pascal's use of the word « heart » also conveys the usual implication of emotion and sentiment. He ask us—is it by reason that you love?—with the negative answer implied. God is not possessed by a knowledge of certain metaphysical proofs of His existence but by the living sense of His presence in the heart. « C'est le cœur qui sent Dieu et non la raison. Voilà ce que c'est que la foi. Dieu sensible au cœur, non à la raison. » (25). This clear recognition of the limitations of intellectual knowledge and the

(23) Ibid., par. 438.
(24) Ibid., par. 479.
(25) Ibid., par. 481.

needs of the heart reveals the fundamental humanness of Pascal and justifies Vinet's apt description « L'homme, chez Pascal, entraîne à sa suite le savant et le philosophe, mais l'homme reste à la tête de l'expédition. » (26). It is the presence of this factor which compels Pascal to say that reason's final step is to recognize the infinite number of things which surpass it and that when it fails to do this, it is a sign of weakness. « Il n'y a rien si conforme à la raison que ce désaveu de la raison. » (27).

The third point is really a deduction from the second, Pascal's clear vision of the difference between metaphysic and living religion. The latter is certainly what would be called today an « existential » question, a matter of life and death. He has plenty of sympathy for those who are led into doubt and scepticism by their sincere search for the truth, but he has nothing but disgust for those who are simply negligent and indifferent. It is an offence against our natural feeling of self-interest and amour-propre and our human dignity. In regard to those who simply ignore the fact of death and the great problem of immortality, he has these plain words—« this negligence in regard to a matter which concerns themselves, their eternity, their all, produces in me irritation rather than tenderness; it both astonishes and terrifies me: for me it is a monstrosity. » (28). Further religion is something intensely practical, centred in the love of God, and finding expression in the concrete duties of life. He has no faith in the saving power of philosophy and somewhat ridicules those philosophers who have God without Jesus-Christ. Pascal anticipates in this respect some recent criticisms of Descartes. God exists in this latter's system only to fill a metaphysical lacuna—« I cannot forgive Descartes: he would have preferred to do without God in his whole philosophy but he could not avoid compelling Him to give a fillip in order to set the world in motion; after that he has no more to do with God. » (29).

Fourthly and finally it must be insisted that Pascal was not anti-intellectualist or a pyrrhonist in his considered attitude.

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(26) A. Vinet, Etudes sur Blaise Pascal, édition par Pierre Kohler, 1936, p. 112.
(27) Pensées, par. 465.
(28) Ibid., par. 335.
(29) Ibid., par. 194.

He tells us that man is visibly made for thinking. The latter is his dignity and his duty. He defends passionately that final liberty of man in the face of all authority. It is the inward conviction of the truth which counts:—« C'est le consentement de vous à vous-même, et la voix constante de votre raison et non des autres qui vous doit faire croire. » (30). He repeats that thought (pensée) is man's greatness and that even if he is a feeble reed, yet at least he is a thinking reed. Granted the reason is sometimes foolish—« Qu'elle est grande par sa nature! Qu'elle est basse par ses défauts »—none the less it remains the sign of man's greatness. One cannot cite all the passages relative to Pascal's opinion of reason. No one denies that he admitted the impossibility of convincing the hardened atheist by metaphysical argument, or that the notion of the living, personal God came to the philosophers from Christianity and not vice-versa. This, however, does not signify his final despair of reason and its contemptuous rejection. « Tout est là, Messieurs; car quant au raisonnement ou à la logique, Pascal y croit; mille et mille passages l'attestent. » (31). This brief analysis of Pascal's attitude contains in our view the suggestion of a fruitful method of considering the criticisms raised against the existence of the « Object of Christian Worship ». Pascal is held to be right in his endeavour to show the limits of reason and the existence of another source of knowledge. This is the justification for the treatment of moral and religious experience as specific data, with a claim to a special consideration. Recognizing therefore the specificity of religion, Whitehead's attempt to frame a comprehensive system of speculative philosophy is held to be justified. That he tries to do this by the use of organic categories alone will be criticized. The use of « personal » categories in the interpretation of the world-process will be defended as giving a more coherent and intelligible philosophy than that to be met with in Dr. Whitehead's impressive scheme. This « personalist » approach is the only possible one that will enable us to situate the religious experience of the Christian within the philosophic scheme as representing an integral and rational expression of man's

(30) Ibid., par. 249.
(31) Vinet, Pascal, p. 120.

being. Otherwise Whitehead's organic philosophy as well as Bradley's Absolute Idealism will compel us to admit the dangerous distinction between the concrete religious life, as implying communion with God as personal and therefore practically justifiable for the believer, and the ultimate philosophical truth in relation to which the personal category is regarded as illusion when viewed from the standpoint of the Absolute. As we have seen, Whitehead's work may be regarded as a noble effort to rejoin the great European philosophical tradition deriving from Plato. This implies that « if any rational understanding is to be possible, the logos in us must be akin to the logos in things. » (32). It means the rejection of fundamental irrationality in the heart of the universe. Dr. Temple describes it as the discovery by the mind of the activity of transcendent Mind in the « other » than the self.

It is hoped that this discussion will have shown the legitimacy of metaphysical speculation and its limitations. « Enfin croire en Dieu et se trouver incapable d'en tirer aucune conséquence pratique, c'est, si vous voulez, croire en Dieu, mais c'est être sans Dieu. » (33). The endeavour to defend the existence of the « Object of Christian worship » by reference to the metaphysical arguments alone or by an uncritical use of religious experience is almost certain to be unconvincing. What is contended here is that the two taken together constitute a set of converging evidences which make the Christian belief in God reasonable. It is not a question of demonstrating with mathematical rigour the existence of God. This is impossible precisely because such belief involves more than reasoning but also « Dieu sensible au cœur ». Even if one is convinced intellectually, there is still needed the art of becoming Christian and the latter may be, as Pascal insists, an essential element in the attaining of the former. It will be shown later that even science does not offer demonstrative knowledge immune from sceptical attack, but it is not rejected as illusion because of that. A greater measure of certainty is not claimed for our defence of the religious life and its object of reference, God. The religious man can therefore combine complete certainty as a

(32) Emmet, Philosophy of Organism, p. 53.
(33) Vinet, p. 126.

matter of personal religious faith and at the same time admit that the metaphysical scheme which crystallizes this faith is not demonstrative for all men in the same sense as $2 \times 2 = 4$ without being accused of anti-intellectualism. « Au lieu de vous plaindre de ce que Dieu s'est caché, vous lui rendrez grâces de ce qu'il ne s'est pas découvert aux sages superbes, indignes de connaître un Dieu si saint. » (34).

Before venturing into speculative metaphysic and the study of religious experience, we propose to devote the rest of this chapter to a short discussion of the question as to whether man possesses an innate knowledge of the existence and character of God. Let us cast a brief glance back at the path by which we have travelled.

Firstly, the problem was stated, namely that the « Object of Christian faith and worship » has been increasingly subjected to a series of hostile and, in the eyes of many, damaging criticisms.

Secondly, it was argued that the adverse result of many of these criticisms was due to the method adopted, and there is a pressing need to modify such methods so as to allow religious and moral experience their rightful place as part of the data to be considered.

Thirdly, the nature of speculative philosophy has been defined and its role in relation to the religious life.

The rest of this thesis will be devoted to what it is hoped may be modestly called "constructive metaphysic". The attempt will be made to show the significance of the emergence of "mind" and "personality" as this is disclosed to us by the scientific description of the world-process. This will be followed by a discussion of the nature of scientific knowledge, the limitations of scientific method, and its claim to give us the "truth" about the material world. We shall then turn our attention to the data offered us by the religious and moral experience of man. Before embarking upon this somewhat lengthy voyage, we propose to clear the ground by a preliminary consideration of a question which has always haunted the more philosophically-minded believers, namely to discover some simple and logically irrefutable proof of the existence of God,

(34) Pensées, par. 839.

either as a truth clearly engraven upon the minds of all men or as given at the conclusion of an irresistible chain of reasoning.

In face of the criticisms levelled against the Christian Object of worship, God, the following different attitudes may be taken:—

(*a*) The argument from the universality of belief in God—it may be argued that all men have an « innate » idea of God which makes it impossible to doubt His existence and character.

(*b*) The metaphysical argument that the possession of the idea of God is in itself a guarantee of His existence since the notion of a « Perfect Being » would be impossible unless such a Being really existed. This is the ontological argument as stated by Anselm and re-expressed by Descartes.

(*c*) These two propositions may be rejected whilst at the same time it may be maintained with Locke that by the correct use of our faculties, together with observation and experience, men may reach true notions about the being and character of God. This is the attitude taken by Thomas Aquinas and all those who believe that a « natural theology » is possible, that is, that by reflection upon man and the world, we may reach a valid notion of the existence of God and certain of His attributes.

(*d*) The position described in (*c*) may be completely denied on the ground that reason in its speculative capacity cannot lead us to a knowledge, even partial, of God and that our only source of such knowledge is supernatural revelation, i. e. rational reflection can never of itself take us beyond probabilities and is generally the producer of scepticism.

(*e*) The position of (*c*) may be accepted as far as it goes, i. e. man can by the exercise of rational reflection reach a certain knowledge of God but that, in addition to this rather abstract knowledge, there must also be considered the concrete religious experience of men and women and their claim that a *saving* knowledge of God can only be due to the initiative of the living God testifying in a personal revelation of Himself through human form.

The position adopted here combines (*c*) and (*e*). Whether the attempt succeeds will have to be judged at the end of this

thesis. To many this attitude will seem unsatisfactory precisely because there is a compromise and no clear-cut antithesis between reason and revelation. We have not succumbed to a despair of the intellect which would regard man's reason as capable only of impotent gropings in a world it can never know or understand. At the same time, reason has not been allowed to dominate beyond its proper domain and the claim has been made for a proper consideration of « religious experience » as something specific, as a fact requiring explanation.

The debate between Locke and Leibniz as to the possibility of a priori knowledge claims our attention here. Locke claimed that many ideas considered as innate are not really so, this being true in particular of the idea of God. Both thinkers were partly right in their main contentions. Locke contended justly that a priori knowledge, even if it exists, cannot inform us of what exists in the physical world, it can only tell us what will happen if something does exist. Leibniz on the contrary, whilst admitting that we must have sense-experience of some things before we can have a priori knowledge of anything, maintained the existence of the latter, the most striking examples of which belong to the realms of logic and mathematics. The mind is not a tabula rasa, a blank sheet. He asks us to imagine a piece of marble, unhewn and shapeless, but in which the veins are so arranged as to give the shape or figure of Hercules. One could then say that the statue of Hercules is in a certain sense innate in the piece of marble but that in order to discover it, one must first find the veins, then clean and polish it until the figure appears. « Thus it is that ideas and truths are innate in us, whether as inclinations, dispositions, habits, or natural virtualities. » (35). He admits that by an admirable arrangement of nature, we arrive at this a priori knowledge only by the aid of sensible things, but this does not alter the fact that the mind possesses these necessary truths in itself as an intrinsic quality. He freely admits that these innate ideas are only discovered if one pays attention to them and that this attention is stimulated in the first place by contact with the world through sensation. This is his reply to the objection of Philalethe that if there are truths thus engraven from birth

(35) Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, p. 142.

upon the minds of men, then these truths should be most clear and evident in the case of children, idiots, and savages whose minds have been less changed and corrupted by custom and other people's opinions (36). Philalethe is, of course, the mouthpiece of Locke's own objection that a « child knows his nurse, his bib, and his rattle » but that there is no evidence that these innate principles, « these native beams of light », shine out in their full lustre in the infant and the new-born baby. The conflict, however, has largely arisen because the rationalist philosophers have claimed that the extent of this a priori knowledge is far greater than a few logical or mathematical propositions. They have claimed a similar kind of certitude in regard to the existence of a perfect God. Locke's discussion of this question in the « Essay concerning the Human Understanding », published in 1690 but of which the first draft appears to go back to 1671, is still classical and may be summarized here.

(*a*) He criticizes the argument from « universality », that all men everywhere have a clear idea of a Being whom they call God. Locke says that if those who put forward such arguments would only acquaint themselves with history and look « beyond the smoke of their own chimneys », they would discover whole nations without « the notion of a deity ». He fears that the same may be true of many people in the so-called civilized countries.

(*b*) Even where men have an « idea » of God, their views are so different that it is difficult to use them as evidence of an innate knowledge of the existence and character of God. « But it being most evident that men of the same country under one and the same name of God have far different, nay often contrary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of Him, their agreeing in a name or sound will scarce prove any innate notion of Him. » (37).

(*c*) If it is said that the wise men in all nations have the same true conceptions of deity, this may be a fact but it destroys the appeal to universality since these men represent only an elite or, as Locke says, one perhaps in every hundred thousand. The modern researches in the field of comparative religion

(36) Ibid., p. 49.
(37) Locke, Essay, edited by Rand, p. 25.

would suggest that even the wise few are not agreed on this subject.

These criticisms do not spring from an anti-religious bias on the part of Locke for he himself was a sincere believer in God. Yet he reaches the general conclusion that the great majority of mankind are « lazy and inconsiderate » and do not bother their heads about such questions. The few by « thought and meditation and a right use of men's faculties » have arrived at true notions concerning the being and nature of God. Men therefore do not start off with clear ideas of God imprinted on their minds. This, says Locke, is no disparagement of God's goodness. The same God has also sent us into the world with « bodies unclothed » and devoid of art and skill. Yet He has given us the faculties whereby these latter can be obtained and the rest depends upon our industry. Agreeing therefore that a priori knowledge, in the sense in which Leibniz understood it, does exist, this does not alter the truth of Locke's positon as far as it is a question of an innate knowledge of God. If this latter existed, it would be as easy to convince what Pascal calls « l'athéiste endurci » of the existence and nature of God as of the truth of the multiplication table. This is notoriously not the case. It is not a logical corollary of this admission that rational reflection is therefore completely impotent in the face of this question. Furthermore it cannot be granted to the empiricists that observation alone is the only source of our knowledge of what exists. Since no man has ever seen God at any time, this would mean that the impossibility of applying a sense-test to God is sufficient to prove His non-existence. Valid reflection upon the data supplied by observation gives us genuine knowledge of what exists.

It is sometimes said that to seek for proofs of God's existence is a sign of spiritual poverty, that truly religious souls have no need of such artificial and abstract supports. There is a sense in which this is profoundly true but also a sense in which it is dangerously false. « Christianity would long ago have sunk into a noxious superstition apart from the Levantine and European intellectual movement, sustained from the very beginning until now. » (38). We shall proceed therefore at once

(38) Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 207.

in our endeavour to lay the foundation of a metaphysic in which the notion of « personality », whether in man or God, will be taken as central. Unless this can be done with a reasonable show of plausibility, the Christian experience of God will have to be considered as incapable of any organic connection with a reasoned scheme of theology or philosophy. That the attempt to establish such a connection has on the whole been avoided by theologians within recent times is due to the fact that the modern stream of European philosophy, deriving from Descartes and passing through Kant, has on the whole been increasingly hostile to the notion of personality, even in man himself. « The two modern philosophers who most consistently reject the notion of a self-identical Soul-Substance are Hume and William James. But the problem remains for them, as it does for the philosophy of organism, to provide an adequate account of this undoubted personal unity, maintaining itself amidst the welter of circumstance. » (39). But Whitehead's philosophy of organism is compelled, by its very nature, to treat « personality » and personal identity as in some sense « appearance » only and not a fundamental and permanent element in the nature of things. That man represents something specific in the universe irreducible to sub-personal categories is therefore either implicitly or explicitly denied. The attempt is here made to re-establish the specificity of human personality, to demand that it should be treated as what it is and not artificially reduced to a play of physico-chemical forces and that the significance of its appearance should be fully grasped.

(39) Whitehead, Op. cit., p. 240.

## CHAPTER 4.

## THE EMERGENCE OF MIND AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE.

Our approach to this question will be based upon the acceptance of the scientific description of the world-process. According to this latter, mind as we know it in self-conscious personalities, is a late arrival in the evolutionary process and emerged, chronologically speaking, out of a world from which it was absent. The scientific account begins with certain groupings of matter in space, whether matter be interpreted in terms of atoms or of waves of energy or any other unit. Whatever the ultimate constituents of this stuff may be, from it comes the cosmic systems now revealed to us by astronomical research, including our own solar system. This in turn has given rise to life in its lowliest forms and this force of life in interaction with the environment, has resulted in the emergence of mind and self-conscious personality. « Thus there is a large chance that the youngest solar system in the whole colony of stars is our own... civilization on Earth is, let us say, 10,000 years old. If solar systems come into being at the rate of one every 6,000 million years, and if each contains two planets suitable for life and destined ultimately to be the abode of life, then civilizations come into existence at an average rate of one every 600 million years. » (1). There is obviously an element of speculation in this picture but it suffices to place the emergence of the mind in the context of the world-process, as it is seen by the scientist. In the face of this situation we, the self-conscious personalities who have emerged from it, can adopt different attitudes. At a first glance, it is difficult to explain why there is such process at all and why it has the characteristics it has.

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(1) Cf. article in Universal History of the World, vol. I, p. 77.

« No reason, internal to history, can be assigned why that flux of forms, rather than another flux, should have been illustrated. » (2). One can either accept the process as it is, admit that the emergence of mind is a fact but an inexplicable fact simply to be accepted, admit that the process taken as a whole is incomplete and that we cannot know in any sense the nature of the Cause or Causes in which it is grounded, and that the conclusion of the process is for ever hidden from our gaze. In short, we shall confess that for us the process is fundamentally irrational and just leave it at that. This offends both the philosopher's quest for a rational coherence in the nature of things and the religious man's conviction that life is significant, not only as a temporal phase, but in the light of eternity. If a sincere study of the facts leads to such an agnosticism as has been outlined above, then it must be accepted. It is, however, our conviction that the world-process is not so completely enigmatic but contains within itself the clue that will guide us in the interpretation of the whole. Our thesis is in no way original but has been already developed with great learning and logical force by Dr. Temple in the Gifford Lectures— Nature, Man, and God (3). It is our hope here to add certain useful reflections to the three fundamental formulations of these lectures.

(A) « The world which we apprehend is apprehended as having been extant historically before anyone apprehended it. » (4).

(B) « That the world should give rise to minds which know the world involves a good deal concerning the nature of the world. » (5).

(C) « The more completely we include mind within nature, the more inexplicable must Nature become except by reference to Mind. » (6).

(A) The scientific description of the world-process has impressed upon men the fact that this world must have existed long before any individual human mind beheld it. M. Bergson,

(2) Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 64.
(3) W. Temple, Nature, Man and God, Gifford Lectures 1932-3 and 1933-4.
(4) Temple, Op. cit., p. 111.
(5) Ibid., p. 130.
(6) Ibid., p. 133.

following in the footsteps of Darwin and Spencer, has shown us the historical evolution of intelligence. The latter for him is only a weapon which man has gradually forged to enable him to survive in the struggle for existence. It has permitted man at different stages of his evolution to control his environment more effectively, to adapt himself more adequately. The intelligence is firstly an instrument of life and only secondarily an instrument of knowledge. It is in the higher stages of civilization, and then only among the few, that the intelligence ceases to be a means of satisfying the fundamental instincts and becomes active in its own right in the attempt to discover the true nature of the « real » world. It is well known too that for M. Bergson the « intelligence is characterized by a natural incomprehension of life » (7). This will have to be discussed later. Here we are concerned simply to insist that « mind » cannot be isolated from the process in which it appears, that it belongs integrally to the world-process which is sometimes called « nature ». Any « explanation » of this latter must therefore offer some account of mind as being a necessary factor within nature itself.

This starting-point is quite obviously not that of Descartes. As far as we can discover by an analysis of our experience, the mind does not begin with itself and then proceed to the apprehension of an external world by way of construction and inference. The existence of the mother is not an inference of the child but part of the immediately given data of experience. It is only at a later and more sophisticated stage of development that one comes to the point of doubting the « objective » existence of one's mother for philosophical reasons. The apprehension of the world develops pari passu with the apprehension of the self and though they may be separated in the detachment of the study, they are always inextricably combined in personal experience. In his epistemological researches, the realist may start with the external world and seek to make the transition to mind, the idealist may start with the mind as the only thing of which he is certain and try to get back to the external extramental world, but once the two have been completely separated, there seems to be no logical way of healing the severance. In any case, the religious man cannot wait until the epistemologist has

(7) H. Bergson, Evolution Créatrice, p. 179.

solved all his problems and even the philosopher must sometimes act, as Hume well knew. « Philosophy destroys its usefulness when it indulges in brilliant feats of explaining away. It is then trespassing with the wrong equipment upon the field of the particular sciences. Its ultimate appeal is to the general consciousness of what in practice we experience. » (8). It is this latter which must form the basis of any fruitful philosophic construction. « The elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justification for any thought, and the starting-point for thought is the analytic observation of components of this experience. » (9). This analytic observation has produced the scientific account of the world-process with its irresistible implication that the world existed before the individual mind. Accepting provisionally this description as an accurate account as far as it goes, it will not be out of place to relate this method of approach to that line of speculation which derives from Descartes and which may be said to constitute the history of modern European philosophy.

It is well known that Descartes' systematic doubt led him to the unshakeable conviction of the existence of his own self as a thinking substance (a res cogitans) and that this was the rock upon which he proposed to build the rest of his philosophic structure. He abandoned the Thomist belief that perception is the only pathway to knowledge outside miraculous revelation and challenged our trust in sense-perception as a means to genuine knowledge. The senses are by their very nature untrustworthy and their function is not to reveal the true nature of the object. He committed what M. Maritain calls « le péché de l'angélisme ». Descartes' method had the salutary effect of encouraging intellectual integrity and a healthy individualism in the face of the past. « He shifted the balance of philosophy from the external world to the individual », says Mr. Boyce Gibson. Yet despite the logical cogency of the cogito ergo sum—it is an idea clear and distinct, it does refer to something existing (myself), we cannot contemplate it without knowing it to be certainly true—it is not easy to see how one can pass from experiences of one's own self-existence to anything beyond the

(8) Process and Reality, p. 23.
(9) Ibid., p. 5.

self and its states. Having decided that the only certain thing is himself cogitans and that the senses are no longer to be trusted he cannot be sure that he has any genuine knowledge of anything outside the self. There may even be a malicious spirit (le malin génie) intent upon deceiving us even by means of our clear and distinct ideas. Descartes' solution of this awkward problem is surprising to the contemporary thinker. He reaches the external world via God. Whereas Aquinas was more or less naively realist and based his rational arguments for the existence of God upon the evidence offered by the external world to the senses. Descartes no longer has this path open to him. He appears to have been at one with Anselm in the belief that certain truths about the divine nature could be reached by the exercise of the natural reason. He is in this respect scholastic, not modern, in his confidence. « How could I realize », he says, « my imperfection, if I had no prior idea of a more perfect being, and I, who am finite and imperfect, cannot be the origin of the idea of infinite perfection. » He means by God « a substance that is infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, omniscient, omnipotent, by which I myself and everything else, if anything else exists, have been created » (10). There must be some cause of this idea in our minds. What is in the effect must exist in the same or a higher degree in the cause. My self cannot be the cause of the idea since I am obviously not omniscient, etc. « I admit that we could form this idea of God though we did not know that a supreme being existed, but not that we could do so if such a being were in fact non-existent. » (11). God therefore exists and since God is perfect and not « malin », the clear and distinct ideas we have may be taken as giving us true knowledge of the outer world. Descartes has completed the circle. Having started by abandoning the shifting sand of the senses until he reaches the res cogitans, he rises to the omnipotent and veracious God and then descends once again to the world of sense-perception and common-sense. The argument is hardly convincing. Once the senses have been so completely stripped of their trustworthiness, the only solid basis is the ontological argument which will not bear the weight of all that is put upon it. It will

(10) Descartes, Troisième Méditation.
(11) Descartes, Méditations.

be seen that Descartes is preoccupied with the question—How is knowledge possible? Whilst he and his followers were attempting to answer this satisfactorily, the natural sciences, to which he himself gave a great stimulus, went off on their own with a naive confidence in the reality of the external world and the ability of the human mind to obtain a genuine knowledge of it. These sciences, which have begun to examine seriously their basic assumptions only within comparatively recent years, have given us the picture of the world-process previously described. Starting therefore with this scientific account, we shall leave aside for the moment any endeavour to give a definite answer to the Cartesian question as to how genuine and trustworthy knowledge in the absolute sense of the word is possible. Suffice it for the moment to say that the world apprehended is prior to its apprehension by any individual mind.

(B) « That the world should give rise to minds which know the world involves a good deal concerning the nature of the world. » (12). It is not necessary here to show in detail the different stages by which « mind » has emerged. This descriptive task has already been done for us by the biologist. The actual origin of consciousness is an obscure and difficult question. It seems however probable that the power of self-motion, evident in the smallest of living creatures would stimulate a rudimentary awareness of the difference between organism and environment. The first decisive turning-point is the substitution of intelligence for instinct as a means of adaptation. Nature, if one may so speak, seems to have been faced with the necessity of making a choice between the two. Either she could supply the animal with natural weapons, as in the case of the now extinct prehistoric monsters provided with huge shell-like encasements as a means of defence and protection, or she could leave the organism comparatively unprotected, as in the case of man, but develop in the organism an intelligence capable of manufacturing the weapons and instruments needed for the conservation and preservation of its life. Man, in whom this faculty of intelligence first becomes self-conscious, finds himself without adequate natural protection against cold and famine. He must make himself clothes, learn to cultivate the soil, store food, study

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(12) Temple, Gifford Lectures, p. 130.

the climate, in short use his intelligence as a weapon of protection. When nature « chose » the path of intelligence, she was taking great risks, but the success has been all the greater. Intelligence in the sense of « cognition » appears very late in the process. Consciousness arises at first simply as an organic reaction, aware of its significance in terms of pleasure and pain. Awareness of that which is outside the organism is not so much due to direct bodily sensation: physiologically, emotional tone « depends on the condition of the viscera which are peculiarly ineffective in generating sensations». « We prehend other actual entities more primitively by direct mediation of emotional tone, and only secondarily and waveringly by direct mediation of sense. » (13). The account given to us by modern science of the growth of the human organism and of the mind within it shows that the consciousness of the external world is mediated directly through the emotional tone elicited from the organism by the external world in response to that of the latter. Immediate experience therefore supplies us with an apparently undifferentiated continuum which the mind then attempts to analyse into its component parts. « The subject-object relation is therefore ultimate in all cognition and neither term is in any way reducible to the other. » (14). The significance of the fact that the mind is capable of knowing the process which has produced it has been finely expressed by Pascal in the Pensées.

« L'homme n'est qu'un roseau, le plus faible de la nature; mais c'est un roseau pensant. Il ne faut pas que l'univers entier s'arme pour l'écraser: une vapeur, une goutte d'eau suffit pour le tuer. Mais, quand l'univers l'écraserait, l'homme serait encore plus noble que ce qui le tue, parce qu'il sait qu'il meurt, et l'avantage que l'univers a sur lui; l'univers n'en sait rien. » (15).

Thus, says Pascal, our whole dignity consists in thought. The fundamental moral principle is this—let us then strive to think well. This is a striking passage coming from one who was equally conscious of man's misery without God, and who launched one of the most devastating attacks against human pride in the intellect. His insistence that mere size is not the most important thing is very relevant to our theme here.

(13) Process and Reality, p. 197.
(14) Temple, p. 126.
(15) Pensées, par. 264.

« I should have no more by possessing lands; spatially, the universe includes me and swallows me up like a mere speck; but by thought I understand it. » (16). The same idea is expressed by Leibniz—« Un seul esprit vaut tout un monde, puisqu'il ne l'exprime pas seulement, mais le connaît aussi, et s'y gouverne à la façon de Dieu. » (17). The implications of this are far-reaching. The fact that man can understand, if only partially, the universe in which he is placed means that this latter is in some sense amenable to intelligent treatment. The fact that the universe is capable of being understood by the human mind tells us something, not only about the dignity and the capacity of the beholding mind, but also about the universe itself. There exists a fundamental kinship, a hanging-togetherness of mind and the world. The Kantian explanation of this fact is to say—that is very natural since the mind finds in the world what it has already put there. It has been maintained, however, that science contains an irreducible element of realism, that the subject-object relation is fundamental, and it will be seen later that the nature of scientific knowledge demands another and different solution which approximates to Whitehead's re-assertion of the Greek principle of the logos. This would account for the really surprising fact that the mathematical laws discoverable by the mind « apply » in some sense to that which is « other ». The scientific method demands the assumption that there is an « object » of research, that there is something going on outside the individual mind, and that there is some sort of liaison, a possible contact between the two, which means that there is not absolute heterogeneity.

(C) « The more completely we include mind within nature, the more inexplicable must nature become except by reference to mind. » This raises the fundamental question—is there anywhere to be found a principle of explanation which is completely satisfactory to the mind? If the scientific description of the world-process is taken as the last word, then there is left a final dualism, an unresolved irrationality in the heart of things. Life appears to have « emerged » from « inanimate » matter and the personal from the sub-personal. The principle of purpose and

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(16) Ibid., par 265.

(17) Leibniz, Discours de Métaphysique, p. 115.

intelligent choice is only one that really satisfies the mind. The latter, as we have seen, is an integral part of the world-process and cannot be separated from it. How can this process therefore be explained apart from mind? The Cartesian attempt to mathematicize the world and to exclude all final causes will have to be abandoned. It is interesting in this connection to consider Leibniz's defence of final causes as against Descartes. Many of Leibniz's arguments are no longer convincing to us and the problems are stated by us in a somewhat different form. None the less the support of this many-sided thinker may be claimed for some of the positions here advocated. Firstly it should be remembered that Leibniz also was a mathematician and that he accepted the Cartesian method as applicable to certain aspects of reality. He therefore believed that the mechanical explanation of things was true up to a certain point—what makes him significant is his refusal to accept this as the whole truth about the world. He wished to find a place for final causes and for the notion of liberty and goodness, that is for mind and personality. Descartes' attempt to explain the world in terms of extension (étendue) and motion is insufficient since these terms are not self-explanatory. Efficient causes need final causes to give them true intelligibility. He points out some of the difficulties and indeed absurdities to which the mechanistic explanation by efficient causes alone leads. One must say that we see because we happen to have eyes, not that our eyes were made in order that we may see. In the Timaeus, it is asserted as something evident that the sight has been created specialy for us as something of the highest utility (18). To explain nature in mechanical terms, says Leibniz, is just as if a historian, wishing to recount the conquest of some great prince, attributed the latter's success to the fact that small particles of canon powder, ignited by a spark, escaped at a speed sufficient to impel a hard and heavy body against the walls of the fortress, whilst the copper of which the canon was made was strong enough to resist disintegration as the result of the speed: instead of showing how the conqueror had chosen with foresight a suitable time and means and how his power had overcome all obstacles (19). To eliminate the

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(18) Plato, Timaeus.

(19) Leibniz, Discours de Métaphysique, p. 96.

element of intelligent choice and purpose is to make nonsense of the mechanistic scheme. The same is true of the world-process. If we wish to find an « explanation » as distinct from a description, it must be in terms of intelligent purpose. « If it (the world) is as described, we may be glad that it is what it is, but that is not the same as saying that we see why it is what it is. » (20). Descartes' programme is clearly stated:—« Que je ne reçois point de principes en physique, qui ne soient aussi reçus en mathématiques, afin de pouvoir prouver par démonstration tout ce que j'en déduirai; et que ces principes suffisent, d'autant que tous les phénomènes de la nature peuvent être expliqués par leur moyen. » (21). This means that « nature » can be effectively explained without any reference to mind in the sense of intelligent purpose. Leibniz, as we have seen, admitted that the scientist is obliged to accept the mechanistic scheme as a working hypothesis and the fact that it has succeeded in its application to certain aspects of reality proves it is not simply false. Having granted this, he still insists that this method only gives us a very superficial knowledge of the nature of things. He rejects the Cartesian notion of extension-substance, which cannot explain the multiplicity of bodies nor their resistance which implies a certain activity. For him there is a hierarchy of being—

(*a*) Those beings which are simply living (simple vivants), i. e. inorganic beings and plants. Even at this level, there is « thought » of a certain kind, not conscious, reflective thought but something similar to our « experience of being overwhelmed by a deep sleep uncontrolled by conscious thoughts ». These are the « bare nomads ».

(*b*) The next stage is marked by distinct perception, memory, and what may be called an anticipation of reason embodied in habit and the ability to act according to certain associations of ideas. These are the animals. Intelligence here is still completely empirical, i. e. based upon examples. The felt necessity of universal rational principles does not yet appear.

(*c*) The emergence of rational animals or « minds ». Here we have conscious reflection and an awareness of those neces-

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(20) Temple, p. 260.

(21) Descartes, Principes de Philosophe, 2e partie, principe 64.

sary truths which form the basis of all science. Leibniz places God at the summit of this hierarchy, admitting too the possibility of the existence of non-human beings possessing a higher form of intelligence between man and God. In this system, « reason » in the words of Pringle-Pattison, « is present at every stage as the shaping spirit of the whole ».

The Leibnizian scheme reveals a most interesting attempt to interpret the whole process of nature in terms of conscious mind such as we know it in ourselves. We have been led to similar conclusions, not by starting with some form of epistemological idealism but rather with the realistic scientific attempt to describe dispassionately the world-process. This latter attempt has shown « mind » itself to be such an integral part of the process that there is no way of accounting for it, unless by admitting its presence in some sense throughout the whole range of the process. That Leibniz saw this clearly seems to us a vitally important advance upon Descartes:—« Should there exist anyone sufficiently irrational to suppose that man is the only being capable of knowledge and of wisdom, but that nevertheless he has been formed by pure chance, and that it is this principle, blind and unknowing, which guides all the rest of the universe, I will advise him to examine at leisure the very sound and emphatic censure of Cicero. Certainly, he says, no one would be so foolishly proud as to imagine that there is within him understanding and reason, and yet, however, that there is no governing intelligence in the universe. » (22). Leibniz in our view was fully justified in the belief that once the presence of mind is admitted anywhere in the process, then it must be admitted everywhere, that only by the use of final causes, i. e. in terms of intelligent purpose can any « intelligible » explanation of the world-process be given. This means that neither the mathematical (Descartes) nor the organic (Hegel) symbolism is adequate to describe the fact of personality as we experience it in ourselves through our intercourse with other persons. This brings us to one of the most fundamental questions the implications of which are far-reaching. Before we can give greater clarity to the notion of intelligent purpose we must attempt some kind of answer to the question—How is the self to be conceived?

(22) Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, p. 384.

What is the nature of « personality » ? Our discussion presupposes that we can speak of the emergence of « mind » and of « personality » in a more or less definite sense. Our primary concern is not to attempt a complete demonstrative proof of Theism, but to show that, apart from the testimony of religious experience, there are grounds for believing that the world-process is grounded in « mind » and therefore in that which is « personal ». Certainly this affirmation does not decide the question as to the quality of this personal ground or cause. Indeed in the face of evil and suffering, and the presence of ugliness as well as of beauty, it might be asserted that the Personal Being, in whom the process is grounded, is malicious, immoral, and cruel, instead of being the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. There are, too, philosophical difficulties in the application of the notion of « personality » to God. The doctrine of the impassibility of God was largely dictated by the desire to free the notion of God from the more unworthy passions of men a necessary purgative of that which remained of the cruder Greek anthropomorphism. The point to be developed and emphasized here is that the scientific description of the world-process commits us to the view that « mind » or « personality » is an integral part of the process and that we are not therefore compelled to accept in the name of science a metaphysic which, by denying the presence of personality or by making the ultimate impersonal, would thereby deprive the religious experience of its raison d'être and make it inexplicable or illusion. As Pascal has insisted, the God of the religious man is not the « Dieu des savants et philosophes » and that the metaphysical proofs of God's existence are so remote from the reasonings of men, so involved, that they have little force or influence. There is also the more profound reason that these metaphysical efforts either undermine or ignore the religious man's conviction of the « personal » relationship which binds him to God. The notion of « personality » however cannot be made clear and distinct in the Cartesian sense, and this constitutes the first great difficulty in the philosophical treatment of it.

We shall devote the rest of this chapter therefore to a consideration of this question. Let us begin with the difficulties raised by Hume in regard to personal identity. The common-

sense view, of course, is that there is a « self » which endures through all the changes of this mortal life. The fact that the body is in a constant state of metabolism, the changes in our moods, the continuous flux of our mental life, all this does not prevent the average person from thinking that he has a « self » and that in some sense he remains the same person through all these changes. « An infant becomes a man, and is sometimes fat, sometimes lean, without any change in identity. » (23). To understand Hume's attitude to this problem of the self, it is necessary to remember his theory as to the origin of our « ideas ». That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions (what we should call sensations) which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent. » (24). A pineapple must be actually tasted before we can have a just « idea » of its taste. Hume, applying this principle, asserts that we can have no « impression » from which such an idea of the self can be derived. « When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception and can never observe anything but a perception. » (25). When we seek therefore to discover the « self », all that we find is a continuous inward flux of perceptions:— « The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations » (26) although, unlike the actual theatre, we have no notion of where the scenes are represented or of the materials of which they are composed.

If this is so, how is to be explained the ineradicable conviction that these various perceptions do form a kind of identity and that we possess an interrupted existence throughout the whole of life? This conviction, says Hume, arises from the action of the imagination in confounding « identity with relation ». A series of related objects, which are different but nevertheless

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(23) Hume, A Treatise of Human Understanding, Everyman Library, vol. 1, p. 244.
(24) Ibidem, vol. 1, p. 14.
(25) Ibid., p. 239.
(26) Ibid., p. 239-40.

similar, induces in the imagination a sense of identity and thus produces the notion of an underlying substance which persists through all possible changes. When identity is attributed to variable and interrupted objects, the tendency is to assume the existence of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable, as with plants and animals, which accounts for this underlying unity. Daily experience and observation show that when we speak of objects supposed to continue the same, we really only mean a succession of parts connected together by resemblance, contiguity, and what is called causation. A ship, much changed by frequent repairs, is still regarded as the same. An oak which grows from an acorn to a large tree is still regarded as the « same » oak, although the particles of matter of which it was originally composed may have completely changed. We are told that the human body changes its composition every seven years. The identity ascribed to the inner life of man is of the same fictitious kind. The imagination, passing swiftly from one perception to another by reason of their resemblance, arrives at the notion of an enduring « self ». The imagination is helped by the memory, a faculty for raising up past perceptions. Without memory we should have no notion of « causation » and therefore of that chain of causes and effects which constitute our self and person. Once having acquired this belief, we can extend the notion of identity beyond our actual memory. We believe ourselves to be the same persons who were concerned with past actions, but of which we have now forgotten the details and the circumstances. The result of Hume's argument has been neatly summed up by Joad:—« If we think of the self as a necklace along which are strung the beeds of our various psychological states, the effect of Hume's criticism is to eliminate the thread and to leave only the beads... more correctly then, the universe is a series of experiences which are not experiences of anything and which do not belong to anybody. » (27). Hume himself is, of course, perfectly aware that he is going against the common convictions of mankind. « I am first affrighted and confounded with that forlorn solitude in which I am placed in my philosophy, and fancy myself some strange uncouth monster, who, not being

(27) Joad, Guide to Philosophy, p. 233.

able to mingle and unite in society, has been expelled all human commerce, and left utterly abandoned and disconsolate. » (28). He realizes too that his philosophy breaks down in practical life. He therefore declares:—« Here, then, I find myself absolutely and necessarily determined to live and talk and act like other people in the common affairs of life. » (29). Yet he cannot reconcile himself to the view that philosophy should have no influence at all upon our practical life. Although it is a virtue of philosophy that is does not excite the passions, that whereas religious errors are dangerous, philosophical errors are only ridiculous, none the less he sees that to throw ourselves back upon uncriticized everyday experience is to leave the door open to all kinds of superstitions and fantastic ideas. Like most acute thinkers, he has his moods of despair, when truth seems quite inaccessible and he is tempted to play backgammon, to converse and be merry with his friends, instead of troubling his head with such useless « subtilities and sophistries ». Yet he fights against this intellectual defeatism and draws the moral that the difficulty of attaining the truth proves the necessity of humility on the part of the philosopher in putting forward his opinions.

It is obvious, however, that if Hume's criticism of personal identity is accepted, then our thesis falls to the ground. The notion of personality is neither evident nor clear enough to supply us with our chief category of interpretation. What Hume's treatment of the question does show is that the nature of mind and the self cannot be discovered by such psychological means. We can never observe the self which does the psychologizing, nor can the self be traced to a definite « impression » or sensation. The only other method is the philosophical one, the attempt to describe the nature of personality in the concrete, not to dissect and analyse. As Joad asserts « If all the different accounts, the physiological, the chemical, the physical, the psychological, the behaviouristic, the psycho-analytic, the economic, the statistical, the biological, the anthropological and the novelist's, were collated and supplemented with other accurate and complete but partial accounts and worked up into a comprehensive survey, they would still fail to constitute the truth about

(28) Bume, vol. 1, p. 249.
(29) Ibid., p. 254.

the Self. » (30). Knowledge of personality means knowledge of the self as a whole and this is only to be obtained in the living of the personal life, that is, in intercourse with other people. Macmurray singles out the following features:—

(*a*) A relationship with a person is vastly different from one with an inanimate object.

(*b*) The reason for this difference is in the mutuality of the experience, that the object gives a response at our own level. Personality reaches its full and mature expression therefore in mutual friendship, or in love at its highest point of development. Personality is constituted by self-consciousness and that is only fully achieved where there is a mutuality of conscious relationship. A man who passed all his life in the presence of inanimate objects only or even amid the living forces of organic but sub-personal nature would never develop a mature personality. « Mathematical relations are external to the terms they relate. Organic relations are internal to their terms. But personal relations are at once internal and external. They create not merely a unity between individuals, but also the differences of the individuals which they unite. » (31). This may seem a very banal and simple attempt at a solution but it is the only way to that « science of man » for which Hume pleaded, a science based upon a genuine study of human nature, the true character of which is only discoverable in the field of human and therefore personal relationships. Hence the justice of Whitehead's insistence on the importance of great literature, social institutions and common practice as data, since they are the concrete results of the clash of persons in their continual mutual intercourse. If we eliminate all this and seek to find the « self » by the Humian method, we shall vainly pursue an ever-fleeing entity whose existence it is impossible ever to reach.

The following summary of Dr. W. R. Matthews' discussion of the question throws valuable light on the importance of this problem. If we treat personality « objectively », as one among the many « objects » in the world and try to define its characteristics, we notice that « every rise in the scale of life is an increase of individuality » and that « unity with complexity » is the

(30) Joad, Guide to Philosophy, p. 249.

(31) Macmurray, Interpreting the Universe, p. 140-41.

distinguishing mark of living creatures. The spontaneous self-directing activity possessed in some measure by every living organism becomes in man self-conscious personality « capable of modifying behaviour in accordance with general principles or judgements of value » (32). There is, however, the subjective approach to this question. Philosophy has on the whole doubted the substantial existence of the soul or self. Although Macmurray's insistence upon the essential mutuality of personal experience has been remarked, there is another aspect, the essential separateness of the self, what Dr. Tennant (cited by Matthews) calls the « impervious individuality » or the « alogical core ». The fact that this element escapes intellectual analysis may be due to the fact that the « essential self is activity » and that the latter is by its very nature incapable of being seized by the intellect, as Bergson has emphasized. James Ward in his « Psychological Principles » asserts the necessity of a subject of experience as a foundation for any possible psychology of the self. Matthews admits that we have no intuition of the self as « substance » and that therefore Hume's description and analysis is practically correct. This does not alter the fact however that his complete rejection of a « central organizing and active ego » places us in an impossible dilemma. Whilst admitting then the claims of scientific psychology, yet the philosopher may defend an activist theory of the « self ». Our « idea » of this self must always remain imperfect because the « I » who does the knowing can never observe itself but only the « me ». A second defect is that our self-knowledge is limited by the fact that the « self » is the product, not only of the active « ego » but also a product of the environment in which this activity is exercised (33). Thus « personality » as we know it in ourselves possesses certain imperfections inherent in its human form.

Our contention is therefore that the world-process presents us with the emergence of conscious personalities capable of rationality, i. e. of acting consciously in terms of the not-self, as Macmurray defines it. The mere absence of logical contradiction is not sufficient to establish the « rationality » of a given set of ideas. It is the continual and mutual interplay of individual

(32) W. R. Matthews, God in Christian Thought and Experience, London 1930, p. 166.
(33) Ibid., p. 173.

and the whole system of nature which discloses the presence of a common reason working in both. We have rejected Hume's attempt to dissolve the consciousness of personal identity into a mere unconnected flux and have maintained that an intelligible explanation of personality demands an activist theory of the self and that intelligent purpose is the only possible category for a rational explanation of the world-process and the emergence of such « persons ». We are committed therefore to the bold hypothesis that the world-process is grounded in personal being. If not, the notion of intelligible purpose must be abandoned. Pringle-Pattison, speaking of teleology as a cosmic principle, i. e. that the developments observable in the world-process are due to purpose and design, declares:—« It is, as I have said already, the character of the whole which we have in view, not the historical fact of its having been purposed, but its nature as worthy of being purposed, something fit to be the end of a perfect Being. » (34). It is difficult to conceive of an ultimate separation between the two, to maintain that the universe is worthy of having been purposed, without at the same time admitting that it has been guided in actual fact by intelligible purpose. For us at least « no value of any kind can exist or have meaning part from personal life and experience » (35). This is where Whitehead's philosophy of organism presents us with so many difficulties. Speaking of what he calls God's primordial nature, he says « This side of his nature is free, complete, primordial, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious » (36). God here is certainly not the personal Creator of the universe but simply an X invoked to show that the world is as it is and not otherwise. The adjective « unconscious » here definitely rules out personality and therefore intelligent purpose as possible ultimate categories. Yet as Balfour says, « All creeds which admit no such purpose (i. e. an intelligent purpose behind the unthinking powers of material nature) are intrinsically incoherent. In the order of causation, they base reason upon unreason. In the order of logic, they involve conclusions which

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(34) Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God, Gifford Lectures 1912-3, p. 332.
(35) M. R. Matthews, God, p. 161.
(36) Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 489.
(37) A. J. Balfour, Foundations of Belief, Edition 1901, p. 218.

discredit their premises. » (37). Intelligent purpose is therefore, as we have seen, impossible without some reference to personal being. It necessitates this latter in a form which is not radically different from our acquaintance with it in ourselves. Yet the recent representatives of the British Idealist tradition, Bradley and Bosanquet, starting with presuppositions very different from those of David Hume, have attacked the ultimate metaphysical reality of « personality ». They insist on the inherent contradictions in the notion of the « self » : they deny that personality is the most significant thing in man, and consider it inapplicable to God and therefore quite unfitted as a category for philosophical explanation and elucidation. The essential mutuality of personal life, which has been emphasized as one of its most important defining characteristics is regarded by these thinkers as leading to the inevitable conclusion that God himself must therefore be considered, not as Supreme Being, but as a member of a community, a primus inter pares, and this is not the normal conception of God—« But even the distinction between God and His worshipper, which must remain to the end in religion, cannot (so Bradley and Bosanquet hold) be regarded as the last word in metaphysics: and thus the ultimate Reality, of which they usually speak as the « Absolute », cannot be God, if by God is meant, as usually in the language of religion, Another than us towards whom we stand in a personal relation. » (38). Lotze, in the Microcosmos, raised another difficulty. For us, the growth of personality is necessarily bound up with the existence of a natural and a social environment, in response to which and in interaction with which the « self » grows and develops. We cannot conceive selfhood in abstraction from this setting provided by nature and other people. Yet God, in any satisfactory sense of the word, cannot be considered to have an environment in the same sense as human beings, nor indeed can His essential being depend upon His relationship with other beings. « What is it that in God corresponds to the primary impulse which the train of ideas in a finite mind receives from the external world »... « Though self-existence cannot be produced by any external condition in a being to which it does not belong by nature, yet it could never be

(38) C. C. J. Webb, Religious Thought in England from 1850, Oxford, 1933, p. 119.

developed without the co-operation and educative influences of an external world. » (39). Lotze admits, then, that for us the ego is not « thinkable » without a non-ego but he denies that this relationship is of the essence of the personal life and that it may be regarded as one of the imperfections inevitably present in a finite creature, but not necessarily as constituting the « essence » of personality. « Every feeling of displeasure or of dislike, every kind of self-enjoyment does in our view contain the primary basis of personality, that immediate self-existence which all later developments of self-consciousness may indeed make plainer to thought by contrasts and comparisons, but which is not in the first place produced by them. Self-consciousness is only the subsequent endeavour to analyse with the resources of cognition this experienced fact. » (40). Lotze's ultimate solution is to suggest that « perfect personality » is to be found only in God, of which human personality is only an imperfect and partial representation. « Perfect Personality is in God only; to all finite minds there is allotted a pale copy thereof; the finiteness of the finite is not a producing condition of this personality, but a limit and a hindrance to its development. » (41). In the light of these criticisms, what is to be our attitude? The religious man is not committed to a doctrine of the solitary personality of God. He is not the God of Aristotle.

« Ainsi Aristote, fidèle à l'idée d'une hiérarchie purement rationnelle des êtres, ne veut rien emprunter au vocabulaire troublé des passions humaines, cher aux âmes religieuses, pour son explication du monde. Il ne voit dans l'univers, ni amour descendant de Dieu vers le monde de la matière, ni amour ascendant des hommes vers Dieu. » (42). Whitehead reminds us that Aristotle's metaphysical train of thought « did not lead him very far towards the production of a God available for religious purposes » (42). Furthermore, the Christian at least is compelled to regard the living God as active here and now. « If God Himself is not active in the process, He is no more than the Eternal Dreamer, and the whole time world becomes the

(39) Lotze, Microcosmos, cf. Selections from Theistic Literature by Caldecott and Mackintosh.
(40) Ibid.
(41) Ibid.
(42) V. Monod, Dieu dans l'Univers, Paris, 1933, p. 53.

illusion which many Absolutist systems declare it to be. » (43). Dr. Matthews ventures further and maintains that mutual fellowship which is the essence of human personality, need not be excluded from our idea of the divine nature, the unity of which should be regarded as a concrete unity « which means a unity of multiplicity and not a bare unitary self » (44). Again, personality in man implies also ethical endeavour, the pursuit of ideals. If, then, the category of personality is applied to God, this demands a sphere from which He distinguishes Himself, in which His « ideals » may be realized. This does not mean that God is considered as progressing towards a better, but simply that He must have a sphere of creative activity. This is to reject what Pringle-Pattison calls the « fusion of the primitive monarchical ideal with Aristotle's conception of the Eternal Thinker ».

The ordinary man has never had a very warm faith in the Creator-God existing before all time and wrapped up in self-centred contemplation. The ordinary Christian thinks of God as in some special sense « near » to him in Jesus. This latter conviction really implies the abandonment of that idea of God as « the far-off, self-involved, abstractly perfect and eternally blessed God of pure monotheism, inherited instincts combining with the potent influence of Greek philosophy to stifle what was characteristic in the new faith (i. e. Christianity) » (45). Whitehead tells us that the Christian theologians of the early centuries were the only thinkers to have improved upon Plato in a question of fundamental metaphysic when « they decided for the direct immanence of God in Christ and in the world generally, for Plato only found « imitations » of the Ideas in the world (46).

It is obvious enough that there are serious metaphysical difficulties in the attribution of personality to God, but these are not necessarily of a more serious nature than those that may be levelled against other systems of thought. Furthermore, it is an hypothesis which enables us to treat the data of the moral and religious consciousness as relevant and as supplying us with

(43) Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God, p. 341.
(44) W. R. Matthews, God, p. 176.
(45) Pringle-Pattison, p. 409.
(46) Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 215.

valuable evidence. No metaphysical scheme as such will satisfy the religious man in his practice of the religious life, because of the former's essentially abstract nature. The attempt here has been made, not to construct a complete metaphysic, but to show that when we are using « personal categories » of God, we are not fundamentally misrepresenting His nature. We have tried to avoid the neglect of what C. C. J. Webb considers to be the greatest lesson offered to theology by the Kantian criticism of the three proofs of God's existence, namely that one can « reach a justification of religion from premises which take no account of an experience specifically religious. » (47). There will be occasion later to discuss in more detail the evidence supplied by the concrete moral and religious life of mankind, which will take us beyond our metaphysical scheme. Whitehead assures us that « it may be doubted whether any properly general metaphysics can ever, without the illicit introduction of other considerations, get much further than Aristotle » (48). Further knowledge of God must be sought in the region of « particular experiences », i. e. in the religious life of men as it is actually practised. An empirical study of this latter is demanded. This will be undertaken as a completion of and supplement to the scheme of general ideas which we have outlined above. This order of discussion has been adopted because many today have metaphysical prejudices, whether they recognize them under this name or not, which weight the balance at the very commencement against the evidence offered by religious experience, and secondly, because it is also believed that a philosophic scheme, employing the notion of personality and its correlative, intelligent purpose, is possible and capable of rational justification. The existence of the « Object of Christian Worship » will therefore be testified to by three orders of evidence, metaphysical reasoning, moral practice, and last but not least the religious life itself.

(47) Webb, Religious Thought in England from 1850, p. 162.
(48) Whitehead, Science and the Modern world, p. 215.

## CHAPTER 5.

## THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE.

Before embarking upon our study of religious experience, it is proposed to devote two chapters to a consideration of the nature of scientific knowledge and of morality. It may be thought a little disproportionate to spend more time on science instead of coming quickly to the centre of interest, the religious life. We believe that our decision is justified in view of the widespread influence of the scientific method and the almost unchallengeable conviction that this method is the only valid means of arriving at « truth ». It is because we believe this to be a quite unwarrantable assumption that we consecrate yet another section to the discussion of science and its methods.

What is the reality with which mind in its scientific activity comes into contact? Does it obtain a genuine knowledge of an extramental reality, i. e. beyond the limits of the individual mind? Let us first approach the question of « truth ». Truth is, strictly speaking, a quality of propositions and can therefore only be regarded from the standpoint of a mind. Does then « truthful » apprehension by the mind give us genuine knowledge and if so, knowledge of what? To answer this question demands an estimate of the value of science.

It is one of the remarkable signs of our times that some scientific men have come to regard their scientific knowledge as only a « symbolic » description of the « real » world. Yet it can never be too much emphasized that the scientist's practice involves the assumption of the existence of this « real » world outside himself, even if it is unknown or unknowable, as Kant maintained, or knowable only in symbolic terms. It is interesting to note the assertion made by different thinkers that the origin and growth of modern science derives from the Christian

Faith. MM. Dubois-Reymond and Tarde declare:—« La foi chrétienne a enfanté la science. » M. Secrétan affirms:—« C'est un phénomène incontestable que la religion est la source commune des lois, des arts, des sciences même. » (1). A. N. Whitehead has maintained more recently that the Christian belief in the one God and therefore in nature as in some sense a fundamental unity, together with the rigorous logical discipline given by the scholastics of the Middle Ages, is intimately linked with the origin and success of modern science. Macmurray asserts more paradoxically:—« The only positive Christian thing in the world as yet is modern science. » (2). His reason for believing this seems to be that science is the only human activity at the present which has that complete sincerity and modesty which springs from a clear knowledge of its limitations, and of the distinction between genuine knowledge and subjective fancy. For the philosopher who is not content to accept his experience of the world without criticism and who seeks a certitude beyond the deliverances of common sense, human knowledge must be regarded as in some sense symbolic, and all experience as subjectively conditioned. The recognition of this truth has led some to the extreme position embodied in the dictum of Condillac—« Toute science n'est qu'une langue bien faite. »

All thought is an attempted interpretation of immediate experience. The latter may be defined as our experience when we are not consciously reflecting upon it, when we are no longer distinguishing ourselves as subject, as I, from the content of experience. Immediate experience is not to be equated, as Macmurray warns us, with sense-perception. I may include sense-perception, imagination, images derived from memory, the results of past reflection, but it is this totality lived, not consciously thought of by the mind. Philosophic and scientific thought attempts by means of words to offer an interpretation of this fundamental experience. The question as to the symbolic nature of all human knowledge resolves itself therefore in the final analysis into a study of language, the forms of expression employed in words, and their adequacy as symbols. Hegel considers it to be the aim of all knowledge to deprive the

1) Cf. H. Bois, De la Connaissance Religieuse, Montauban, 1894, p. 102.

(2) Macmurray, Reason and Emotion, p. 193.

objective world of its « foreign » character and to make us feel more at home in it (3).

As far as can be judged, the most primitive form of thinking is an affair of images produced in the mind through contact with what is called the « external world ». Later the image becomes detached from rigid reference to a particular object and assumes, as it were, an independent life of its own. Then follows the « reduction of imagery » by which the details supplied by perception are omitted and we have an abstract form, a symbol, which can be more easily manipulated by the mind. « Thought is a reflective activity directed upon ideas and manipulating ideas and therefore it is closely associated with the symbolic images of language. It seeks its expression in words. » (4). In reflective thought, whether of the philosophic or of the scientific kind, an organized system of ideas, expressed in words, is substituted for our immediate experience of the world. Indeed, the scientific symbolism may consist, not of ideas or words in the ordinary sense, but of figures or letters possessing mathematical significance. Instead of giving us the vivid colours and varied sounds of the world as it is directly experienced, the scientist may present us with a set of mathematical symbols, meant to suggest the motion and speed of waves of energy. The poet who uses words and is still therefore within the sphere of symbolic thinking, does attempt by the use of these same words to recreate in us images which are able to evoke in us those reactions prompted by our direct experience of the world. This the scientist does not attempt and indeed cannot do with the very « reduced » images he employs. Our thesis has been that no thinking, whether of the philosophic or the scientific kind, is an adequate substitute for our knowledge of the world given through our immediate experience, that therefore all thinking is symbolic, this being necessitated by the use of words, whether spoken, written, or as images in the mind. M. Bois reminds us that « if the epithet adequate is applied to the concrete knowledge of the object known, scientific knowledge is far from deserving this epithet. » (5). All our experience, therefore, is infected with

(3) Hegel, Logik.
(4) Macmurray, Interpreting the Universe, p. 51.
(5) H. Bois, De la Connaissance Religieuse, chap. 9.

subjectivity, since the mind is always an active factor in our apprehension and we cannot get outside our own skins, if the phrase may be pardoned in this connection. Does this mean, however, that because we cannot escape the subjective reference in all our responses, because all our thinking is in part symbolic, that we can never come to a genuine knowledge of the objects presented to our notice? Whitehead expressly repudiates « the trust in language as an adequate expression of propositions ». This is not put forward as an excuse for lack of clarity in expression or as an invitation to put our confidence in vague, undefined sentiments devoid of any attempt at rationalization. It is simply the emphasizing of the important fact that all scientific knowledge and philosophic construction implies a previous knowledge, that which is given to us in immediate experience.

Let us face this problem therefore in relation to our scientific knowledge. It was M. Boutroux who, in his « De la contingence des lois de la nature », reinforced Hume's affirmation that experience could not establish the « necessity » of the relation of causality. « Les lois sont le lit où passe le torrent des faits: ils l'ont creusé, bien qu'ils le suivent. » 6). The laws of nature do not dominate phenomena by any tyrannical necessity but are really descriptions of the rhythms of nature. The root of modern determinism is the belief that everything is finally explicable in mathematical terms. This, however, is not so and is rendered plausible only by the way the scientist abstracts a limited portion of the field of experience as the data for his study. A more recent description of the laws of nature is « statistical averages », i. e. the ways in which nature behaves reveal themselves in certain cases to be always the same and since this seems to happen in as many cases as one can count ad infinitum, then one assumes that there is a « law » at work applicable to an indefinite number of such cases, but it has always to be remembered that this is an act of faith and not a demonstrative certainty. « Complete mechanism », says M. Fouillé, « is a complete abstraction: it is the silhouette of the universe projected on to our thought. » (7). The question is—

(6) E. Boutroux, De la contingence des lois de la Nature (F. Alcan), p. 39.
(7) Vide H. Bois, p. 163.

granted that the scientific description is symbolic, is there a point at which one can say that science does put us in contact with the truth about reality, if it is only a partial truth? Is there any escape from the Kantian assumption that the laws of nature are prescribed by our minds? Does the mind create or discover truth? According to those theories which put the emphasis exclusively upon the creative activity of the mind, the laws of nature, says Jeans, tell us little about nature but a great deal about the working of our own minds. His reply is that the mind in this case would have produced a more readily intelligible pattern in nature and would not have had recourse to the very difficult mathematical gymnastics to which the scientist has been forced in his endeavour to « explain » nature. Moreover, if the mathematicians merely impress their own mathematical laws on nature, why cannot the artist, the poet, or the moralist do the same and meet with equal success? Why is not the artist able to say "the sunset will now turn a little more green or purple: this is necessary to keep it quite perfect as the light decreases" or "the star will appear at the centre of the crescent formed by the new moon, for this is the most artistic arrangement of a star and a crescent"? » (8). Finally he asks why our mathematical minds did not mould nature to their own laws at an earlier date and why it has been necessary to follow such a long and painful path. The conclusion to be drawn from Jeans' remarks would seem to be that although scientific knowledge is in part symbolic, it is not merely symbolic but puts us into direct contact with an extra-mental reality.

It is well-known that M. Bergson has launched an attack not only against the scientific method as in itself abstract and incomplete but against the intellect itself as being by its very nature unable to comprehend the essence of life and to do other than distort it. Pascal was equally conscious of the difference between the methods of the exact sciences, what he calls l'esprit des géomètres, and l'esprit de finesse, the capacity for seeing things in their totality, in their wholeness, a capacity displayed most eminently in the artist and the religious genius. Pascal, however, recognized that the mathematical sciences do give us,

(8) J. Jeans, The New Background of Science, p. 295.

if an incomplete, yet a true picture of the world as far as it goes. He refrained from going as far as Bergson and seeing there only distortion. « It is confusing and mischievous to see in intellect itself, as Bergson professes to do, a faculty inherently deceptive. Reasoned philosophy cannot credit intellect with this inherent deceptiveness without committing suicide... Indeed, if the intellect were really limited in its procedure in the way Bergson assumes, it is hard to understand how it could ever have discovered and proclaimed its own defect. » (9). We shall endeavour therefore to treat in more detail the fundamental questions raised by the practice and success of the scientific method and the reactions which this has provoked. The material for this discussion has been taken from M. Parodi's excellent work « La Philosophie contemporaine en France ».

Firstly, we shall consider M. Emile Boutroux' criticism of the scientific method. His position does not derive from any anti-intellectualist bias as such or from any desire to minimize the importance and achievements of the scientific method in its own field. He is concerned principally to insist on the limitations of the method and to show that « reason » should not be regarded simply as identical with the scientific intelligence, but as containing that wide area of experience not susceptible of formulation in the clear and distinct mathematical symbols of the exact sciences. « Il faut que l'esprit scientifique reconnaisse les droits d'une raison plus générale, dont il est sans doute la forme la plus définie, mais dont il n'épuise pas le contenu. » (10). The artist, the poet, the inventor, even the scientist is governed by a faith, an inspiring ideal, which is not capable of expression in scientific terms. The word « reason » must be allowed to contain æsthetic and moral aspirations, all that is meant by faith, by the ideal, by love. « L'être des choses déborde l'être que la science s'assimile, et l'esprit humain déborde les facultés intellectuelles qu'elle utilise. » (11). Boutroux is making the same claim as Whitehead when the latter sees in the Romantic movement of the 18th. and 19th. centuries a protest in favour of a more organic conception of nature. What Boutroux calls

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(9) A. E. Taylor, Faith of a Moralist, vol. 2, p. 339.
(10) E. Boutroux, Science et Religion, p. 354.
(11) Ibid., p. 357.

the rights of a more general reason, Whitehead finds vindicated and expressed most adequately in poetry. Poetry is concerned with all that vast part of human experience, which the scientist must of necessity ignore because of the method he employs. « For me », says Whitehead, « the criterion must be "naive" experience and it is for that reason that I attach so much importance to the testimony of poetry. » (12). Boutroux starts therefore with the general assumption that the scientific analysis of that part of our experience which can be measured, counted, and weighed, is not exhaustive and that other aspects of human experience are equally existent and demand to be treated fairly and without previous unjustified bias against them. All that is contained in the moral, æsthetic, and religious experience thus takes its necessary and rightful place within the economy of human life, along with science which is only one among several forms of activity possible to the human spirit. The following may be accepted as a short and therefore necessarily incomplete but not, we hope, false account of M. Boutroux' main position. He devotes himself first to the problem of necessity— « By what sign is a thing recognized to be necessary? What is the criterion of necessity? » After a critical examination of the logical problems involved, he reaches the conclusion that experience is able to reveal to us stable relationship (liaisons constantes) but not *necessary* relationships. Further, the scientific belief that everything is necessarily determined springs from the assumption that everything in reality is mathematical, which is by no means proved. The isolation of a world of atoms and mechanical forces for the purposes of scientific study is not sufficient, for this abstract world cannot be isolated from physical and organic phenomena and there is no demonstrative proof that « the real basis of the so-called mechanical phenomena is itself mechanistic and subject to determinism » (13). His conclusion is that the underlying assumption of science that everything is determined mechanistically by necessary and immutable laws is neither demonstrable by logic nor by experience. Passing to another group of studies—the biological, psychological, and social sciences, he shows that here again the

(12) Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 122.
(13) Boutroux, Idée de loi naturelle, p. 49-50.

element of contingency cannot be eliminated. These can never be sciences in precisely the same sense as the others, because the only laws they are able to discover are laws of change and evolution, historical laws, which lack both the permanence and the identity of those discoverable in the physico-chemical field. A. E. Taylor reminds us that the liberty of man, even if only partial, implies that contingency is more profoundly inherent in the historical process than many are willing to admit. M. Hauter likewise attributes Kant's refusal to attempt a philosophy of history to the same cause—namely his uncompromising assertion of man's freedom. Scientific laws cannot therefore be regarded as unchanging and unchangeable, because things themselves are in motion and our minds too are not static but are capable of more ingenious and adequate adaptations to the real. Nothing is fixed. Reason itself is progressive, free, creative. What are called the « categories of the understanding » are only habits of the mind contracted in the course of the attempt to adapt itself to phenomena.

This position, so attractive at first sight, raises, however, special difficulties of its own. If both reason and nature are only flux, what guarantee have we that nature is not entirely capricious? Can we depend upon nature any longer with confidence? And is the scientific belief in the regularity and the dependability of nature only an illusion or does it contain some truth? This would not seem to be the intention of M. Boutroux. He still retains his faith in the power of the intelligence and does not wish to abandon it for a Bergsonian « intuition ». He wishes to free the « reason » from an undue narrowness and to give it a greater suppleness and comprehensiveness. He has no wish to suggest that the « laws of nature » are arbitrary conceptions which man simply imposes on nature. One has no right to say that mathematics are purely conventional, « un simple jeu d'esprit ». It is a fact that mathematical laws are applicable to reality and this is only conceivable if there is « au fond des choses, sinon une intelligence semblable à l'intelligence humaine, au moins des propriétés, des dispositions, qui aient quelque analogie avec cette intelligence » (11). There is, however, another kind of necessity which

(11) Ibid., p. 19.

finds its expression in the Aristotelian doctrine of finality—i. e. a necessity which springs, not from the exclusive dominance of efficient causes, but from the attractive power of the ideal. The fundamental principles, by which things are governed, are those moral and æsthetic laws which act by way of attraction. Nature, the whole cosmic process, appears as that in which the mind discovers itself at work. « La nature nous apparaît donc, en dernière analyse, comme une hiérarchie de formes, de plus en plus belles, parfaites, et libres, où l'esprit, leur commun créateur, se retrouve, se reconnaît, et se saisit de mieux en mieux. » (15). M. Boutroux does not admit any other faculty of knowing beside the intellectual. « Derrière l'idée anti-rationaliste de contingence », says Parodi, « ce n'est ni le hasard, ni je ne sais quel principe occulte qui se cache, mais l'affirmation, et rien de plus, de la liberté de l'esprit. » (16). Still the fundamental problem remains—how is it that our laws are not openly contradicted by the facts? Why do they succeed when applied? Certainly M. Boutroux himself wishes to escape the charge of anti-rationalist. He is equally averse to a rigid determinism and to a fundamental irregularity in the nature of things but he wishes, above all, to preserve a place for spontaneity, for life, for liberty. Parodi asks the important question as to whether there is not an inner logic in the exercise of freedom, an inner logic capable of satisfying the demand for intelligibility and saving reason from the arbitrary and the contingent. Dr. Temple makes a similar criticism of this claim for spontaneity and freedom in things but from the standpoint of spiritual growth. « The will is therefore a real power; nothing forces it to choose one way or the other; it follows its own « apparent good ». It is not undetermined. It is determined by its own apparent good, and itself determines—not by specific choice but by its actual constitution in each self—what shall be its apparent good. Hence it has—or rather is—the freedom which is perfect bondage. It is free, for the origin of its actions is itself; it is bound, for from itself there is no escape. » (17). It would seem therefore that from the standpoint of rational

(15) D. Parodi, La Philosophie Contemporaine en France (F. Alcan), 1925, p. 191.
(16) Ibid., p. 192.
(17) Temple, Gifford Lectures, p. 385.

intelligibility as well as genuine spiritual freedom, more is needed than an assertion of spontaneity and freedom in contrast to some kind of determinism. We shall have occasion to return to this issue later.

We have now to consider the philosophy of M. Bergson, the most effective and powerful reaction in modern times against the attempt to imprison the spontaneity of life within the narrow framework of logic, to escape from the « tyranny » of efficient causes as well as the compulsion of final causes. This philosophy is not merely limited to the attempt to delimit the exercise of the scientific method to a certain sphere—it is a sustained and consistent attack upon the intellect as an instrument for obtaining a true knowledge of the real, and especially of the phenomenon known as life. For M. Bergson, philosophy consists in reversing the normal direction of the work of thought (philosopher consiste à invertir la direction habituelle du travail de la pensée). (18). The result of this is a drastic treatment of the intellect and the attempt to cultivate by way of contrast another means of reaching the « real », the way of « intuition ». « On appelle intuition cette espèce de sympathie intellectuelle par laquelle on se transporte à l'intérieur d'un objet pour coïncider avec ce qu'il a d'unique, et par conséquent d'inexprimable. » (19). By means of this intuition, the philosopher attempts to penetrate beneath all the artificial and abstract constructions of the intellect to a more primitive and naive awareness of things and of life. This philosophy therefore will endeavour to place itself in « that extra-intellectual part of knowledge by a superior effort of intuition » (20). He criticizes Kant for having tried to bring all experiences within the sphere of the intelligence. Kant did not realize that « science might become less and less objective, more and more symbolic, according as it passed from the physical to the vital, from the vital to the psychical » (21).

Philosophy is essentially the effort to express reality in ideas and therefore words, thus appealing to the human intel-

(18) H. Bergson, Introduction à la Métaphysique, in Rev. de Métaph. et de Mor., janv. 1903, p. 27. vide Parodi, p. 255.
(19) Ibid., p. 3.
(20) Bergson, Evolution Créatrice, p. 387-9.
(21) Ibid., p. 388.

ligence. The method of procedure will be twofold:—

(*a*) The negative way of attacking intellectual prejudices and destroying habitual illusions.

(*b*) The positive method of attempting to produce in the reader, by the employment of suitable images, that state in which it is easy for the reader himself to arrive at the intuition.

« L'unique objet du philosophe doit être ici de provoquer un certain travail, que tendent à entraver chez la plupart des hommes, les habitudes d'esprit plus utiles à la vie. » (22). It should however perhaps be said in justice to M. Bergson and this question of anti-intellectualism:—« Bergson introduced into philosophy the organic conception of physiological science. He is thus separated completely from the static materialism of the 17th. century. His protest against spatialization is a protest against the consideration of the Newtonian conception of nature as other than in the highest degree abstract. What is called his anti-intellectualism should be interpreted in this sense. In certain respects, he is near to Descartes but this resemblance is corrected by an instinctive understanding of modern biology. » Whitehead. (23).

We shall not attempt here, what is indeed impossible, to condense into a summary all the rich and suggestive ideas contained in M. Bergson's works. His attitude to the intelligence as such is here the point of interest. M. Bergson is by special training a biologist and it is natural that this should make itself felt when he passes from his speciality to the wider and more metaphysical questions. The intelligence is no longer regarded by him as surrounded by a quasi-divine halo. It is one among several faculties acquired by man in the course of evolution. Its development has been essentially determined by considerations of utility. It has had a practical reference—namely to enable man to act and to adapt himself successfully to the world of objects in which he finds himself. In this, he follows, with some modification, the general position of Darwin and Spencer. The intelligence therefore is not simply destined for pure contemplation ,for the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, but primarily for the effectiveness of action. It is characterized

(22) Bergson, Introduction à la Métaph., ibid., p. 7.
(23) Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 183.

by a natural inability to understand the « living ». It is at home among solid objects, among that which is static and immobile. In face of the living, the essence of which is durée, perpetual becoming, movement, spontaneity, the intelligence must recognize its own inadequacy. « Ce qu'il y a de fluide dans le réel lui échappera en partie, et ce qu'il y a de proprement vital dans le vivant échappera tout à fait. » (24). He concludes from the fact that the intelligence has been developed in the course of evolution largely as an instrument of self-preservation that it is therefore inherently tainted and incapable of being an adequate instrument of knowledge and understanding in the wider and philosophic sense.

We shall need to discuss the implications and the justice of this view later. Suffice it to say now that it does not seem to us that M. Bergson has established beyond dispute the fact that the intelligence has no other function than the satisfaction of practical needs. « Nos concepts ont été formés à l'image des solides et par là-même notre intelligence triomphe dans la géométrie où se révèle la parenté de la pensée logique avec la matière inerte. » (25). If this is so, there is evident distortion when the subject of study is not the world of solid objects but life with its incalculability and its quality of the spontaneous and the unforeseen. One may say then that this theory is a kind of pragmatism and has even led some to regard all science and abstract knowledge as simply a sort of language, a series of useful signs, by which we are able to talk about the world, but not as giving us the « truth » in the philosophic sense.

This discussion leaves us in no doubt that the whole scientific method and even the intelligence itself have been subjected to a very penetrating and even drastic criticism within recent years. How far is it to be accepted as valid? Can one justify the scientific faith in the possibility of arriving at the « truth »? Is M. Bergson's systematic disparagement of the intellect acceptable or even tolerable as the last word? May we not still retain the faith that science is not the mere playing with symbols and signs in an ingenious way but that it does give us a genuine knowledge of the world in which we live?

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(24) Bergson, Evolution Créatrice.
(25) Ibid.

One must at the start admit the justice of many of the criticisms levelled against the scientific method by the thinkers just considered. What is dangerous and undesirable is to accept all the conclusions drawn from these criticisms either by the thinkers themselves or by their more enthusiastic disciples. Let us begin with M. Bergson's treatment of the intellect, since if this true, many of the other questions will be seen to be incapable of solution by any mere process of thinking; if it is not true, the questions still remain open for discussion. Prof. A. E. Taylor has made several acute criticisms of the fundamental position of Bergson, which seem to us to be just and may be reduced to the following theses:—

(*a*) To regard the intellect as inherently deceptive is the suicide of all philosophy and rational thinking.

(*b*) Intellect is not simply a geometrizing faculty in the sense of a measuring faculty. Otherwise, how can the rise of the historical sciences be explained? If the intellect is as Bergson has described it, how could it have discovered its own defect?

(*c*) Even if the intellect has been evolved to met practical needs, is it proved that when thus evolved it can serve no other purpose?

(*d*) Bergson's theory that the intelligence is at home among solids only and the inanimate is improbable in view of the fact that living creatures, even at the earliest stages, are as much concerned with mutual adaptation among themselves as with adjustment to the inanimate physical environment. Hence there is no reason why the intelligence should feel itself incompetent in the realm of the living and indeed of the personal. « The social environment is as old and as insistent a condition of life as the geographical. » (26). « If the intellect is so radically corrupted, philosophy or science ought to be as impossible without supernatural revelation as morality must be, if the human will had been totally "depraved" by the fall of Adam. » (27).

(*e*) The absolute division made by Bergson between la durée réelle (i. e. the inner consciousness of life as essentially becoming, distinguished not by the artificial divisions of clock time, but by differences of quality, as when time seems to go quickly

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(26) A. E. Taylor, Faith of a Moralist, vol. 2, p. 344.
(27) Ibid., p. 343.

or slowly according to our moods) and the objective, mathematical clock time is not an absolute division. The attempt to apply the « clock time » to the durée of the personal inner life is not the « forcing of an alien geometrical form upon experiences of pure duration ». In immediate experience, location in time and space are given together when we find ourselves in a certain place at a certain time. The intellect then attempts to separate the two, not because it is by nature a wilfully distorting instrument, but because of the need of mutual understanding between different persons—to make it possible for persons whose « personal » time and space are different to meet at some common point in time and space. « We are thus delivered from the view, really fatal to serious thinking, that we can get nearer to understanding reality by merely setting ourselves to undo the results of intelligent reflection, and reverting to a more primitive intuition which is only another name for crude apprehension of the unanalysed and not understood. » (28).

(*f*) Bergson is right in maintaining that the rich content of la durée is eliminated by monotonous uniform clock time. He is wrong—

(1) In supposing that there is not a difference of exactly the same kind between real volume, and the qualityless, purely mathematical space of the geometer.

(2) In treating as a wanton blunder the abstracting process by which we form the notion of clock time.

The conclusion is therefore that Bergson, by his depreciation of logical thinking, deprives himself of the only instrument by which he can convince others of the soundness of his view. Whilst these criticisms prevent us from accepting the Bergsonian philosophy in toto, we are not prevented from acknowledging the genius of this philosopher or the real importance of his insistence that « becoming » is of the stuff of reality as we know it, and that any philosophy of merely static concepts, which eliminates this aspect of things, is thereby condemned. What then is the result? M. Boutroux has admitted that science is more than a jeu d'esprit and that the mind discovers in nature the operation of something which approximates to the intelligence

(28) Ibid., vol. 2, p. 346.

present in man. It is significant however that M. Boutroux, despite the limitations he imposes, accepts mechanism as applicable to a wide area of experience. Life and the human intelligence appear therefore as rebellious intruders. Bergson has tried to free the living from the dominance of mechanistic concepts. It is therefore interesting to compare this with Dr. Whitehead's attempt to apply the concept of « organism » to that part of nature usually regarded as subject to some sort of mechanistic scheme. Dr. Whitehead's philosophy is difficult to understand and expound; what is given here is only a bare summary of what the present writer has been able to glean from the stimulating works of this author. A lack of competence in regard to technical scientific questions imposes caution upon us. Rather do we wish to single out his method of approach as worthy of special consideration. Whitehead expresses his indebtedness to Bergson, James and Dewey and his wish to « rescue this type of thought from the charge of anti-intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been associated with it ». The influence of these writers is indeed evident in the title « Process and Reality » of his most important and weighty work. We shall begin then with his criticism of science or rather with what have been the accepted presuppositions of scientific orthodoxy since the 17th. century.

(*a*) The first point to be criticized is the notion of « simple location », i. e. the idea that a piece of matter can be adequately described by reference to its position in a definite finite region of space and a definite finite duration of time without essential reference to other regions of space and other durations of time. This is the « fallacy of misplaced concreteness » (29).

(*b*) He accepts the Humian criticism of causation and induction in the sense that it has never received adequate theoretical refutation. Yet despite this philosophic refutation, we remain convinced of their validity. Once we admit causation as necessary sequence as distinct from regularity of sequence which might at any moment cease to operate, then we imply some kind of link between the different elements of nature and this is inconsistent with the scheme of the 17th. century scientists, in which the world is composed of separate particles,

(29) Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 72.

each distinct, and having no necessary relation to any other particle:—« The enormous success of scientific abstractions, presenting on one side matter with its simple location in space and time, and on the other side, mind, perceiving, suffering, reasoning, but not intervening, has imposed upon philosophy the task of accepting them as the most concrete translation of reality. » (30).

(*c*) He criticizes the traditional dualism between mind and matter. Once admit this complete separation between two radically different and independent substances, there is no way of convincingly bringing together what we have so violently torn asunder. « It (i. e. the 17th. century scheme) implies a fundamental dualism with matter on one side and mind on the other. Between these two are placed the conceptions of organic life, function, instantaneous reality, interaction, order of nature, which collectively constitute the Achilles' heel of the whole system. » (31).

(*d*) The next subject of attack is the notion of substance-quality. Nature is thought to consist of separate pieces of matter located in space. These possess primarily qualities only, i. e. extension in space, number, motion, solidity. When these pieces of matter impinge upon the sense-organs, consciousness comes into play and endows them with the secondary qualities-colour, sound, beauty, etc. In what sense are the colour blue and noise properties of a given body? Is the aroma of scent a quality of the rose? Galileo said that apart from eyes, ears, and nose, there would be neither colours, sounds, nor scents. Descartes affirmed in his Principes de Philosophie—« Qu'il n'y a rien dans les corps qui puisse exciter en nous quelque sentiment, excepté le mouvement, la figure (ou situation) et la grandeur de leurs parties. » (32).

(*e*) The result of the 17th. century view is then to deprive even the scientific world of value. Not only does this traditional account of the world deprive the latter of all its customary sense-qualities, but it also strips it of all those values expressed by the words good, beautiful, holy, etc. If this account is true,

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(30) Whitehead, Op. cit., p. 70.
(31) Ibid., p. 71.
(32) Descartes, Principes de Philosophie.

then the conclusion drawn by Joad is irresistible—« There is thus nothing in nature which justifies or answers to our ethical, æsthetic and religious aspirations, which are the merest will-o'-the-wisps of our consciousness, self-spun fancies which the mind seeks to invest with a baseless objectivity, and projects for its comfort and assurance upon the empty canvas of a valueless universe. » (33). A world without any value means that the scientific account is also meaningless. Yet the scientist believes that his theories are not simply the fanciful play of his imagination, but that in some sense they express the order of nature and therefore correspond with the facts. Is this belief illusion or not?

The « pragmatist » has an answer to this question. This theory contains the following theses:—

(*a*) The traditional intellectualist logic omits the personal and psychological element in all thinking and is therefore without value.

(*b*) Consciousness is in experience a continuous whole. It is only afterwards that the intellect breaks up this continual flow. Why? because of the necessity for action imposed upon us by the need of adaptation to the environment. The mind therefore creates the world of separate objects, a device which facilitates action.

(*c*) Truth is identical finally with emotional satisfaction.

(*d*) Scientific laws are only hypotheses or postulates.

Against this solution of our problem, the following arguments may be urged. If the mind can create its own facts for the purposes of action out of the featureless flux of being, how is it that the mind sometimes makes facts which thrawt it or oppose it? This is only explicable on the assumption that reality is not simply a featureless flux but that it contains certain characteristics which prevents the mind from arbitrarily selecting just what it pleases. Yet if this be so, the reality has certain features independent of the mind's subjective selection and therefore one description of reality may be more accurate than another, i. e. more true. We thus arrive at the negation of the pragmatist theory.

We come back then to our initial question—In what sense

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(33) Joad, Guide to Philosophy, p. 565.

can science be said to be true? How far does it give us a genuine knowledge of reality? The fact that scientific knowledge is continually growing presents us with the difficult problem of defining science? When we ask if science gives us the truth, do we mean the Newtonian system of the 17th. century or the modern theories of relativity? Is it possible to say that both are in some sense true, or is one more true than another? What is the criterion? Whitehead supplies us with some illuminating comments on the case of Galileo? Whereas the latter said that the earth moved and the sun remained motionless, the Inquisition decreed that the reverse was the truth. The Newtonian astronomers on the other hand, working with an absolute notion of space, decided that both sun and earth moved. Whitehead adds that, in the light of modern relativity theories, it is possible to say that all these statements are « true », provided one defines « motionless » and « movement » in a way demanded by the assertion (34). Whether the implications of these modern therories are understood or not, the fact that a modern man of science can speak in this way at all shows that we are far removed from a simple dogmatism as to what is scientific « truth ». Scientific theories are themselves in a state of evolution and it is difficult to say of any theory—this is a final formulation beyond which we can never go.

The success of scientific abstractions within their own field is a convincing demonstration of our main thesis—that mind rediscovers itself at work in the world-process, in nature, in the universe. When the individual mind attempts to penetrate the secrets of the world, it is not confronted by a blank wall, completely impervious to any mental apprehension, but that rather it reveals to the individual mind that the latter is only a small part of a transcendent mind everywhere at work. The scientist attempts to understand this « other » with a clearly defined method. He is dominated by l'esprit de géomètre, he approaches the universe as mathematician. This leads to Jeans' affirmation that « according to the intrinsic witness of his creation, the great architect of the universe begins to appear to us as a pure mathematician ». This seems to be the one point perhaps where we can speak of « truth ».

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(34) Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 227.

Whatever else the universe may be, it does at least seem to be constructed in a way that corresponds to our mathematical way of thinking. This may not be the whole truth about the universe but it is part of the truth, and as scientific success has shown, a by no means unimportant part of the truth. The fact that our scientific knowledge is the elucidation in symbolic terms of « certain components » discoverable in immediate experience needs to be balanced by Jeans' comment that this is not an arbitrary symbolism. It is none the less an abstraction and this justifies us in insisting upon the relative and partial character of scientific knowledge. This need not result in « despair of the instrument » since science springs from a wider knowledge which it presupposes. It is this latter that we must now consider with all the richness it contains. We shall not however disdain the knowledge that science brings; rather would we accept A. E. Taylor's conclusion that the scientific analysis of nature may enable us to see the « footprints, if not the likeness of the Creator » (35).

(35) A. E. Taylor, vide article in Essays Catholic and Critical.

## CHAPTER 6.

## THE NATURE OF MORALITY.

To those who have been associated since childhood with some form of the Christian tradition, it is a natural assumption that religion and morality are in some way closely allied and indeed intimately bound together. One is therefore sometimes led to overlook the fact that historically there has been a great deal of religion with very little of what we call « moral » content and that religious practices and rites have often been completely divorced from what we call « ethics » or the pursuit of moral goodness. The Bible itself presents us with a good illustration of this. Beside the lofty and passionate moral faith of the prophets, there is a whole complicated system of ritual laws governing sacrifice, food, and hygiene which, by the pious Jew, were and still are regarded as an integral part of his « religion ». For the Gentiles and those who have ceased to be pious and orthodox Jews, these rites and practices are neither an essential part of religion nor directly questions of morality, as we now understand the word. Certainly there are some vegetarians who would defend abstinence from meat on moral and humanitarian grounds, but the motive in this case seems to the different from the Jewish conviction that some meats are unclean.

Without attempting at the outset to make rigid definitions, we may start with a rough distinction, the justice of which will be corroborated in what follows. Morality is the endeavour to realize in practice, in actuality, « ideals » which are not yet « realized » in this world of change and becoming. It thus presupposes struggle and effort, the need of fighting for the ideal. In religion, the emphasis is not simply on future realization but on the actuality, the present existence of the Object of Worship.

For the religious man, his God is a very present help in time of need, a Person with whom he can enter into contact here and now. There is therefore an element of paradox, a constant tension in the religious life. « Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest. » (1). There seems then to be at first sight a fundamental contradiction between the exigencies of morality and religion. Let us then try to obtain a clear understanding of the nature of the moral life.

The discussion of morality frequently begins with a consideration of the sense of obligation. « We find in our experience of the world that there is upon us in some situations an obligation to act, or not to act, in certain ways. » (2). This sense of inner compulsion driving a man on to act in certain ways is certainly one of the most striking features of human experience. It may be met with in various spheres of human thought and activity. When Galileo died with the words « but it still moves » in reference to the earth's movement round the sun, he was bearing witness to the compulsion of scientific truth, the conviction that truth is truth, unchangeable by ecclesiastical denunciations and condemnations.

The power of beauty to compel the disinterested allegiance of man is evident in the artistic creations offered us in the course of history. The great artists, like the great saints, have had the same powerful sense of « vocation ». The religious man has it in a pre-eminent degree. It finds its illustration in Luther's Ich stehe hier—ich kann nicht anders, in the Biblical—The Lord hath spoken, who can but prophesy?, in Augustine's—« Thou wast driving me on with Thy good, so that I could not be at rest until Thou wast manifest to the eye of the soul. » This sense of something binding, obligatory, is seen in the Roman Regulus, who returned to Carthage to certain death rather than break his parole honourably given. In this case, the religious motive is

(1) Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 238.
(2) Temple, Gifford Lectures, p. 169.

replaced by a moral consciousness which knows of no limits. There can be no doubt that some men in all ages have had this sense of an uncomprising obligation to do or not to do certain acts. There is too the unusual case of Socrates who was continually prevented by an inner check, his dæmon, from doing certain things. He obeyed implicitly this inner guidance which was negative and preventative, never positive. « It is something which began from my early childhood, a certain voice which, whenever it made itself heard, always turned me away from what I was going to do, but never incited me to action. » (3). Socrates was unable at the time to give any rational explanation for some of the actions forbidden him. Only later did he come to see that it was right to obey without question. These examples should at least suffice to show that the sense of obligation does exist and that where it does, it comes to men with irresistible force. Humanity's noblest representatives have unanimously rejected Oscar Wilde's cynical dictum that « the only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it ». A grave problem is at once forced upon us with the fact that this sense of obligation is attached to actions which differ and in some cases are completely contradictory, such as monogamy among European Christians and polygamy in Arabia. The fact that the deliverances of the conscience have differed according to age and country has led some to the essentially sceptical conclusion that conscience after all is only the product of society, or more accurately, of the particular social group to which the individual belongs. Yet care should be taken not to exaggerate this divergence. Aldous Huxley points out that though the contents of our judgements of value manifestly vary, there is also an approximation among men of increased knowledge, sensibility, and non-attachement. « The ethical doctrines taught in the Tao Te Ching, by Gautama Buddha and his followers in the Lesser and above all the Greater Vehicle, in the Sermon on the Mount and by the best of the Christian saints, are not dissimilar. Among human beings who have reached a certain level of civilization and of personal freedom from passion there exists a real consensus gentium in regard to ethical first principles.»(4).

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(3) Plato, The Apology, 31d. Oeuvres Complètes—Croiset.

(4) Aldous Huxley, Ends and Means, London, 1937, p. 282.

Despite this fact, it is still asserted by some that the conscience has no absolute authority but is relative to the nature of any particular society and its general level of development. The social environment, the pressure of society, suffices to explain the sense of obligation. It would seem impossible to refute this explanation by any mere form of argument. Certainly it seems impossible to show by the above theory why « conscience » has sometimes driven the individual to act directly contrary to the current social standards. « To say that the moral consciousness arose because it promoted tribal efficiency or that religion arose because it promoted cosmic comfort tells us something but not all. » (5). It is a little difficult to see how Thomas Helwys, the first English Baptist, who languished in prison and died there for having published the Mystery of Iniquity with its claim for complete religious tolerance, was actuated simply by obedience to the pressure of society. « Our lord the King is but an earthly King, and he hath no aucthority as a King but in earthly causes, and if the Kings people be obedient true subjects, obeying all humane laws made by the King, our lord the King can require no more: for mens religion to God is betwixt God and themselves; the King shall not answer for it, neither may the King be iugd betwene God and man. Let them be heretikes, Turcks, Jewes or whatsoever, it apperteynes not to the earthly power to punish them in the least measure. » (6). If anyone insists that he was, then there is nothing more to be said.

Can we then speak of « moral » experiences as such, without any reference to ultimate religious and metaphysical questions? Is it possible to discern in human society an activity that may be singled out and called « moral » as distinct from what one calls « æsthetic » or « religious »? This raises the fundamental question as to whether « morality » can be thus regarded as self-sufficient in isolation from other aspects of the personality. Can a man in the last analysis act morally without at the same time being « religious »? Does not the moral conviction that one « ought » to do or not to do certain things, that certain ideals are compulsive for us and ought to be obeyed at all costs, imply beliefs which transcend « morality » as such? A morality which

(5) Joad, The Future of Religion.
(6) Thomas Helwys, The Mistery of Iniquity, p. 69, vide H. W. Robinson, Life and Faith of the Baptists, London, 1927.

is living is not satisfied simply with the knowledge of what goodness is, but is equally concerned to discover by what inner dynamic or force this ideal is to be attained by man. Does moral teaching alone give us this power? Is it true that when I know that I ought to do a thing, then of necessity I « can » do it? St. Paul's answer was in the negative—« For the good which I would I do not: but the evil which I woud not, that I practise. » The Christian has always claimed that the translation of the moral imperative into actuality demands a power which only religion can give. The moral life is not aimed at as an end in itself but is, if the phrase may be permitted, a by-product of God's activity in us, « moral » effort is possible only because of the grace of God which worketh in us. « Every great religious teacher has revolted against the presentation of religion as a mere sanction of rules of conduct. Saint Paul denounced the Law, and Puritan divines spoke of the filthy rags of righteousness. » (7). To attempt to raise onself to the heights demanded by the religious and moral consciousness by virtue of one's own limited powers and resources is a psychological impossibility, an inherent contradiction, and indeed for the religious man a presumption before God. The Christian attitude to morality may be summed up by saying not, I ought, therefore I can, but « I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me. »

Since, however, this attitude is valid only for those who are already in some sense Christians, let us consider the question first from the standpoint of one who attempted to find a basis for morality in certain necessary principles of reason, independent of any reference to religion, whether interpreted as a revelation of certain principles or as providing the necessary dynamic for the actual living of the moral life. Kant was certainly in deadly earnest about the moral life, a characteristic which links him with Plato but separates him from Aristotle and Hume. Kant was concerned to save the moral life from being undermined by the utilitarian spirit and deprived of its authority by the uncertainty attaching to all moral judgements based simply upon results. Once one allows that moral questions are to be decided by reference to pleasure and pain or the amount of general happiness produced—may one, for example, follow duty at the

(7) Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 238.

cost of suffering for others?—once one seeks to find an adequate justification for the performance of duty by reference to some sensuous element in our nature, for example, the derivation of love for and respect of our neighbour from the sentiment of pity or fellow-sympathy, immediately morality loses that quality of « obligatoriness », that element of uncomprising necessity, and becomes infected with all the relativity and subjectivity inherent in all human sentiments. The attempt to seek the canons of morality in an assessment of the motives of the results of our actions must then be abandoned. Recourse must be had to the pure reason in its practical application. Kant's morality is often criticised for being too abstract—and this we believe to be valid up to a certain point—and dry in its treatment of moral problems, too devoid of sentiment to be acceptable to the majority. « Es ist überall in der Welt, ja überhaupt auch ausser derselben zu denken möglich, was ohne Einschränkung für gut konnte gehalten werden, als allein ein guter Wille. » (8). Yet it should be observed in justice to Kant that for him, at least, the notion of duty was in no way abstract. « Notre attention est attirée sur l'émotion de l'âme Kantienne devant l'apparition du devoir moral. Cette apparition frappe religieusement l'âme du philosophe et cette impression religieuse domine le système de Kant et plus encore sa façon de vivre. » (9).

The penetrating analysis of M. Charles Hauter in regard to the « ethical object » (objet éthique) merits attention here, both because of its relevance to our thesis and the hope of bringing to the attention of English readers his stimulating and original book « Essai sur l'objet religieux » (10). For Kant, says this author, the moral conscience is not a hypothetical but an empirical fact, i. e. something given, a concrete existent factor in the universe of which man is a part. Christianity is not a purely ethical religion and Kant was only able to include certain Christian formulæ in his system by transforming them in the ethical sense. His attitude to grace and prayer are cases in point. Religion, considered from the side of the subject, is the knowledge of all our duties as divine commands. A man, thus acting,

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(8) Kant, Metaphysik der Natur und Metaphysik der Sitten; vide Kant, Die drei Kritiken ed. Schmidt, Leipzig, 1933, p. 212.
(9) C. Hauter, Essai sur l'objet religieux, p. 171.
(10) Ibid., vide chap. L'Objet dans la religion éthique.

acts « as if » God existed, but that gives him no right to assert the objective existence of such a Supreme Being. Such a man obeys from a purely subjective point of view. When Kant uses the word « subjective », it does not signify illusion or error. Even the categories are « subjective », since they do not form part of the Ding an sich. The word really signifies very definite facts « that we should call objective ». He who obeys the voice of conscience and acts rightly performs an act of religious faith. It is so precisely because the moral life is founded on liberty, that which alone constitues human dignity. For Kant, « le fait moral du devoir devient objet excitatif et évolue en se surpassant lui-même dans la direction de l'objet religieux ». (11). M. Hauter would have us extend the use of the word « religion » beyond the traditional limitation to its theistic form and apply it to those different tendances in which are discovered a faith and an object of faith. In this sense therefore, one can speak of a Christian, Jewish, Mahommedan, national, and even ethical religion. If we agree to speak of an ethical faith, what is the nature of the « object » of this faith? Firstly the ethical object is distinguished from its environment in a manner quite different from a natural object of the physical universe. By its spiritual nature, it is different from all merely physical facts. The very existence of the ethical object presupposes a dualism at the heart of reality, a dualism in which the active force is found on the side of the subject, whilst the object possesses only the force of inertia. The object of the moral consciousness is capable of eliciting a sacred emotion, which can be called religious. Hence, the object ceases to be simply ethical and becomes a religious ethical object, an object of adoration and worship. This ethical religion, however, is threatened by difficulties of a practical and theoretical order—

(*a*) Men are free to hear or not to hear the voice of conscience.

(*b*) The « moral object » can only be realized fully in the elite, in the few and is therefore esoteric. The fact that the masses can never rise to it is a sign of « material » weakness, not an inherent spiritual weakness in the object itself.

Then there are intrinsic imperfections, theoretical problems,

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(11) Ibid., p. 179.

which undermine the existence of the ethical object. The latter finds itself isolated from the general domain of nature. The theoretical reason, desirous of reducing all things to a certain uniformity, can find no place for the moral fact. It is the moral conscience as an existent fact that is called in question. The modern spirit has been moulded according to the exigencies of the physical data of nature. Hence, for something to exist, to be a « thing », it must be capable of description in scientific terms, i. e. in terms of the formulæ applicable to the physical world. It is obvious that the moral conscience is not a « thing » or an « object » in this sense of the word; therefore it is denied the quality of existence by the modern mind dominated by science. The only other alternative is to regard the moral world as possessing the true reality, whilst the world of « things » becomes a « phenomenal veil » covering a deeper reality. Authentic Kantianism has adopted this second alternative. Forberg is cited as giving the logical conclusion of the scientific theory with the following result:—

(1) The theoretical reason alone decides the reality of an object.

(2) The term « practical » signifies only a rule of action, a maxim, and implies no idea of existence.

(3) The ethical religion can subsist, even if the devotee professes a theoretical atheism.

(4) The ethical religious object is therefore theoretically denied and consequently its existence.

The results of this line of development are as follows:—

(*a*) It is impossible to establish by scientific means the value of any ideal whatsoever. One believes in an ideal, one does not prove it.

(*b*) The methods of research elaborated within the last few centuries are suitable for the study of concrete or material facts. They are useless for a knowledge of the « ideal ».

Hence the denial pure and simple of the intrinsic value of the ideal. The ideal becomes simply the product of the society or of psychological, even physiological states. The ideal no longer dominates the facts, it is dependant on or a slave of them. « We are living now, not in the delicious intoxication induced by the early successes of science, but in a rather grisly

morning-after, when it has become apparent that what triumphant science has done hitherto is to improve the means for achieving unimproved or actually deteriorated ends. In this condition of apprehensive sobriety we are able to see that the contents of literature, art, music—even in some measure of divinity and school metaphysics—are not sophistry and illusion, but simply those elements of experience which scientists chose to leave out of account, for the good reason that they had no intellectual methods for dealing with them. In the arts, in philosophy, in religion, men are trying—doubtless, without complete success—to describe and explain the non-measurable, purely qualitative aspects of reality. » (12). If there is this radical difference of quality between the world of duty, i. e. the world of ideals and physical facts, one can either affirm the absolute value of science, thereby eliminating as illusion all that does not come within its scheme, or one can treat scientific knowledge as relative only. Kant appears to choose the second alternative but in either case, the notions of « truth » and « reality » are reserved by the modern spirit for those things capable of treatment by the exact sciences. No ideal can therefore be established as the result of a chain of reasoning starting from established facts, as science interprets the latter. Hence the modern world is completely deprived of any single ethical conviction. There is a multitude of ethical religions, a kind of polytheism, and the ethical object depends for its force solely upon the personality of the prophet who is its advocate. We thus arrive at that complete divorce between fact und value which is at the root of our modern malaise. As A. E. Taylor rightly insists, the possibility of a genuine worship is bound up with the belief that the highest good is the most real, that the ultimate object of worship combines existence and goodness. Otherwise one is left with the worship of a bald fact, a something which exists, but which is completely separated from all that man means by the good. This fatal division is traced back to Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft « where the purpose of the smashing assault on speculative theology and indeed of the whole dialectic of the Pure Reason is to divorce value completely from fact by denying that the "ideals" of the speculative reason

(12) Huxley, Ends and Means, p. 268.

have any contact whatever with genuine knowledge » (13). One may act as if God exists, one has on right to say He does exist.

Another serious difficulty arises from the very notion of duty. An object of worship must have a certain stability and a certain permanence. If the worshippers are in a continual state of doubt as to the nature of this object, worship is made impossible. « But the idea of duty », says M. Hauter, « is neither clear nor has it a single meaning, it is an abstract concept, devoid of positive content, and elaborated by the mind according to the very different ideas it has of special duties. » There is no « DUTY » but only particular duties. It is not possible to discover in the abstract, in advance of all concrete situations, what precisely is my duty. This ambiguity raises grave difficulty for an ethical religion whose object of worship is the religious ethical object, i. e. the concrete deliverances of the moral consciousness regarded as divine commands. Kant's solution of this problem is to be found in his formulation « Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law » (14). This is really no solution and is useless for practical guidance until it has been given some definite content. As Hegel pointed out, it implied the desirability of life being continued, thus assuming the optimistic, world-affirming attitude without any attempt to substantiate this basic premise. This criterion of universality likewise fails when applied to a concrete case like monogamous marriage. Kant regarded this latter as natural and « rational » because he had been reared in the tradition of Lutheran piety. But only if this conception of marriage is previously regarded as the rational norm can departure from it be logically held to be « irrational » and the former Kant does not attempt to prove. The common illustration of Kant's maxim is the question of lying. If everybody lies, then mutual confidence is completely destroyed, no one believes anyone else, and the value and need of lying is destroyed. Yet may not a lie be sometimes justifiable as with the doctor and a very sick patient upon whom a true knowledge of his condition might have a fatal effect. May it not sometimes be a duty so suppress a human life as well as to save one? The

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(13) A. E. Taylor, Gifford Lectures, vol. 1, p. 33.
(14) Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals.

abstract notion of duty as Kant defines it gives us no guidance on these knotty points. A consistent ethical religion will therefore have many objects of worship. For one man, duty will be the complete sacrifice of the individual to the glory and well-being of the nation. For another man, it may be an unconditioned allegiance to the whole of humanity, as is the case with the thoroughgoing pacifist. For yet another, it may be the furthering of his own career. This way leads to a complete moral realism and the disappearance of « duty » as a clear and stable notion. Again « duty », from the standpoint of material reality, of the physical world, does not exist. It is what is called « ideal » in contrast with the « real », i. e. that which exists. Further ideals are never detached from their concrete setting, from their significance for particular individuals and specific social conditions. Ideals too change in the course of historical evolution. The word « justice » may have widely different meanings in its practical realization according as it is used by Amos in the 8th. century B.C. or by Karl Marx in the 19th. A.D. Yet one cannot suppress that divine discontent which urges man on to a better than he is or the conviction that the good of yesterday can never be the evil of today and vice-versa. We may seek to realize conditions in the world different from those envisaged by Socrates and Amos, but we do not condemn these heroes as being morally mistaken or fundamentally deceived. In that sense one may speak of a certain unity in the moral history of mankind. The unity is not to be found in the similarity of the moral ideals, the objects pursued, but in a certain resemblance between the men themselves, a certain « moral quality » which they share.

In the face of all these difficulties, there is the danger that « morality » will degenerate into what the French call « la science des mœurs », i. e. simply an empirical study of the different codes of conduct and habits which actually prevail in various parts of the world. The attempt to find in « morality » a universal and necessary element will be abandoned. Locke himself points out how ambiguous is the word « virtue » and how men are not agreed as to the principles by which they shall regulate their conduct:—« View but an army at the sacking of a town, and see what observation of their principles, or what

touch of conscience for all the outrages they do. Murders, rapes, robberies, are the sports of men set at liberty from punishment or shame. Have there not been whole nations where it has been a fashion to expose their children and let them perish? And are there not countries where they at a certain age kill their parents without any remorse at all? Where then are these innate principles of justice, piety and equity? » (15). The difficulty of defining « duty » is also stressed. « A man's holding a gun in his hand and pulling down the trigger may be either a rebellion, parricide, murder, homicide, duty, justice, valor, or recreation, and be thus variously diversified and put into those different ranks, when all the circumstances put together are compared to a rule, though the simple action of holding the gun and pulling the trigger may be exactly the same; and these I call moral. » (16). The ideas of virtues and vices refer only to transient actions—the result is that one can never reach a stable notion of what they signify. Again, actions which are virtues in one country are vices in another « wherein the inclination or fashion of the people seems wholly to have established them virtues or vices » (17). Locke seems to arrive at the sceptical solution already mentioned and decides that, in the final analysis, one must abide by the practices and customs of one's own country. He quotes the Christian precept of brotherly love, but it is evident that, on his premises, it can have no absolute or binding authority. Is this then the position to which we are reduced or is it not possible to find a more solid basis for the moral life, to discover certain principles that all rational beings everywhere will recognize as binding? That was Kant's task and he attempted to solve it by rational thinking, independently of any appeal to revelation.

One must admit, however, that he has not been very successful in establishing a morality on a purely rational basis. It should be noted that Kant goes beyond « morality » as such in his introduction of the postulate of immortality and the idea of God. He observed very justly that in this life perfect virtue is never attained by any man and that therefore one must assume an endless existence in order that the progress begun

(15) Locke's Essay, edit. Rand, p. 30.
(16) Ibid., p. 292.
(17) Ibid., p. 300.

here may receive its ultimate consummation hereafter. Otherwise the moral struggle would mean perpertual frustration and never the satisfaction of attainment. Again it is an obvious fact that virtue is never rewarded in this life by its legitimate equivalent of happiness. « The race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all. » There must therefore be a balancing up afterwards whereby the virtuous man receives the happiness that is his due, but of which he has been deprived in this life. God is introduced to see that the balance is kept. It is obvious that God in this scheme is not the centre from which all goodness flows, in communion with whom man is enabled to live the highest life, but that he is introduced to give logical completion to the scheme. Man is still autonomous. He can, therefore he ought, and he does not need the grace of God which is regarded by Kant as very near to superstition and in any case a danger to the purity fo the moral demands. It is not altogether a surprise to learn that Kant as he grew older gradually abandoned the practice of prayer.

If then we reject Kant's criterion of universality as a sufficient guide to the goodness which the will ought to pursue, what then is to be our standard? We must go deeper and ask— what determines our judgements of value? our division of actions into good and bad? Before attempting to answer this question, it should be said that Kant, by rejecting all utilitarianism, inevitably ended in a system of abstractions incapable of being applied, except in a very limited way, to the concrete circumstances of life. « The great Utilitarians held that the good is pleasure, and their error was not in being utilitarian as regards conduct but in being hedonist as regards the true end of life. » (18). Plato and Christianity were utilitarian in the sense that « By their fruits Ye shall know them » was accepted as a valid criterion of actions but the evaluation of the fruits was in terms, not of pleasure, but of righteousness. What then is this righteousness which should be the real determinant of our wills, and how do we come to know it? This takes us beyond that morality which treats obligation alone as the primary fact.

(18) Temple, Gifford Lectures, p. 193.

The Indian widow may feel a powerful sense of inner compulsion to burn herself alive on the funeral pyre of her husband, but this would not be accepted as an example of righteousness, simply because she obeys a strong inward conviction. The important thing then is not that my conscience should be « binding » upon me but rather what kind of actions does it bind me to do? We may agree with Kant that it is always my absolute duty to do the right, but there is no way of determining what is « right » in the abstract apart from all consideration of the context in which my acts must take place. Agreed that I am bound to do that which appears to me to be the best but how do I discover this latter? At this point the crux of the whole problem is revealed—« Reflective reason must accept from intuition the ultimate judgements of value. » (19). Macmurray's solution is that reason is at work in the emotional life itself. It is by this latter that we come to awareness of the real values of the world in which we live. Our evaluation of things in terms of goodness and badness, right and wrong, beauty and ugliness, springs from our emotional reaction to the world. The so-called « principles of morality » are only the abstract scheme imposed afterwards by the intellect on this living experience. Macmurray draws the conclusion that many of our judgements of value are mistaken, both in the artistic and the religious field. Certainly it seems as if we are here dealing with a certain ultimate response which is not susceptible of intellectual formulation in the strict sense of the word. Or as Edwyn Bevan says, each man in the last analysis acts upon the assumption that « a certain kind of life is worth living ». Certainly this may appear to be regrettably vague to those who wish to have a clear-cut series of principles by which to live. It is so much easier to accept a number of prohibitions and commands and attempt to conform one's outer life to them. Unfortunately this outward conformity can sometimes be attained without the inner springs of our personal life being touched. This is only attained when a man acts in obedience to his vision, to his own compelling sense of what is right and good. This is the implication of St. Paul's claim that the Christian is not bound by the Mosaic Law. Not that the Christian will break the ten

(19) Ibid., p. 192.

commandments but the more he advances in the Christian life, he will obey, not simply because they are commanded, but because Christ lives in him and by virtue of this indwelling presence he is enabled to produce spontaneously the fruits of the spirit. If any man persists in the assertion that the pursuit of pleasure as embodied in the Don Juans of this world embodies a superior vision of the ultimately good than the missionary self-sacrifice seen in the lives of a St. Paul or a William Carey, then no merely logical arguments will persuade him to the contrary, since judgements of value are not determined by logical considerations. This confirms the epigrammatic and profond saying of Dean Inge that « true religion is caught, not taught », and that the great religious leaders and supremely Jesus have won the allegiance of men, not simply by their preaching and teaching, but by the compulsive attractiveness of their lives. This may explain why many of the most creative personalities have left little behind them in the way of books but have trusted their vision to a personal band of disciples, responsible for its transmission to posterity.

What then is our conclusion? The existence of the sense of unconditional obligation in regard to certain acts has been defended by a choice of concrete examples taken from history. We have also seen that the attempt to found a rational morality based upon the autonomy of the will leaves out certain vital factors. This has led us to the position that the driving force behind ethical endeavour compels us to go beyond ethics as this is generally understood to those final judgements of value. Kant's maxim—« Act in such a way as to always treat humanity, whether in thine own personality, or in that of another, as an end in itself, never as a means » (20) is only compulsive for those who have had a vision of righteousness far transcending the criterion of universality. « There is a spiritual world », as Kierkegaard insists, « beyond the ethical. » (21). A positive notion of the « good » is needed to give to « obligation » a content. Man cannot know the highest good for himself simply by introspective analysis, but he needs a revelation of « goodness » capable of winning his complete allegiance and elimin-

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(20) Kant, Op. cit.
(21) A. Huxley, Op. cit.

ating the self-centredness which infects even his best moral efforts. Kant was right in thinking that the imperatives of duty only obtain their compulsive character when regarded as divine commands. This logically implies reference to a divine Personality and this only takes place when one passes from the ethical to the religious sphere. This transition we have no right to make in a section devoted only to morality but the study of religious experience will compel us to make it. The « moral » will then be seen to take its place in a wider whole which includes and surpasses it.

## CHAPTER 7.

## THE INTERROGATION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

« There is no point. Life and Love are life and love, a bunch of violets is a bunch of violets, and to drag in the idea of a point is to ruin everything. Live and let live, love and let love, flower and fade, and follow the natural curve, which flows on, pointless. » D. H. Lawrence.

« The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof;
The world and they that dwell therein. » Psalm 24.

« Every good gift and every perfect boon is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom can be no variation, neither shadow that is cast by turning. Of his own will he brought us forth by the word of truth, that we should be a kind of firstfruits of his creatures. » The Epistle of James.

Our task now is to question the religious man as to the nature and structure of his experience, so that we can define it in relation to those "objectivities" already described. The religious man responds to the universe as a whole personality, not as scientist, or as artist, or as one striving to attain moral ends, but as a man whole and entire, and does so in the conviction that he can enter into saving contact with the ultimate reality of things whether negatively by the absorption and disappearance of his individual self into the whole or affirmatively, by a direct personal response from a Personal Being or beings to himself. The scientist may be aware of a mathematical mind at work in the world around him but one does not pray, as the religious man does, to such a mind. « Il n'est plus possible de concevoir la religion comme un phénomène ressortissant exclusivement à l'une ou l'autre fonction de l'esprit humain. L'histoire et la psychologie interdisent d'assimiler la religion uniquement à l'intelligence ou à l'émotivité,

au sentiment esthétique ou au vouloir éthique. Dans le mouvement religieux, le moi se trouve engagé tout entier. » (1). The religious man believes himself to be in contact with a power or reality superior to himself. Now the physical universe, Nature, cannot give him the response he craves, since it is less than personal. Hence early man's personification of the forces of nature. Dr. W. R. Matthews distinguishes between supernatural and other types of religion in the following way. « A religion is supernatural if it is based upon the experience of and belief in the initiative of God—if in other words, it finds the Eternal to be not a mere Absolute or a moral order of the world, but a living personal Spirit who draws near to man with creative and redemptive purpose. » This is, without doubt, a description of what Christians would regard as the higher form of religious experience. In all the great positive religions, the power or powers believed to be in control and with which man seeks to come into contact, are regarded as active and not simply passive, and this holds true even of Buddhism as a religion as distinct from the agnosticism of the Buddha himself. A system such as that of Spinoza, with its Eternal Substance, unconscious of the temporal process save as the necessary unfolding of its own nature and with which man can come into contact only through an amor intellectualis, is not and has not given rise to a positive religion. « Dieu n'est pas différent de ce que les philosophes appellent nature. » (2). It is obvious that man's commerce with such a God is not religious in the sense in which this had been understood by the great religions. In the higher religious affirmation, man goes beyond nature as it is open to his inspection to a Being who or which is the efficient cause of nature and man as nature's product. This being he conceives of either as an impersonal Absolute or as a Personality akin to his own, superior but still recognizably personal. At this point it will be well to emphasize as clearly as possible these two contrasted attitudes. The Christian is irrevocably committed to a "personalist" approach. For him, God is personal and capable of entering into personal relationship with him. Aldous Huxley classifies this as the bhakti-marga type of

(1) F. Ménégoz, Le Problème de la Prière, p. 4.
(2) Emile Bréhier, Histoire de la Philosophie, Tome 2, Fascicule I.

religion. « All the great religions have taught the necessity of transcending personality; but the Christians have made it particularly difficult for themselves to act upon this teaching. They have accompanied the injunction that men should lose their lives in order to save them by the assertion that God himself is a person and that personal values are the highest that we can know. » (3). His criticism, however, is far more fundamental. He contends that the mystical way, which he believes to be a valid path to a knowledge of ultimate reality, has always led to the disappearance of the intuition of God as personal.

« Those who take the trouble to train themselves in the arduous technique of mysticism always end, if they go far enough in their work of recollection and meditation, by losing their intuitions of a personal God and having direct experience of an ultimate reality that is impersonal. » I take the opportunity of quoting here from a letter of my sister Miss Margaret Aldwinckle, who for some time past has lived in the Sri Aurobindo ashram at Pondichery as disciple of its famous guru, and has therefore had exceptional opportunities of entering into close contact with the spirit and practice of Hinduism: in relation to this question, she writes as follows—« There are of course certain schools of thought in Hinduism which approximate to something like a belief in a Personal, Extra-Cosmic God, but here also their conception differs fundamentally from the Christian one and is still rather the conscious personnification of what they know to be an impersonal force rather than an intellectual-ethical-spiritual belief that such a God really exists. As you are aware, the Indian mind is metaphysical to an extreme, and any and every conception may be held by it at some time or other, but from the point of view of actual action, that is, in other words, the dynamic aspect of Hinduism, the belief in a personal God may be considered as definitely non-existent. But from the point of view of individuals calling themselves Hindus, it is very difficult to apply this general statement which belongs rather to the metaphysics of the religion than its actual practice in everyday life. There are

(3) Aldous Huxley, Ends and Means, p. 240.
(4) Ibid., p. 235.

hundreds and thousands of Hindus who have most evidently some inner conception of a personal God, either in a broad general sense or in a narrower sense of having taken one of the lesser deities and made it serve as a "personal God" for the purposes of actual living. This happens most frequently with the God Krishna who, to very many people, is as personal as living and as real as any god can be. But with all this, one must always bear in mind that Hinduism has an infinite capacity for adaptation to individual needs and for this reason individual testimony is not always a safe guide to the basic beliefs of Hinduism. This happens in every religion, but I think one is perfectly safe in saying that Hinduism is, in this respect, the most elastic of all religions—this is both its strength and its weakness.» Despite the practical resemblances, there does seem to be a profound and irreconcileable antithesis between the Christian belief in the Personal Creator and the official metaphysic which underlies Hinduism and Buddhism. Huxley admits the effectiveness in action of a belief in a personal God and also that the mystical experience, as he defines it, is probably only open to a limited number of people, since the majority by their psycho-physiological make-up are incapable of attaining it. That is to say, the great majority are predestined by nature to be incapable of the only experience which can give them a knowledge of the ultimate reality. This looks like a subtile return of the Calvinism that Mr. Huxley so much dislikes. Our contention has been that if one eliminates "personality" from our notion of that which is ultimately real, then it is difficult to retain it on the human level save as a form of illusion or "maya". This is an unjustifiable elimination of one of the most evident facts of the real world as we know it, as unjustifiable as the scientist's ignoring of non-scientific values, a procedure justly criticized by Mr. Huxley. We have already shown that the use of "impersonal" categories in the interpretation of the world is not metaphysically satisfying. It remains to show that moral and religious experience is equally incapable of satisfactory explanation within such a scheme of ideas.

Granted then that the religious act engages the whole man and not simply one part of his being, let us try and make more

precise our notion of the religious consciousness. « La religion tient avant tout pour un être qui peut entrer en rapport avec nous; or c'est précisément de quoi est incapable le Dieu d'Aristote. » (5). We are therefore faced with the problem of definition and terminology. One can give to the phrase "religious consciousness" a wide or a narrow connotation. If one considers some form of ethical monotheism as a necessary element in any genuine form of the religious consciousness, then one eliminates at a stroke all Buddhists and that vast mass of religiosity of a more or less pantheistic nuance. Yet there is an obvious practical advantage in commencing with a definition sufficiently broad to admit of our taking a wide sweep in considering the subject. J. B. Pratt has supplied us with such a definition:— « Religion is the serious and social attitude of individuals and communities towards the power or powers which they conceive of as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies. » (6). The word "attitude" here is meant to cover the actively responsive side of consciousness as well as the passive. If one starts with this definition, then it is possible to venture the generalization that man is by nature a religious animal, in the sense that he recognizes that his creation and existence depend upon a power or powers other than himself. The subjective effect of this recognition is the effort of man to enter into contact with such power or powers with a view to influencing It or He or them in his favour. His method may range from the monotonous and unintelligible incantation of the jungle to the prayer of the Christian saint, but in each case there is the attempt to reach some kind of contact. All living religion, as M. Ménégoz maintains, « s'exprime sous la forme de la prière ou d'un mouvement d'âme tendant à la prière, ou d'une élévation d'âme dans laquelle survit quelque chose de la prière. » (7).

The following attempts have been made to define the essential characteristics of the religious consciousness. When the effort is made to render more precise the practical implications of our general definition, the task is by no means easy. Yet the attempt must be made to give the word "religion" some definite and intelligible content. If one starts with the prejudice

(5) Bergson, Les Deux Sources, p. 258.
(6) J. B. Pratt, The Religious Consciousness, 1923.
(7) Ménégoz, Op. cit., p. 6.

that all that has been so named is simply a pathological aberration on the part of the human race, then evidently not much progress can be made. It is, however, possible to roughly distinguish the different forms taken by man's religious experiences, according to the element specially emphasized as constituting the essence of religion.

(*a*) The intellectualist point of view. Leuba distinguishes firstly that type which selects a specific intellectual disposition as the distinctive mark of religion. Herbert Spencer is quoted as representing intellectualism in religion. For him, the essence of religion is the recognition of mystery in the universe. No criticism can destroy this. « Thus the mystery recognized by all religions is, in the last analysis, far greater than any of them suspect; not a relative but an absolute mystery. » (8). Thus for Spencer this is a religious truth of the highest importance. Leuba's criticism is just and to the point. This recognition is not religion: the latter only begins when man goes beyond the sheer mystery of things and attempts to find a solution, an explanation of this mystery, which will be of practical value to him in the struggle for existence. Living religion seeks, not primarily intellectual understanding of God, but immediate enjoyment of Him, expressed in a heightened sense of power and inward satisfaction. « The religious consciousness seeks being; the philosophical consciousness seeks knowledge. » (9). Certainly the great religious souls have not been intellectualist in this sense. St. Augustine cries—« How do I seek thee, O Lord. When I seek thee, O my God, I seek a blessed life. I will seek Thee that my soul may live. For my body lives by my soul and my soul by thee.» (10). Luther is equally moved deeply—« To have a God is to believe and trust in God. God is very being, the author of every gift and every grace, to whom we ought to have recourse in all our needs. God however is our God only in as much as we believe in Him and give Him our confidence. Otherwise our God will not be the Eternal but rather an idol. » (11).

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(8) H. Spencer, First Principles, p. 43-6, vide Leuba, Psychologie des Phénomènes Religieux, p. 29.
(9) Leuba, Op. cit., p. 33.
(10) Ibid., p. 34-5.
(11) Luther, Great Catechism, vide Söderblom, Le Dieu Vivant, p. 93.

(*b*) The second type of religion is defined in relation to a certain emotion or feeling. The emotional experiences, ranging from fear and terror to loving submission and a "cosmic feeling" are chosen as illustrative. The name of Schleiermacher is inevitably associated with the attempt to make the feeling of absolute dependence (Abhängigkeitsgefühl) the underlying unifying factor in all forms of the religious consciousness. For him, the religious man's point of departure is not the impulse to know or even to act but this feeling of absolute dependence. « The common element in all howsoever diverse expressions of piety, by which these are all conjointly distinguished from all other feelings, or in other words the self-identical essence of piety, is this; the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or which is the same thing, of being in relation with God. »

« The whole religious life consists of two elements, that man surrenders himself to the universe and allows himself to be influenced by the side of it that is turned towards him one part, and that he transplant this contact which is one definite feeling within and take it up into the inner unity of his life, is the other. » (12). The development of self-consciousness continues pari passu with increasing awareness of one's dependence. The great value of Schleiermacher's starting-point is the insistence that the religious impulse is an inherent and necessary quality which develops along with the mind itself. It is not something artificial, which is acquired at a certain point of history and only by men of certain tastes. It is there at every stage of human development, however unformed and immature it may be. As one passes from the state of diffused awareness of the baby to the clearer consciousness of adulthood, man becomes increasingly conscious that he is only one small being over against an infinite universe, that over against him is an immense "other". When he is a Pascal, he is terrified by the silence of the infinite spaces (it should be observed that it was their silence and not their infinity which was the source of his fear), if he is a Kant he is moved by the star-spangled heaven, if he is a poet like Francis Thomson, he is acutely aware of the radical separateness of all human beings. Yet

(12) Schleiermacher, Second Reden.

whatever his specific reaction may be, he cannot fail to observe that around him and above him is another and mysterious world, a world which stretches away into endless time and space beyond the scope of his measurement. What is this mighty "Other" into contact with which he is so ruthlessly thrown, to which he must adjust himself somehow if he is to survive at all. The attempt to answer this question certainly brings us very near to the heart of the religious issue. But the application of Schleiermacher's principle to the universal manifestations of the religious consciousness involves us in certain difficulties. His use of the word "universe" in the Reden reveals the pantheistic implication of his stand-point, since the sense of absolute dependence may be produced by man's feeling that he is up against something very big. Again, where the supreme Controller of Destiny is conceived of as creative will, as in the Hebrew religion, there is in addition to the feeling of dependence, the conviction of the need of effort in obedience to this will. Schleiermacher's emphasis on the passive experience of dependence leaves no place for the Christian feeling of being fellow-workers with God. In his anxiety to distinguish piety from morality and his consequent emphasis upon "feeling", he underestimated the activist element in certain forms of the religious consciousness. Furthermore, his definition identifies the whole of the religious life with what may be regarded as an aspect only. Psychology does at least seem to have established the impossibility of thus separating thought and feeling in the conscious life, except for purposes of abstract discussion. Yet again it has been said that a mere feeling of dependence, unless it includes at the same time awe and reverence, is not of necessity a religious feeling. Such a feeling of absolute dependence as he posits presupposes a consciousness of the "other" than man as in some sense a unity, a universe over against him, and as far as we can judge, this is not present in the more primitive religions. This feeling of absolute dependence therefore cannot be taken as distinctive of religion, since it is present in many aspects of life not usually described as religious. Leuba points out that when we distinguish between our dependance upon the world of finance, a father, Jehovah, a mistress or the Absolute, that is because the objects are more

or less distinct. In actual fact, man very rarely has that feeling of dependance upon the Infinite and the Illimitable. Certainly he has to do with something greater than himself, but this is possible without having the feeling Schleiermacher describes. The attempt to isolate "adoration" as the distinctive feature of the religious consciousness is also not a happy one, seeing that it consists of a complex of emotions and feelings. Emotion and feeling cannot therefore be singled out as distinctive. All possible human feelings are capable at one time or another of finding their expression in some form of religious experience. They may equally well appear in a completely non-religious context. The distinguishing factor therefore is to be found, not in the feelings themselves, but in the complex of ideas representing the object in relation to which man has these feelings.

(*c*) The third type attempts to define the religious consciousness in terms of will, the latter being understood in the broadest sense, i. e. as including desires, appetites, and instincts. Feuerbach regarded religion as the product of man's thirst for happiness. Religion becomes on this view simply an aspect of the will-to-live, in which thought and feeling are inextricably interwoven. It is a particular kind of activity, a mode or type of conduct and does not depend necessarily upon any specific emotion or belief. In this sense therefore the great contemporary political movements like Communism and Fascism, despite their atheism, may well be called religious.

(*d*) We now come to the sociological explanation of religion and particularly to the theory of M. Emile Durkheim. His thesis turns upon the notion of the sacred or holy (le sacré). He emphasizes the following points. The distinction between sacred and profane is independent of the idea of God. There are religions without the notion of God (Buddhism, Jainism) and sacred objects which are in no way gods. The notion of the "divinity" is only a secondary episode in the religious experience, not its fundamental essence. For Durkheim, the origin of the sacred is to be sought in tradition, i. e. in society. Sacred and profane are synonyms of social and individual.

« C'est donc un corollaire de notre définition que la religion a pour origine, non des sentiments individuels, mais des états

de l'âme collective et qu'elle varie comme ces états. » (13). The social origin of the sacred explains therefore the imperative nature of religious beliefs as contrasted with free opinions. « Or, tout ce qui est obligatoire est d'origine sociale. » (14). Hence we arrive at the following definition of religion:—« Les phénomènes dits religieux consistent en croyances obligatoires connexes de pratiques définies qui se rapportent à des objets donnés dans ces croyances. » (15). It is objected by Leuba that the essential characteristic of sacred objects is to provoke both fear and admiration. This, however, is not the same as religion, especially when the latter arouses tender feelings or emphasizes the love element. The Christian God of love is no longer "holy" in Durkheim's sense of the word. Again, that which is traditional does not possess necessarily this quality of "holiness" and "sacredness". This is only the case where the tradition is the expression of a force or power superior to the individual, capable of good and evil and of being influenced by human conduct.

What is the distinction between magic and religion? Broadly speaking, magic is used to indicate direct, automatic, or mechanical action directed towards those powers or "gods" believed to be capable of influencing human destiny; "religion", as this word is generally used, is given to rites in which ideas, feelings and volitions are aroused in personal agents by non-mechanical means, i. e. invocations, offerings, prayers, etc. The great distinguishing mark is the "personal" relation which is established in the religious rite, however unethical this may be. « En ce qui concerne la différentiation de la magie et de la religion, l'idée d'un agent sur qui on peut influer par des moyens anthropopathiques est en réalité fondamentale. » (16). The attempt therefore to differentiate religion and magic by means of the criteria social value, public character, systematization of ceremonial is a failure. Certainly one can try to coerce a personal being by constraint, i. e. magic. It is the way in which the "god" is acted upon that separates religion from magic.

(13) Durkheim, L'Année Sociologique, édit. Alcan, 2, p. 23-4.
(14) Ibid.
(15) Durkheim, De la définition des phénomènes religieux, Année sociologique, vol. 2, 1897-8, pp. 1-28.
(16) Leuba, Op. cit., p. 61.

Leuba, who cannot be accused of wishing to defend the Christian conception of God, does none the less accept our thesis that, where religion is concerned, man always feels himself in contact with powers of a psychical nature, i. e. beings which can be described as in some sense personal. These personal beings, however, do not exist in the sense in which Christians believe that God exists. They have a biological function in that they aid man in the struggle for existence. In that sense, they are "subjective", being the creation of man's will-to-live. They are "objective" if by that one means that they definitely exist as powerful psychological factors determining human conduct.

The work of Rudolf Otto may be usefully considered here in relation to the theory of Durkheim. Otto has impressively maintained that religion is not only moral and intellectual belief, but contains also a specific emotion called forth by the apprehension of that which is wholly other (ganz andere) than man and induces in him awe and dread. It is this sense of a mysterious "Other" at once overwhelmingly crushing in its strangeness and yet with a certain allure which leads man on to get in touch with it (mysterium tremendum et fascinans) which is the distinguishing mark of the religious experience. In the primitive man, it may be simply a shuddering dread in the face of the powerful and enigmatic workings of nature, but even in the higher religious life, which is marked by definite intellectual beliefs and moral content, there still remains this sense of the mysterious "other". This contention must be analysed in detail, since if it true, it is impressive testimony to man's inherent capacity for contact with and apprehension of the divine. It may be said at once by way of general criticism of Otto's position that the whole significance of Christianity resides in the fact that it has reduced, if not eliminated, this element of otherness, of mystery, in man's relation with God, not in the sense that it has given a complete account of the Godhead, which no finite mind in the nature of the case can do, but in Otto's sense of the Mysterium Tremendum. The whole point of the doctrine of the Incarnation surely is that God is not "wholly other", a Power foreign to man and completely inexplicable in terms of his own experience, but that He is seen in His true being and character in the face of Jesus Christ;

when man thinks of God in the light of Jesus Christ, he is nearer the truth of things than when he quakes before that which is unknown und alien to him, whether it be the "primitive" man's fears of the devils or the recognition by the Hebrew prophet of the holiness of the Lord. It must be said, however, in behalf of Otto that he does recognize that for us today the term "holy" is a word which inescapably carries with it a moral content. The "numinous" is therefore an element within the holy: as he says himself « the holy minus its moral factor or moment, and as we can now add, minus its rational aspect altogether » (17). He also hints, without explicitly elaborating the question, that the categorical imperative of duty may also have a numinous quality which induces awe and reverence. Kant seems to have felt something of this in the imperatives of duty. Otto admits too that the ascent of religion is marked by a progressive rationalization and moralization of the numinous element and that the greatness of the Christian religion consists precisely in this fact. « Rather do we count this the very mark and criterion of a religion's high rank and superior value—that it should have no lack of "conceptions" about God; that it should admit knowledge—the knowledge that comes by faith—of the transcendent in terms of conceptual thought... Christianity not only possesses such conceptions but possesses them in unique clarity and abundance, and this is, though not the sole or even the chief, yet a very real sign of its superiority over religions of other forms and at other levels. » (18). Having conceded this, Otto goes on to assert that the rational and moral attributes imply a non-rational or supra-rational subject, which presents itself with an almost naked objectivity, not through the moral and rational personality, but through the numinous described as non-rational. It must however be confessed that Otto, in seeking to escape from subjectivism and placing the Object of man's religious response "outside" him, making the essence of religion consist in response to a "given" and not in the projection of his subjective experiences, although apparently outmanœuvring the arguments of those who dismiss religion as illusion, yet raises formidable difficulties of his own. What

(17) Otto, Das Heilige, Engl. trans. J. Harvey.
(18) Ibid.

precisely is the essential bond, if any at all, between the non-rational mysterious numen and the facts of man's rational and spiritual consciousness? Even in the worship of God at its highest, says Otto, the element of demonic dread survives in the quality of exaltedness and sublimity, and that even in the teaching of Jesus, there remains a « trace of that weird and shuddering dread before the mysteries of the transcendent. »(19). It is this mystical awe in the highest worship, which induces the sense of creature-feeling, of personal abasement and nothingness, before the awe-inspiring object directly experienced.

The question now arises therefore—in what sense is this numinous experience the essence of the religious response or merely the survival of man's imperfect response to the divine Object? It is not denied that the numinous experience exists, what is questioned is whether it is the only or the highest way to a genuine knowledge of the divine. It is difficult to see how man can worship a being, in which the most distinctive features of his own personality find no counterpart. This mysterious being may compel a submission dictated by awe, but it is not worship of God as the Christian understands it. It is a queer paradox, if it is true, that human history shows man's steady travail through the age towards the knowledge of a God who is no longer simply a capricious ruler of the world with an arbitrary character but a God who governs the world in an ordered rational fashion and possesses in a supreme degree the highest moral and spiritual qualities found in man himself, culminating in the self-sacrificing love of a Christ, if after all the avenue to a genuine knowledge of the divine is through the non-rational numinous from which these elements are absent. A man who impresses us simply by his strangeness of behaviour, by his differences from other men, by a quality not capable of expression in human terms, does not compel respect and adoration and it is difficult to see how the Divine, if such is its nature, can command our worship and why the Son of God should have become Son of Man!

« Above and beyond our rational being lies hidden the ultimate and highest part of our nature. » (20). How does this

(19) Ibid., p. 87.
(20) Ibid.

conception harmonize with the earlier statement that the possession of clear and abundant "conceptions" is a mark of a religion's high and superior value. It would seem then that the Christian at least is committed to the view, implicit in the doctrine of the Incarnation, that there is no fundamental and irreconcileable dualism between human and divine. True the Christian will have the sense of creatureliness before the Creator of Heaven and Earth, true he cannot ignore the gap between the human and the divine which is human sin, but the fact that he can pray Abba, Father is a standing denial that the Divine is something wholly other than man. He will claim that the steady growth of rational and moral personality is a true revealing of the divine and that in Jesus perfect love has cast out fear, and that man's approach to God should now be to the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ and not to the non-rational numen.

This criticism, from the standpoint of belief, is reaffirmed from the philosophical angle by M. Hauter. The divine, says Otto, is radically different from all that is human. But if the feeling of absolute mystery, the ineffable, which is properly the domain of religion, is truly a priori, if the divine is in some sort a "category", then it is a part of the human spirit and a constitutive element of it. « The non-rational element in religion has also an independent origin and directly plunges its roots into the hidden depths of the spirit. » (21). The divine then becomes as it were a creation of this spirit. Then it cannot be das ganz andere, the radically different. It is impossible that the self should have such a feeling in the presence of its own being. If the term a priori is to keep its general significance, then it must express the identity of the self with the object, or at least with a part of the object. But if this is so, it cannot be wholly other than the human spirit.

Despite these criticisms of Otto, we owe him gratitude for his convincing demonstration that the essential religious experience is to be found in contact with a Present Reality, which the religious man believes to be no subjective fancy. In the distinctively moral experience, man is always striving towards an ideal, endeavouring to transmute the "oughts" of

(21) Ibid.

life into an "is", seeking to give a concrete embodiment in the present to what is for him now a future ideal. This forward gaze is indeed an integral part of the Christian religious experience but the religious man par excellence, the saint, is always moved and strengthened to press forward by the impact of a present reality, God. God is not merely the future ideal but the most real fact of the present. « It may be said to be the essential characteristic of religion as contrasted with morality, that it changes aspiration into fruition, anticipation into realization. » (22). Man's experience of the numinous in a form that we can accept may be thus described in the words of A. E. Taylor—« It is the universal voice of the temporal and the mutable brought face to face with the absolutely Eternal. » (23). Yet the goodness towards which man strives, when he acts only as a moral creature, becomes in the religious act, not a future but a present reality, since this goodness is the expression of the Eternal as it impinges upon man here and now. Hence we get the paradox of the Christian experience—the need of moral effort and pressing forward to the future, coupled with the conviction that the "good" is already realized and actual effective reality, since it is the expression of the living and Eternal God. The religious man's experience of the divine is not a series of rational inferences from the system of nature to its originating Cause nor the moralist's striving to a future ideal, but an immediate contact with the Eternal which, though it may induce a feeling of the numinous carries with it as an essential the recognition that the Eternal is not simply the awe-inspiring but a Being possessing moral and spiritual qualities akin to those which man finds, if only imperfectly, in his own being.

Can we say then, in the light of this discussion, that Otto has adequately sustained his thesis that there is a revelation of the divine to man which comes to him through the numinous experience. The difficulty of answering this with an unhesitating affirmative springs from the fact that this particular numinous experience can be provoked in man by a wide variety of different objects. The savage may have a sense of the weird,

(22) J. Caird, Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 1880, p. 243-50.
(23) A. E. Taylor, Essays Catholic and Critical, p. 76.

the uncanny, the otherworldly in the presence of some object of nature, such as a queer shaped stone but can it be said in any intelligible sense that this is a revelation of the divine to the savage, except in the quite vague sense that he has a groping feeling towards a reality which is above and beyond him. The prophet feels it in a more elevated form in the vision of the Lord of Hosts, sitting upon a throne, surrounded by cherubims crying Holy, Holy, Holy, is the Lord of Hosts (Isaiah 6, v. 3) and is overcome by the sense of the transcendent Otherness of the Lord separated from all that is human and earthly. Yet despite the impressiveness of this, it is difficult not to feel that the Hosean phrase « I desire mercy and not sacrifice » was a more important step forward in man's apprehension of the Eternal than Isaiah's crushing sense of the numinous. The study of man's numinous experiences, from the most primitive to the most developed, does suggest that man can come into immediate and direct contact with that which is transcendent and in that sense "other" but that this "other" in the highest forms of religious experience, will express itself through an experience that contains rational, moral, and spiritual qualities such as are manifest in human personality at its highest, in other words the discovery by the finite mind of the working of transcendent mind in the other than the self.

Furthermore, why limit the operation of the divine in eliciting from man this numinous response to select objects only? Goethe felt the mystery everywhere, so much so that he was prepared to worship Christ if he could also worship the sun. According to what principle does Otto establish a hierarchy among the different objects which provoke this numinous experience? Not by a moral principle because the "holy" is by definition not inclusive of the moral values. Finally Leuba criticizes the theory from the psychologist's standpoint. The sense of mystery, of fear in presence of the terrifyingly sublime, is in no way distinctive of the religious life. The same reactions may be experienced in the face of any spectacle suggesting immense power. Unless the word religion is to be used in a sense so broad as to rob it of any precise significance, such feeling cannot be regarded as specially "religious".

For M. Hauter, the common element in all religions is

neither the feeling of absolute dependence of Schleiermacher nor the sacred of Otto, but the notion of force or might. « Le sentiment religieux se trouve en rapport essentiel avec la notion de la force et ce doivent être des manifestations puissantes dans le monde ambiant qui en ont déterminé l'éclosion. » (24). For primitive man, the powers capable of exercising such influence might vary from trees and springs to animals, huge stones, unscaled mountains, in fact an endless multitude of objects taken from nature, which have at one time or another become invested for him with a special significance, as having either a real or an imagined influence upon his life. Another significant feature of this type of religion is that such worship as man gives to these objects is asocial—not the worship of society. « Persuader à un fidèle qu'il adore la société ne lui apporte nullement une nouvelle clarté, mais détruit sa piété et ses croyances. » (25). Rather « L'objet doit être considéré comme un des facteurs constitutifs et générateurs de la vie sociale » (26). From this primitive and polytheistic stage, we pass to a more developed form of the same thing, when Nature in her totality becomes the object of worship as in the Spinozistic scheme. Later man is moved by the ethical object, whether it be in reverence for the moral law within or for the hero who, in his own life, has embodied the moral fact. Thus there is an ascending scale of objects, which are regarded as capable of influencing the life of man, whether in his physical or spiritual being.

(*e*) We pass on to a discussion of the theory of a stimulating and original man, Max Scheler. He too attempts to define the specific qualities of man's religious experience in terms of his apprehension of the sacred or the holy. What then does he mean by this latter? His treatment of the question differs in several important respects from that of Otto's. He commences with certain general propositions which are very important and have to be assumed throughout the whole argument. These are:—

(1) There is a universal revelation of the divine to man

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(24) Hauter, Essai sur l'objet religieux, p. 28.
(25) Ibid., p. 81.
(26) Ibid., p. 84.

in his religious experience.

(2) Philosophy and religion are two distinct, irreducible domains, implying therefore that religion is not simply an aspect of philosophy or, as Croce believes, an inferior expression of that which can be more adequately contained in a mature philosophy. As a concrete example of this latter type of thinking may be cited the view of certain Absolute Idealists such as F. H. Bradley that the "personality" of God may be "true" for the religious man, but that from the standpoint of a developed philosophy, the personality of God must be merged into the more inclusive term of the Absolute and that therefore, philosophically speaking, the belief in a personal God is an error.

(3) Religion, although a phenomenon irreducible to and independent of philosophy, is yet accessible to later philosophical knowledge. This means that the specific religious experience is not completely unintelligible, but that on analysis there can be elicited from it rationally intelligible concepts which may be embodied in a system of philosophical knowledge.

For Scheler, the essence of the divine is characterized by two essential features:—

(*a*) Its irresistibility (Allüberlegenheit). This has some resemblance to the pressure of the numinous upon man in Otto's scheme. It is this quality in the divine which induces the feeling of creatureliness, the conviction of the religious man that « all knowledge of God is knowledge by God », the conviction of the Christian man that all his gropings after the Eternal are only possible by reason of a prior movement of the Holy Spirit in his own heart.

(*b*) The divine has the character of Infinite Personal Spirit. This clear and unequivocal attribution of personality to the divine is of the utmost importance in comparison with the non-rational numen of Otto. For Scheler, the infinite love of God is the dominating element in the divine Person, being superior to both His will and intelligence. From this flow equally important consequences. Moral values are essentially personal values and have no significance or meaning apart from their place in a personal experience. One cannot conceive of a stone or better still of the amoeba as having a sense of duty or being actuated by self-sacrificing love, unless we attribute to it a

personal consciousness similar to our own. Likewise if the sum-total of reality is conceived of in organic terms in the manner of Whitehead, personal values as we know them become illusions of the finite creature which, if it could see itself as having significance only in virtue of its function in the organic whole, would cease to see in its personality and the values therein realized the essence of reality. The notion of personality however, even in us, remains incomplete and finally meaningless unless it is referred to an Infinite Personal Being, for whom there is a direct apprehension of moral values, who sustains these latter and communicates them to man. Otherwise man is simply as the grass of the field and the spiritual values he apprehends have no permanent foundation. « All possible values are founded on the value of an infinite and personal Spirit and the world of values which are presented to him. The acts which apprehend absolute values are possible only in as much as they are accomplished in contact with the divine, i. e. God, and values are absolute values only in as much as they belong to a world of values which are present to God. » (27).

In the light of these assertions therefore, let us consider Scheler's fourth set of values. These form a hierarchy which includes utilitarian, vital, spiritual (geistige) i. e. intellectual, æsthetic, and moral, and religious values. The central notion of these last is the holy or the sacred. The recognition of these values is dependent upon their presentation to acts of love and hate of a particular kind. Like all responses of love and hate in their developed form, they refer themselves to personal unities, notably in this case to the person of God. « The emotional states corresponding to the intuition of the holy and profane are beatitude and despair, faith and incredulity, piety and impiety: the way towards intuition of the holy is repentance and renewal. » (28). Scheler rejects the idea of « commencing by isolating nature or man in regard to that which surpasses and surrounds him or them, i. e. the transcendent and supposing that it would then be possible, by a simple logical reasoning,

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(27) Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materielle Wertethik, p. 14; cited by J. Héring, Phénoménologie et Philosophie Religieuse.

(28) G. Gurvitch, Les Tendances actuelles de la Philosophie allemande, Paris, 1930, p. 96.

to pass from that man or nature artificially prepared by science, to the existence of the God of religion. » (29). Having rejected this false method of isolation, Scheler continues with a criticism of the modern psychologizing of religion. Modern Protestant doctrine has no ontology of the religious object. It is a mistake to think that it is possible to describe the act of religious faith in its totality by having recourse to the descriptive procedure of « psychology ». It is not enough to represent the religious act as, with Schleiermacher, a feeling, or with Ritschl as a movement of the will, or with the rationalists as an intellectual attitude. The purely psychological description of the religious act always ignores the vital fact that in the concrete religious life, the religious act always tends towards a transcendent object, God. In addition therefore to psychological research, there must be an attempt to give a phenomenology of the religious life in which this essential factor is presented, by intuitive understanding, as part of the very structure of faith. Otherwise one is not talking about religion but only about the hollow shell, the empty form. To describe prayer exclusively in terms of the psychological workings of the mind and to leave out of account the religious man's conviction that he is praying to God, to note as an interesting psychological fact that the religious man experiences feelings of joy and confidence, that he feels himself forgiven for his sins, that he shows courage and self-sacrifice, and ignore the fact that in his experience all these things are integrally related to his conviction of the reality of God through whom he receives such strength, all this may be interesting as psychology but it is not a correct description of the real structure of religious faith because it omits what Scheler calls that "intentional" quality, that reaching forward to the Object of faith. Again he frankly recognizes the existence of revelation in the religious consciousness generally, i. e. that there exists a primordial, uninterrupted elementary union between God and man, despite the "Fall", despite the sinfulness which has set up barriers. In religious faith, the personal spirit of God reveals itself directly to the personal spirit of man. Wherever there is religion, there is prayer and that which distinguishes the "intention of religion

(29) Ménégoz F., Op. cit., p. 208.

and prayer" is that it is directed towards the transcendent, that it finds satisfaction only in the divine, that it only reaches its goal if the divine is pleased in full liberty, to reveal and give itself to man. The religious man performs certain "intentional" acts, which tend towards an Object impossible to construct by a synthesis of elements taken from empirical experience. No man has seen God at any time. Religion cannot be explained by that which is not religion. In other words, religion is only explicable, if at all, on the assumption that its essential structure with its reference to God is a true one. If one tries to explain religion as a mere survival of tribal tabus or the worship of humanity, or as an effective process of auto-suggestion, one has destroyed its very being and what is being explained is not religion but something else.

The provisional hypothesis of our discussion has been that religious experience is the increasing apprehension of an "object". If this is so, then a man's apprehension at any particular point may have as its subjective counterpart certain mental concepts or a feeling of absolute dependence or the scense of a mysterious "Other" at once tremendum and fascinans or the conviction of its power to influence his own life, or the experience of contact with a personal Spirit as Scheler describes it. But most of these theories do not indicate how man's apprehension of the nature of the "object" may grow and become more adequate. Certainly the feeling of dependance implies dependance upon something, but the feeling itself does not clearly reveal the nature of this something or somebody. The "object" still remains "other" in Otto's sense but an "other" without definite characteristics. The notion of power certainly implies the existence of an object capable of exercising it, but what is the nature of this object and is it one or many? Both Otto and Scheler are agreed that the religious man's experience has reference to a transcendent Object. Rightly or wrongly the former refuses any interpretation that would eliminate this factor. Our previous argument has been that the unifying element in all human experience and therefore in the religious experience is the attempt of the self-conscious organism to adjust itself satisfactorily to its environment, to the "other" which constitutes that part of the world

over against the "self", and that in this process of adjustment the mind, present in the self-conscious organism, finds not merely a hostile "other" but evidence of the activity in the "other" of a mind akin to itself. This argument could be accepted by any intelligent man who might confess himself quite ignorant of that which we have described as religious experience. There is still then this issue to be faced—what is the worth of the testimony of so-called religious experience to the reality of its object, God. That there are specific religious data, which cannot be simply subsumed under the intellectual, æsthetic, and moral aspects, we have seen there is good reason to believe. Certainly these religious experiences cannot be taken at their face value, for it is evident that historically, religion has contained a considerable admixture of error and illusion. If, for example, the Christian idea of God is true, it follows that much that men have believed about the divine nature in the past has been mistaken, and if this is so in regard to earlier religions, why should the Christian experience be exempt from the same taint. « There is no existence », says Dr. Shailer Matthews, « corresponding to the patterns with which the deity has been conceived. There was no Yahweh on Mount Sinai and no Zeus on Olympia. » (30). If, however, our previous arguments as to the nature of the Ground of the world-process are correct, we shall not deny a priori that God may reveal Himself in personal intercourse with man. At least we shall not dismiss beforehand the data thus supplied, as do so many infected with quasi-scientific prejudices. Taken in isolation, these data may not be sufficient as a basis for a theistic scheme, but placed in the context afforded by our earlier arguments, they will be seen to be in harmony and to supply the necessary fulfilment. The Christian will have no interest in denying the previous course of our discussion but he will go much further. He will claim that an autonomous morality is incapable of rendering man righteous. He will insist that, if there have been revelations of God to man in pre-Christian times, they have all been vitiated in part by the imperfections of the human instrument. A fuller and more complete revelation was therefore needed. Scheler himself admits that the necessity of salvation by supernatural

(30) Dr. Shailer Matthews, The Growth of the idea of God, p. 212.

means can be recognized by natural religion, even by metaphysics, but that the latter cannot assert the historical reality of this event. Natural religion may take us some distance towards a genuine knowledge of God and may even enable us to reach the conviction that He is a personal Being who is holy, just, and merciful, as the Hebrew prophets believed. Since however the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation is a statement of something God has done and therefore can only be expressed adequately, as Dr. N. Micklem says, by active verbs—God so loved, sent, was crucified—metaphysical speculation alone cannot successfully handle the problem.

« We may conclude then, that while the Christian revelation gathers up all the truth known of God through natural reason and natural religion and while reason and natural piety may lead to the conclusion both that man needs redemption and that divine help has actually been vouchsafed to him, yet the conviction that at a certain point in history, God laid bare his mighty arm and in some sense Himself walked incarnate amongst men is not, as it cannot be, the conclusion either of speculative thought or of natural theology. » (31).

We have just passed in review several attempts to define the essential characteristics of the religious consciousness. To what extent are these suggestions substantiated by a study of man's religious activities in different ages and climes. In what diverse forms has the religious consciousness manifested itself? Thanks to the life-long researches of the distinguished Swedish theologian, Nathan Söderblom, an answer, based upon a careful study of the facts, can be given with some confidence. Most of our references will be to the French translation of his book—Le Dieu Vivant (32). Firstly we shall endeavour to give a clear impression of the religious activity of man in its non-Christian form, followed by a phenomenology of the specific Christian experience. Our first journey will be to India to study the method of yoga (yuj=to join, to unite). The masculine noun yoga signifies mental concentration, the elimination of all that occupies and distracts the mind. Hence it comes to signify

(32) Nathan Söderblom, Dieu Vivant, traduit par Jacques de Coussange, Paris, 1937.

asceticism in the broadest sense of the word. « Yoga » differs from Buddhism in affirming the existence of the soul, and is orthodox in as far as it retains the Upanishads, the most important part of the Veda, for theological and mystical use. The Yogin, by means of his asceticism, is able to obtain divine powers and become as a god. India has historically recognized three ways of salvation:—

(*a*) By works—Karma-marga
(*b*) By knowledge—Jnana-marga
(*c*) By love, devotion, faith—Bhakti-marga.

To this should be added the tendency to consider the material world as "appearance" only. In the Vedânta, matter is an "appearance", the work of mâyâ, illusion. Indian forms of yoga have on the whole pursued the via negationis:—« Toute l'énergie se dépense à fermer les portes des sens, à éloigner les impressions, à effacer les images et représentations concrètes, à rendre l'esprit libre. » (33). Söderblom remarks that for Jesus, prayer was never a pure état d'âme but a contact, a conversation, and this reveals far-reaching differences between Christianity and the method of yoga. The latter is therefore primarily a systematic cultivation of the inner life, passing from the discipline of the body to that of the mind. Its aim is to arrive at a state of extasy in which the soul becomes one with the soul of the universe. Feeling plays a very important part, hence the emphasis on the subjective aspect, upon the inner states of the soul; this is in sharp contrast with the somewhat brutal confrontation of the Christian believer with an objective fact of history, the Cross of Christ. For the yogin, the problem of the existence of the divinities he recognizes is not an acute one since the « ascetic saves himself ». Jainism too maintains that salvation is possible by man's own efforts without the help of Brahma. Buddhism presents several difficult problems. There is firstly the need to distinguish between what appear to have been the opinions of the historical Buddha himself and the religion that later developed and was called by his name. In the light of the knowledge we have, the Buddha's personal attitude seems to have been agnostic, if not atheistic, in regard to the existence of the traditional divinities of his

(33) Ibid., p. 65.

country. The "perfect illumination" (sambodhi), which came to him beneath the ficus religiosa, was not regarded by him as a divine revelation. There is no suggestion of a divine call or summons, such as is found in Jeremiah and the Hebrew prophets generally. For the Buddha, suffering and unhappiness have one root-ignorance (avidyâ); hence the only way of salvation is by knowledge (jnâna). Siddhârtha discovered, like many after him, that mortification and asceticism for its own sake was no solution. Yet there is no recourse to faith in a personal object of devotion as in the Bhakti. « Nous trouvons en Bouddha une religion sans Dieu qui est l'achèvement d'un mysticisme ascétique. Le bouddhisme dépasse le jinisme et élimine ainsi l'âme. Ce fut un salut de l'âme sans âme, un art de parvenir à un état psychologique donné au milieu d'un perpétuel flux et reflux de facteurs physiques et psychiques. » (34). The greatness of the Buddha resides in his refusal to use this saving knowledge for himself alone but rather to spend his life in the instruction of others. He symbolizes India's second way to salvation—by knowledge.

The third way by devotion and love is remarkably illustrated by the Bhakti (piety). Bhakti, by contrast with the customary monism of Indian thought, emphasizes man's relation with the personal God Içvara. This would seem to be native to India and not the product of foreign influence. « La Bhakti, l'adoration d'un dieu personnel dans un esprit d'amour, n'est pas due à des influences chrétiennes. » (35). In the earlier Upanishads, Atman-Brahman has a personal character. « To him who has the highest devotion (bhakti) for God—and the same for his spiritual master (guru)—these matters, which have been explained to him, will become manifest if he is a great soul (Mahâtman). » (36). It is finally Krishna who comes to represent the incarnation of love—he is the ideal form of the God-man in India. The Bhakti is also democratic in the sense that it may be practised in all walks of life and under all circumstances. Hence its emphasis on the importance of performing the duties of the station to which one has been called.

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(34) Ibid., p. 112.
(35) Ibid., p. 122.
(36) Ibid., p. 124.

« Nowhere do we find in India as here the living God. Warren Hastings was right to claim that, of all known religions, it was the one which had the greatest resemblance to Christianity.»(37). Whereas the yogin gains his spiritual freedom by his own ascetic efforts, here the appeal is to faith.

That Buddhism, which began with a theoretical atheism, developed in the course of time an extraordinary rich variety of divinities and representations of the divine, proves at least that man finds it difficult to eliminate completely the personal element from his notion of the divine, especially in the actual practice of the religious life. Mahâyâna Buddhism made the Budha an object of divine worship. This latter was later extended to a countless number of Bodhisattvas who perform the role of redeemers. This Buddha-bhakti is most widely spread in Japan. It is curious and instructive to note that the Jesuits declared that they had found the Lutheran heresy in Japan where the worshippers believed themselves to be saved, not by works, but by faith in Amitâbha, the Buddha-God. « Celui qui s'efforce encore d'accomplir le bien par ses propres forces n'est pas compris dans le vœu originel d'Amida. Mais celui qui tourne son cœur, encore plein de confiance dans sa propre force, et met toute sa confiance dans la force d'une aide peut être assuré qu'il obtiendra en récompense la vraie vie. »(38). Buddhism, like Christianity later, was faced with the problem of how to obtain certitude and assurance in the religious life. In order to free their faith from the uncertainty attaching to all historical reconstructions, the Buddha and his promise of salvation were detached from the soil of India and transformed into a pre-temporal act. The Christian will at one think of the identification of Christ with the pre-existent Logos in Christian theology. As we have seen, the original Buddhism had no "theology" in the strict sense of the word, since salvation was to be obtained by the individual's own effort, not by some kind of divine grace. It has been the aim of this thesis to defend the use of personality as a category of metaphysical explanation. Buddhism seems at first sight the most striking challenge to this contention. Despite the plea that Nirvâna is not a purely nega-

(37) Ibid., p. 149.

(38) Hass-Amida Buddha, cited Söderblom, p. 176.

tive state, that it is a positive state of inward peace, it seems to have been established by scholars that, although nirvâna may be enjoyed here and now on this earth in as far as the individual is liberated from the illusions of sense, the fear of death and the slavery of desire, yet the absolute Nirvâna does imply a cessation of consciousness and therefore the annihilation of personality. « Le Nirvâna absolu implique une cessation de conscience; la doctrine des Skandhas et celle du Karma, admises toutes deux par le Gautama, conduisent incontestablement à l'annihilation de la personnalité. » (39). It therefore becomes a question of definition and vocabulary as to whether primitive Buddhism should be called a religion or not.

Time does not permit us to make a more thorough study of that vast mass of material which has been gathered together by innumerable workers relative to man's religious history. Can we discover certain characteristic features? Leuba enumerates the following:—for a being to become a "god" the following qualities must be discernible or attributable to it.

(*a*) Such a being must be a psychical or spiritual agent, i. e. capable of being acted upon by will, thought and feeling.

(*b*) The "gods" of all the historical religions have been personal beings, whether in the form of animals or men, and in the higher religions too, though a specific form is absent, the attributes are still psychical.

(*c*) This personal being must be superhuman in the sense that it must transcend ordinary human powers. Absolute power is not however necessary: it is only the more developed religions which make their "god" omnipotent.

(*d*) A "god" must be invisible. The higher the religion, the less frequent the "divine" manifestations.

(*e*) This personal being must be accessible (not by means of coercion, but by anthropopathic action, i. e. by the distinctively human activities which find expression in will, thought, and feeling).

(*f*) The superhuman power must be part of the "god's" essential being, i. e. not a power capable of being controlled and constrained by magical practices but an inalienable possession depending exclusively on the divinity's own exercise of it.

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(39) Leuba, Op. cit., p. 335-6.

(*g*) A certain friendliness towards man must be one of the elements in the divinity's nature.

A study of man's religious history would seem to justify this selection. Buddhism, which at first sight seems to be an exception by reason of the Founder's agnosticism, is seen to fall into line when one considers its later history as it finds expression in the deification of the Buddha and the creation of many gods exhibiting some or all of the above features. The religious life, at whatever stage of development, implies the following presuppositions:—

(*a*) The existence of a power or powers regarded as able to control and determine the destiny of man. When an inanimate object of nature is centre of worship, it is no longer regarded as simply inanimate but as in some sense active, the seat of a power which can exercise influence upon man and his life. The object of the religious man's attention is therefore always living and active and this is the mark of positive religion wherever it appears. Further this power or powers can be acted upon by what Leuba calls "anthropopathic" means. At however low a level, the specific religious activity implies some kind of "personal" contact. It is interesting that Leuba should admit this, seeing that for him the "gods" are the creations of the human spirit; the worth of religion is not in its ontological affirmations but in its biological value. The Christian belief in the existence of a personal God is of course without foundation.

(*b*) The subjective side of man's response to this power or powers may be very varied, as we have seen, but there is always the attempt to establish contact and hence prayer from its lowliest to its highest forms.

(*c*) In the higher forms of the religious life, the number of the "objects" of worship tends to be reduced in number. Polytheism gives way to the one supreme religious Object, whether it be Jehovah, Allah, or the Christian Creator of Heaven and Earth.

The Christian religious experience shares these characteristics. God is an Object of worship, conceived as able to act upon man's destiny and to enter into personal contact with him by what Leuba calls antropopathic means. Regarded from the

psychological standpoint only, the Christian has the same subjective responses as are often elicited in other religions. The problem is now thrust upon us—does the Christian religious experience contain something not to be found elsewhere, what is the value of its testimony to the existence of the Christian God? Have we the right to go beyond the simple psychological description and affirm that the Christian experience has ontological implications? Obviously the believing Christian takes this step. What is the philosopher to do? Is it a matter of indifference for the religious life whether it is based upon the agnosticism of the Buddha or on the Christian belief in a Creator and Redeemer God? Is there a sense in which the Christian experience of salvation through God is more "true" than its apparent counterpart in Mahâyâna Budhism? These are vast and far-reaching questions. To even attempt an answer to these questions, we must first study more closely the Christian religious experience itself.

Our attitude to this will be determined by our conception of revelation. We are faced with the difficult problem of deciding in relation to the New Testament that which the Christian regards as of the very essence of his religious experience and therefore as true revelation of God to himself and that part which is due to the human instruments through which the revelation has come and shares the temporary form of a particular period in the history of the world. We are now trying to answer the question, not as to whether the Christian is right or wrong, but as to what he himself considers as the essence of his religious experience. In what sense do we use the word revelation as applied to events recorded in the New Testament? There is no doubt that in the Christian experience, the figure of Jesus of Nazareth plays a central part. Emil Brunner says very justly—« For a Hindu, Persian, Chinese or Neoplatonic mystic, it is a matter of indifference whether Rama, Buddha, Tao-Tse or Porphyry have really lived or are only legendary persons. » (40). He also says however—« It is a misunderstanding to regard the object of Christian faith as a fact of history. » (41). In other words, the Christian conviction that the

(40) Emil Brunner, The Word and the World.
(41) Emil Brunner, The Mediator, Engl. trans. Olive Wyon, London, 1934, p. 156.

only adequate interpretation of the Person, work, and teaching of Jesus is that "God so loved the world that He sent" is not capable of demonstration by historical research as such. Just as it was possible for the contemporaries of Jesus to be completely divided and puzzled as to the significance and import of His Advent into the world, so the secular historian may see only another Jewish prophet but not the Incarnate Word of the Christian faith. Knowledge of Christ "after the flesh", i. e. historical knowledge about Him, does not constitute knowledge of the Christ in the flesh, i. e. knowledge of Him as an historic figure and the recognition at the same time by faith that He is the Word made flesh. The latter demands a spiritual perception of the Christ according to the spirit, which Brunner calls faith. We are thus driven back to this conclusion. The Incarnation may be what has actually happened, but we cannot know that it has happened without a prior act of faith, without the testimonium spiritus sancti internum, and this brings us again to the question of the validity of our spiritual perceptions and how we know that they are the witness in us of the Holy Spirit. It could be argued that, even if no one had recognized the Incarnate Word in the historic Jesus, it would still remain true that God had sent His Son, since the Incarnation as fact does not depend upon man's response to it. But in this case, we sinful men would never have known that the Incarnation had taken place. Therefore, to use the phraseology of Otto, the revelation of God in Jesus cannot be "wholly other"; there must be some point of contact between the revelation and our spiritual perceptions. The Word in some sense must be already in us. However much we say that faith is obedience to the Word of God embodied in the Person of Jesus, that Word, when it falls upon our consciousness, cannot meet with a blank wall but must elicit a response and that response implies a prior spiritual activity on our part. The Incarnation as a fact accessible to human knowledge cannot be "isolated" but is the fact of Jesus' advent together with the response He has elicited, and that we must therefore consider the complete phenomenon of the Church or the Body of Christ, which is the spiritual perception by men of the Christ according to the spirit.

The Christian religious experience therefore cannot be

reduced to the effects produced in men by the "teaching" of Jesus in the strict and narrow sense of the word, but includes also the effects produced in men by their beliefs about Jesus, both as to what He was and what He has done. The humanist who believes that Jesus was only a man of exceptional moral and spiritual insight and who perhaps accepts His teaching as to the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, if he refuses to go further than that, cannot be considered to have the distinctive Christian religious experience which historically has always included the belief that Jesus is not only another good man but a revelation of God, God in action. It is this element which distinguishes the Christian form of the religious consciousness from those other forms that we have already discussed in general terms.

« Christianity », says Dr. Whitehead, « bases itself upon an intensive study of certain historical occasions scattered irregularly within a period of about 1200 years, from the earlier Hebrew prophets and historians to the stabilization of Western theology by Augustine. » (42). Our philosophical task is to discuss the validity of these fundamental spiritual intuitions revealed in these historical occasions, especially in the Christian form they take with the Advent of Jesus, and decide how far their Object of reference, God, is guaranteed objectively in the light of these intuitions. To say with Brunner that "history as such is not a divine revelation; it merely represents humanity as a whole in its need of redemption" is in fact to deny that God has ever really spoken to men in the Old Testament or indeed at any other time, and this is too high a price to pay for the uniqueness of the Christian faith. Rather do we hold with Dr. Temple that all things in their measure are an expression of the divine will so that the unity of the world, its principle of rational coherence, is the divine personality in self-expression (43). Brunner in his anxiety to defend the particularity of the fact of Christ and its uniqueness, its once-for-allness, is in danger of making the Christian revelation almost unintelligible for us because so detached from all that has gone before. The particularity may be there but it cannot be defended by

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(42) Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 211.

(43) Temple, Op. cit., p. 302.

making Jesus a déraciné. There must be some fundamental principle underlying all revelation if revelation is to be apprehended in any measure by the human personality. « We affirm, then, that unless all existence is a medium of revelation, no particular revelation is possible; for the possibility of revelation depends on the personal quality of that supreme and ultimate reality which is God... only if God is revealed in the rising of the sun in the sky can He be revealed in the rising of a Son of Man from the dead; only if He is revealed in the history of Syrians and Philistines can He be revealed in the history of Israel; only if He chooses all men for His own can He choose any at all; only if nothing is profane can anything be sacred. » (44). In other words, if God is completely absent from the universe and human activity, if He has left no trace of His activity and makes no self-disclosure in the normal course of the world's evolution, then it is difficult to see how man can know a revelation when it does come. We shall, of course, not say that the fullness of God's nature is equally revealed in the stone and the saint, but likewise we shall not deny that but for God's sustaining power the stone itself would cease to be. Why shrink here from employing a completely anthropomorphic image? A man may construct an article of furniture, which embodies not only his manual skill, but those mental qualities of a mathematical, organizing and artistic kind which find expression in pleasing design and accurate measurement. Yet we shall not look to the chair for a full revelation of the man's moral and spiritual character. We cannot discover from the chair alone whether the man is kind and generous and if he is a good husband, father, friend or citizen. For the revelation of the personal being, we shall have to study him in action and primarily in contact with other human beings. Without claiming this to be a complete and adequate analogy, yet we may legitimately expect that if God does exist and He is a personal being as our previous reasoning has led us to suppose, then His revelation of Himself will be similar in kind. It is not in the structure and detailed organization of the material world that we shall look for and expect to find a revelation of God as personal and loving. That does not mean that the physical

(44) Ibid., p. 306.

universe tells us nothing at all about God. As A. E. Taylor maintains—« The spectacle of movement and change which we call nature thus at least suggests the presence of some "transcendent" source of movement and change which is strictly eternal, being above all mutability and having no succession of phases within itself and is omnipotent, since it is itself the source of all becoming. » (45). The religious man will not find in this spiritual satisfaction and an adequate object of worship but he will not despise the suggestions which nature makes to him. « We discover that the universe shows evidence of a designing and controlling power that has something in common with our own individual minds—not, so far as we have discovered, emotion, morality, or æsthetic appreciation, but the tendency to think in a certain way which, for want of a better word, we describe as mathematical. » (46). The relevant comment here is that Jeans, as a professional astronomer, is primarily concerned with those aspects of the cosmos which are amenable to measurement and capable of formulation in mathematical terms, and that he has not adequately considered the data supplied by the emergence of organisms with self-conscious personality, capable of religious, moral and æsthetic experiences. The religious man will gratefully acknowledge God's revelation of Himself as a mathematician, without thinking that this revelation is adequate for his salvation or the only revelation which God has vouchsafed to man. If God then is to reveal himself as personal, this can only be achieved through and to persons, since the personal cannot be revealed through that which is sub- or impersonal. Thus God's fuller revelation must be made, if at all, through a person or persons. This at once eliminates all intellectualist theories of revelation, namely that it is a revelation of doctrines or abstract propositions. The Christian revelation is not contained in the abstract statement—God is love—but in the concrete fact of the life, death, and suffering of Jesus where we see love in action. This important distinction is present wherever there are human and personal relationships. The word friendship has no significance unless it finds expression in concrete acts of friendship. It is the actual

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(45) A. E. Taylor, Essays C. & C., p. 58.
(46) Jeans, Mysterious Universe, p. 148.

fact of friendship knitting together the Jonathans and Davids which is the true revelation of the capacities of human nature. There is no such thing then as revealed truth since truth in the strict sense is a quality of propositions made by a mind. One cannot say:—a brown stone is truth but a proposition about the stone's colour may be true. Thus the proposition—God is love—in the New Testament may be a truthful statement based upon the life and death of Jesus, but the latter is the actual revelation, the statement is only the human formulation of the significance of that revelation for man.

What then is the point of contact between the revelation of God in Christ and the universal revelation which we have declared to be present in the whole world-process? God has slowly revealed Himself to man, not only through the intellectual, æsthetic and moral apprehensions above described, but also in the emergence of "divinely illuminated personalities", to whom has been vouchsafed a special intuition of the personal nature of God in what we have describes as the distinctive religious experience. The prophetic development in the history of the Jewish people, with the gradual clarifying and purifying of the idea of God, was God's own way of educating the Jewish people in a deeper and more truthful knowledge of Himself and constitutes a true revelation of Himself. Yet the medium of this revelation was always imperfect human personality. There was never, even in the greatest prophets that complete coincidence of ideal and life, which is implied in the Christian assertion of the Word made flesh. The human personality of Jesus was the perfect vehicle for the revelation of God in His personal being, for the indwelling of the divine in fullest measure, so that we have God Himself completely informing a human personality and revealing Himself by a direct Word uttered to men in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. This does not imply omniscience in the historic Jesus, but that God as personal and loving for the first time received complete and concrete expression in the actions and life of a human being. To recognize Jesus as Lord, as the New Testament says, is an act of faith, the complete commitment of the whole being to the revelation there seen.

It is obvious that this last affirmation has carried us beyond

the limited sphere of metaphysics; it compels us to plunge into action and therefore faith. The latter is not blind credulity, since metaphysics, as we have seen, is not necessarily hostile to the fundamental presuppositions of the religious life. At the same time, metaphysics cannot transmute theory into living faith. « But the disciplines and compulsions of life are not all; they are what a man may do for himself, but he cannot do all. As he cannot be a poet by will, or a lover by will, neither by will alone can he become a creature of the spirit, but by a yielding, an abandonment. » This sentence from Charles Morgan's novel "The Fountain" is also profoundly true in its application to the specific religious life. It is this yielding to what for the Christian is a divine call and the guidance of the Holy Spirit which must for ever escape the philosopher's net and leave him puzzled and restless. This creation of the new man by the divine Spirit will always be an object of stumbling to the pure metaphysician for it is a plain "thus far and no further" to the latter's speculation. As metaphysicians therefore, we can state the possibility of such a revelation of God in His personal being as we see in Jesus but we cannot state its actuality, since the metaphysician as such is concerned with the "criticism of abstractions". He therefore reaches the point when he sees the need of his own salvation and that even a redemption of philosophy is a prime condition of peace with God.

Let us now briefly summarize the stages through which our argument has passed:—

(*a*) Reflection on the world-process, the occurrence of mind and its significance, the nature of scientific knowledge and of morality, has led us to the conclusion that the process itself is grounded in transcendent "Mind".

(*b*) A study of human history has shown to us the existence of a religious consciousness as man's specific and entire response to the power or powers believed to govern his destiny. We have noted the religious man's belief that he is in contact with an Object other than himself and the fact that he endeavours to enter into contact with this Object by "anthropopathic" means, i. e. to establish a personal contact.

(*c*) A phenomenology of religious experience, Christian and non-Christian, and an analysis of the idea of revelation showed

that the Christian man has this same sense of an Object above and beyond him but in this case the Object of worship is not wholly other but akin to the mind which man discovers in himself; further this Object has disclosed itself in its personal being in a person, namely Christ, so that henceforth the Object is no longer a mysterious other, a vague It but a Father with whom prayer is possible and whose nature as love (agape) is seen in the Cross of Christ. The word Object, so vague and colourless, which we have employed throughout to emphasize the contrast between the psychological states characteristic of the religious experience and its "intentional" quality, i. e. its reference to an Object transcending this subjectivity, is now insufficient.

We believe that these three affirmations have been established by an appeal to evidence and indisputable facts offered by an impartial study of human history. We believe that this is as far as human speculation can go in attempting to show the existence of the Object of Christian worship. It is at least claimed that if the legitimacy of the act of faith cannot be demonstrated with the rigour of a mathematical proposition, yet its reasonableness has been vindicated, reasonable in the sense that it does not violently contradict any well-athenticated body of knowledge about the world in which we live. It is not, of course, reasonable in the sense given to this word by those so-called practical people whose criterion of action is the expedient.

Before bringing this work to a conclusion, it will be valuable to return to those criticisms of the Object of Christian Worship with which this thesis began and estimate their value in the light of our main contentions. It should be emphasized that "religious experience means not some isolated group of bizarre experiences, but the special way in which the whole of life is experienced by the religious man" (47). Yet this does imply that there are in the life of the religious man certain experiences which stand out as specifically religious and which illuminate for him the rest of his experience. Thus, although for the devout man all his activities have a certain religious significance, even if it is only the sweeping of a room, as Herbert says, yet these derive their significance from the exercise of prayer, involving personal communion with the Controller of one's destiny, or the forgive-

(47) A. E. Taylor, Op. cit., p. 71.

ness of sins through Jesus Christ, or the conviction that in the Cross one is in direct contact with the redeeming love of God in action. It is the experience in which these factors play the dominant part which constitutes the norm of the religious man's attitude to the other experiences of his life. The question then with which we began was—Are these experiences the source of a genuine knowledge of reality, or are they completely illusory, or are they a mixture of truth and error?

The arguments for the completely illusory nature of these experiences can be discussed under two headings:—

(a) *The Psychological.*

Freud has suggested in "The Future of an Illusion" that religion is only a special instance of man's tendency to escape from the harsh reality of the "real" world, an instance of the working of the principle of compensation, by which one seeks refuge in the imagination for the sufferings, evils, and frustrations of this mortal life. This principle is sufficient, in Freud's opinion, to explain away the objective validity of all that passes as "religious experience", at least in the sense in which the religious man understands "objectivity". Our previous study has been an attempt at a reasoned refutation of this conclusion, but it will be as well to restate Freud's position in relation to our argument and show its insufficiency and the contradictions to which it leads.

Freud makes the quite unjustifiable assumption that the "real" word is the world of science, i. e. the world stripped of all those qualities we normally attribute to it, save the mathematical. The impinging of certain vibrations upon the retina of the eye is the "reality" the beauty of the sunset is "subjective illusion". The pressure of the tribe upon the individual explains his sense of duty and his ethical ideals which are only a reflection of society's needs. That is the "truth" about the moral life. Freud joins hands here with the sociologist. The prophetic impulse to defy the tribal morality in the interests of higher ideals, as in Jeremiah, the conviction that he must abide by his call whatever the consequences, that is either illusion or completely inexplicable on the Freudian theory. The mind of Freud, so delicate and penetrating in analysis, reaches the curious conclusion that the "real" world is devoid of mind the activity

of which is only the covering of the "real" with illusions of its own. Our previous argument has shown that, starting with the modern scientific account of the world, whether we like it or not, mind does appear in the process and that to eliminate it or try to pretend that it is not there or to show that it is not what it appears to be is wilful blindness and the lazy acceptance of an unnecessary irrationality at the heart of things. But say the psychologists, that does not alter the fact that all man's experiences have a psychical origin and that he is constantly "projecting" his desires, ideals and hopes upon—upon what we may ask—upon the "outer" world is the reply. Yet here is where the fundamental confusion of the psychologist comes in—precisely what is the nature of this outer world upon which the so-called "self" projects itself? All the terms which the psychologist uses are themselves of psychical origin and derived from the introspection of his own experience. The same is true of the scientific notions of force, energy, motion, cause. What guarantee have we that the scientist's symbols may not give us an equally illusory account of the "outer" world as the religious man's experiences are claimed to do? We have seen that there are good grounds for not regarding science simply as the ingenious playing with symbols but as a true, if partial, revelation of the real. « All science », says Huxley, « is based upon an act of faith—faith in the validity of the mind's logical processes, faith in the ultimate explicability of the world, faith that the laws of thought are laws of things. » (48). But science at least works in practice, says the psychologist to which the religious man may reply that, judged by these standards, his own claim is a very powerful one because he can point to the universality of the religious interest. He can point to the persistence of the religious consciousness throughout the ages and the Christian can testify to at least nearly two thousand years of continued and unbroken Christian experience of God in Christ. Judged by a pragmatic test, the toughness and powers of resistance of the religious life will stand every comparison with a scientific theory. « He who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness knows not what he asks », says F. H. Bradley.

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(48) Huxley, Ends and Means.

The plain fact is that if the psychological theory of projection is carried to its logical conclusion, it means resigning ourselves to the most barren form of scepticism, in which all the activities of the mind, intellectual, moral, and æsthetic, and the full response of the religious man are nothing but the playing of the fancy upon an unknown background, and it means that the search for truth (which, incidentally, includes what the psychologist regards as his True theory) as well as our pursuit of the good is a pleasing mirage. If a man resolutely adopts this position, no mere argument will move him. The Christian none the less will claim that such a man has made all intellectual activity futile, including psychology, and that he has left the universe not uni—at all but a chaos. The Christian will have a quiet confidence in the rational superiority of his faith, as well as in its sufficiency for the salvation of man. A religion which has the Cross at its centre need not fear the charge of seeking compensation in the consolations of religion and of refuge-seeking from cruel fact. The chief point we wish to make here however is that the psychological criticism of the religious attitude is equally valid and cogent against every other activity of the human spirit, and that the psychologists should be compelled to accept the logical consequences of their beliefs, if they wish to retain their position at all.

It is notorious that Freud's explanation of religion has been closely connected with the position he assigns to sex. Since this argument has gained the most notoriety and is often cited by the modern young sophisticated who have never thought the issue through, something needs to be said about it. Freud emphasized, what Plato already knew, that dreams testify to a repressed sexuality and that this latter is a necessity imposed by even a minimum of social life. He gave added significance to the already observed fact that "conversion" very often coincides with the awakening of the sexual life in the adolescent. Yet even here one must observe that, if it is in large measure true, it is not universally true, and that there have been many adult conversions in the history of the Christian Church and some of them not the least distinguished.

Granted however that adolescence and conversion seem frequently to coincide, it does not at all follow that conversion

can be completely and adequately accounted for in terms of sublimated sexuality. That the latter plays its part, no honest person would deny, that some people's religious experience is more saturated with it than that of others is also fairly evident, but that the religious consciousness as such can be finally explained in such a way is open to grave doubt. The period of adolescence is usually a time of general awakening for the whole personality, when the self becomes more conscious of its individuality and, at the same time, more conscious of its basic unity with all other life and the world in which it is placed. The human being at adolescence, because its subjectivity is greatly intensified and made more self-conscious, becomes simualtaneously more open to the great objectivities of human life. A. E. Taylor gives us a simple but forceful example. Many a youth whose interest in music has been either very small or limited to the lower forms, suddenly discovers at adolescence that the great classical composers have a significance and an appeal to which he was previously quite deaf. The awakening of his personality coincides with a more acute capacity for æsthetic appreciation and for delight in beauty.

> « There was a time when meadow, grove and stream
> The earth and every common sight
> To me did seem apparelled in celestial light
> The glory and the freshness of a dream. »

And Wordsworth adds a little sadly—« It is not now as it hath been of yore. » Now does it follow from this coincidence that Beethoven is not superior to jazz or that the beauties now revealed are illusory. The common sense view is that the greatness and superiority of Beethoven already existed as objective fact and that the boy has simply become aware of what was already there. Intellectual curiosity and power usually receive a tremendous reinforcement at adolescence. Is science or philosophy thereby an illusion? In fact, one may say that adolescence witnesses the complete awakening of the personality on all sides as a preparation for full maturity. The adolescent may very well then be increasingly receptive of a wide range of objects of which he has been hitherto unaware, and not merely the victim of increasing illusion. Our whole argument has supported this view by showing how the human mind has

become increasingly conscious of itself in interaction with the environment and has discovered in the latter the workings of a mind superior to but akin to its own. As we have seen, the "self" cannot be torn from its context and regarded in isolation. The adolescent is already in a world which has partly influenced and moulded him and of which he already has a certain knowledge. Adolescence may be more the opening of the eyes to the nature of the "real" world than a plunge into illusion. At least we have no right to regard it as the latter without argument.

Let us relate the Freudian analysis more closely to the specific religious experience. We shall do this by first summarizing the extremely acute and profound discussion of Max Scheler in his book—Nature et Forme de la sympathie (French translation, 1928). Scheler claims the existence of what he calls "holy love" (l'amour sacré). It is, he admits, more rare than intellectual genius and cannot be produced by any special education. Its rarity is no argument against its existence, for the objective existence of a value does not depend upon the possible degree of its diffusion, upon the ease with which it can be communicated to other spirits, in short upon its generality, nor even upon the degree of its intelligibility, its accessibility to the human understanding which is exclusively preoccupied with material ends.

What then is holy love? It is seen in those men who suffer pain and death voluntarily and joyously. These men do not cease to regard life as a good of great value (otherwise it would be no sacrifice—the man who, disillusioned with life, commits suicide, is not usually regarded as making a noble sacrifice, since what he gives up has ceased to have any value for him: the death of Socrates on the other hand is regarded by many as exhibiting the highest value in the form of sacrifice for intellectual integrity) but they love something else, even more than life. We see men accept poverty like the Buddha and St. Francis, not as an evil, as a deprivation of vital values, but freely as a radiant lover or fiancée. The Freudian school, what Scheler calls the naturalistic school, attempts to explain this phenomenon as follows:—

(*a*) As a perversion of normal and sane vital impulses.

(*b*) As an orientation of sentiments and tendencies charac-

terized by hostility to life.

(*c*) As an internal sympton of the decadence of one's vital powers.

(*d*) As an expression of resentment.

If we take the case of St. Francis of Assisi, it is said that because he was incapable of administering his fortune and of meeting the exactions of his father, he finally became convinced of his impotence and declared that he preferred to remain absolutely poor in order to escape all worry and responsability. Another explanation is that St. Francis' holy love is only the illusory sublimation of the libido, resolving itself into the love of God, into universal love, into humble love to all his creatures. The very language he uses, say the critics, the fact that he calls poverty his lover and fiancée and declares himself to be God's troubadour, all this shows that we have to do with the all-powerful influence of the libido. But, as Scheler pertinently remarks, does it follow that because a man is incapable of administering his estate, he thereby becomes automatically a lover of God and of the whole universe, and full of kindness for all that lives. Many prodigal debauched men are incapable of administering their estates without by that fact becoming servants of God and their neighbour. What also is the point of resemblance between the man who accepts poverty out of resentment because he lacks the ability to acquire riches, and the young man of the Gospel whom Francis wished to follow by a more literal obedience. Francis was not born poor and can therefore hardly be credited with a proletarian resentment of the rich which he tried to cover with the pious sanctifications of the religious life. Francis loves poverty, not because of its positive value but because of the free spiritual act by which he renounces worldly riches for a wealth of a higher value.

The word "sublimation" has equally been used to evade the real issue. Men, who have an ardent love for things spiritual, have frequently had recourse to images, analogies, and comparisons drawn from the sphere of sensual love. Ah, says the critic, that is merely sexual desire veiled, masked or cleverly sublimated. But the real question is—Why has this desire undergone this particular sublimation? Why are not all the sexually frustrated in the world pioneers in the spiritual life,

animated by a lofty love for God and their fellows, instead of the neurotics they often are? Evidently the question is not solved by a facile use of the word sublimation. This whole attempt therefore to explain religion with reference to its sexual origins is vitiated by this fundamental defect. « The attitude of the naturalistic theory is such that it is prevented from seeing that in the course of development, of the unfolding of life, there can appear new and deeper phases of being which bring to view a host of objects and values previously unsuspected or reveal quite new qualities of certain objects and values. » (49). The Christian who believes that God has created him, including his libido, will have no difficulty in thinking that God may use this vital force as a means of revealing to men higher values, but he will equally insist that the facts of the spiritual life cannot be explained simply by their physical or even psychical origins. The attempt to do this leads to an impasse, if not to nonsense, as Scheler has shown.

(b) *The Sociological criticism.*

This line of argument maintains that the religious life can be accounted for completely and adequately by reference to the whole nexus of social forces as open to human observation. The worshipper of God is bowing down before humanity as an abstraction, whether in its present imperfect state or in its imagined perfection. It is important to notice however that a man like Feuerbach believed himself to be fulfilling, not destroying the essence of Christianity. He regarded his work as a « traduction fidèle de la religion chrétienne, de la langue orientale et imagée de la fantaisie en bonne et intelligible langue moderne, rien qu'une traduction mot à mot, une solution de l'énigme du Christianisme » (50). It should equally be noted that the religious man himself does not believe the sociological explanation, since for him the religious "object" is always transcendent to society. This is as true of the lower forms of religious life as of the Christian saint. In every case and by a kind of irresistible logic, the religious man's acceptance of the above explanation means the withering away of his religious

(49) Scheler, Nature et Forme de la Sympathie, French trans., 2nd. edition, 1928, p. 267.

(50) V. Bréhier, Tome 2, Fascicule 3, p. 789.

life. Even an idealized humanity is no substitute for the living God.

« Amid all the sickly talk about "ideals" which has become the common-place of our age, it is well to remember that, so long as they are a mere self-painting of the yearning spirit, they have no more solidity or steadiness than floating air-bubbles, gay in the sunshine and broken by the passing wind... The very gate of entrance to religion is the discovery that your gleaming ideal is the everlasting Real, no transient brush of a fancied angel's wing, but the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul of souls: short of this there is no "object" given you. » (51). These words of Martineau have lost none of their force with the passage of time. In other words, the sociological theory destroys in practice the fact it has claimed to explain. For those who are already convinced believers in this theory, this is only one more proof of the illusory nature of religion but others may see in it a conclusive proof of the inadequacy and indeed self-contradiction of this same theory. Furthermore the sociologist leaves us with an irrational surd, an inexplicable somewhat, a brute fact in the form of the human race. There is the earth and upon it self-conscious personalities constituting human society. The sociological theory refuses to treat the vital question as to why such a society of beings should have emerged from the natural process at all and who or what could have brought it into being. That men should have the conception of an ideal society that they can worship is in itself a miracle, since present human society is so obviously imperfect. Completely unintelligible too is the fact that men should have the notion of a perfect Being in control of the whole process. How this could have come to them from society as at present constituted is a little difficult to see. Whence then come man's ideals? Even more puzzled must the sociologist be when he comes face to face with the empiric fact of Jesus and the spiritual society that derives from Him. To put it crudely, that Jesus should have emerged from the only too obviously imperfect society of the ancient world, for this there is no explanation on this theory. The sociologist may claim that it is not his

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(51) Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God, p. 53, citation from Martineau, Study of Religion, vol. 1, p. 13.

business to offer such explanations. That may be so, but when he ventures beyond the limits of his speciality to explain away such a widespread and persistent fact as the religious consciousness, he is putting forward a metaphysic and is therefore open to attack. If our previous argument has been sound, the sociological explanation must of necessity be regarded as untrue, whilst we can still value the suggestiveness and truth of much of its detailed description of the actual social aspects of religion in its historical manifestations.

Let us now try to summarize briefly the course of our argument and to estimate the results. The attempt has been made to justify certain fundamental assumptions:—

(*a*) The first is that the religious experience of the human race supplies us with certain data of a specific kind which calls for explanation.

(*b*) The positive practice of religion everywhere includes the attempt to influence the "god" or "gods", the controllers of human destiny, by "anthropopathic" means. This has been claimed as an essential link between the different forms of the religious consciousness until its final consummation in the attribution to God of a personal life and Being whose character is expressed in and through persons. Science has been claimed as a witness to the mathematical nature of this transcendent Mind at work in the universe. Morality and the values it upholds demands in its turn the metaphysical and therefore ultimate significance of personality.

(*c*) A speculative philosophy, basing itself upon these different sets of evidence, has been defended as ligitimate and possible, whilst we have tried to avoid the mistake of transforming living religion into a lifeless metaphysical system without relevance to actual practice.

Hence we have these three guiding assumptions—the specificity of religious experience and its implication of a personal relationship with a personal Being or beings, the legitimacy of using the category of personality and the notion of intelligent purpose for metaphysical explanation, and the possibility of a speculative philosophy that is not mere myth-making. The existence of the Object of Christian worship is thus rationally guaranteed by a series of converging evidences. God is not open

to the senses and can therefore never be an "object" in the common-sense meaning of this word.

Yet we have not hesitated to admit that all our metaphysical speculation is, as it were a kind of diving-board from which we must plunge into the world of action. The religious life must be lived, otherwise its discussion is the merest futility. We have not shrunk too from admitting that the Christian goes beyond speculative philosophy in asserting the fact of the Incarnation in the person of Jesus Christ. That God should reveal Himself through human personality we have shown to be a rational possibility, indeed almost a certainty. That He has indeed done so to the extent of sending His only Son, that is the faith that leaves behind the wisdom of this world for the brighter illumination of a divine gift, a faith that is for those with eyes to see and ears to hear, a faith which is itself a gift. We see in these words of Emil Brunner the divine paradox of our faith—

« We possess God's presence in Christ in a refracted, concealed way; owing to the sinful reality of this world, the rays of His light reach us refracted by the murkiness of the atmosphere of this world. We perceive the God of mercy at the place of horror, at the Cross. Therefore even faith is a kind of possession in the midst of non-possession, certainty in uncertainty, comfort in despair, joyful confidence in repentance, the love of God in the fear of God, the immediacy of God in a wholly mediated manner, the Divine Word, the Word that is near, in the word of the Scriptures, in a book, in fellowship with other people in the church. Here also the Mediator and faith in Him are central; between that which is and that which shall be, forming both in His own image. For this very reason He is the Mediator, because He shares in both, because He has to point in both directions. He has a share in the sinful corrupted world and He has a share in the divine eternal world of perfection. He is the bridge between both. The Bridge however, is there to be crossed. »

It is our conviction that God has not called us to cross this bridge by imposing upon ourselves an intellectual blindness dishonouring to Him who made us. The mental and spiritual travail of the human race has also been His work and His inspiration. Certainly, this bridge is not to be traversed in pride,

whether of an intellectual or any other kind. Yet we may none the less cross it with the humble confidence that He who calls us to Himself through Jesus Christ is the same God who created us and our distant forbears and who has guided this human drama of ours from the remoteness of distant times to the glorious shame and victory of the Cross, leaving us now to live in the assured hope of the day when all things shall have been subjected unto Christ and He unto the Father, so that "God may be all in all".

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